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Voorwoord  
Dit boek markeert het einde van een lang traject. Het was niet de meest gebruikelijke 
weg. Maar toen ik een paar jaar geleden voor de keuze werd gesteld: stoppen of doorgaan 
met het proefschrift, heb ik bewust voor het laatste gekozen. Dat het proefschrift nu, na 
zoveel jaren, dan toch eindelijk af is geeft mij bijzonder veel voldoening. Terugblikkend 
kan ik constateren dat de weg naar voltooiing van het proefschrift evenzeer de moeite 
waard was als het bereiken van het uiteindelijke doel. Ik heb onderweg veel geleerd, niet 
alleen wat betreft het doen van wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Dit alles maakt dat ik mij 
bijzonder gelukkig prijs met dit boekje. Het citaat op de pagina hiernaast drukt dit gevoel 
– voor mij – op treffende wijze uit.  
Op dit punt beland, wil ik graag iedereen bedanken die dit traject op de een of andere 
manier samen met mij heeft afgelegd of heeft bijgedragen aan de voltooiing van het 
proefschrift. De ruimte hier is te beperkt om iedereen persoonlijk te bedanken, maar een 
ieder die een exemplaar van dit boek heeft ontvangen is op zijn/haar eigen wijze 
belangrijk geweest bij de totstandkoming ervan. Een aantal mensen verdient echter een 
speciale vermelding.  
In de eerste plaats Henri de Groot. Beste Henri, ik ben jou ontzettend veel dank 
verschuldigd. Na het debacle met het oude manuscript ben ik, enigszins per toeval, bij 
jou terecht gekomen. Dat bleek een schot in de roos! Jij hebt het aangedurfd om de zaak 
opnieuw op te pakken. In eerste instantie hebben we gekeken of we voort konden 
bouwen op het oude onderzoek. Maar na verloop van tijd zijn we een geheel nieuwe 
richting ingeslagen. We zijn dus feitelijk helemaal opnieuw begonnen. Regelmatig ben 
ik, na overleg, jouw kamer uitgelopen met het gevoel van de spreekwoordelijke bel en de 
klepel. Maar deze “huh?”-momenten werden na verloop van tijd stelselmatig gevolgd 
door een “aha-erlebnis”. Ik kreeg als het ware een abstracte schets van waar ik naartoe 
moest, het was vervolgens aan mij om uit te zoeken hoe daar te komen. Ik heb die manier 
van werken als heel stimulerend en prettig ervaren. Daarnaast ben je iemand die oog 
heeft voor een ander. Om een voorbeeld te geven: ik was verbaasd hoe goed je – zonder 
dat ik daar ook maar iets van heb gezegd – de spanning die toch weer even de kop opstak 
toen het proefschrift bij de commissie lag en de opluchting toen de goedkeuring daar 
was, hebt aangevoeld én dat ook verwoordt. Dat siert je als mens. Ik ben daarom blij dat 
we onze samenwerking kunnen voortzetten door mijn aanstelling als post-doc aan de VU. 
In de tweede plaats ook heel veel dank aan Eelke de Jong. Beste Eelke, na een eerste, 
grove afbakening van het nieuwe onderwerp ben jij als promotor in het project gestapt. 
Met zijn drieën hebben we vervolgens de details van het project ingevuld. Daarna ben ik 
aan de slag gegaan met het onderzoek. Ik ben blij dat ik de volgende promovendus ben 
die onder jouw begeleiding met succes een promotie afrondt. Daarnaast wil ik je graag 
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bedanken voor de tijdelijke aanstellingen als docent aan de Radboud Universiteit 
Nijmegen. Deze hebben bijgedragen aan het financieren van deze hele onderneming.  
Graag wil ik ook de leden van de manuscriptcommissie, Ruerd Ruben, Piet Rietveld 
en Ton van Schaik, bedanken voor hun bereidheid het manuscript te beoordelen en 
vooral de snelheid waarmee dat gebeurd is. Piet Rietveld wil ik als van hoofd van de 
afdeling Ruimtelijke Economie aan de VU bovendien bedanken voor de 
gastvrijheidsverklaringen. Hierdoor kon ik gebruik maken van de computervoorzieningen 
van de VU en had ik tevens een (vaste) werkplek. 
Bijzondere dank ben ik ook verschuldigd aan Gert-Jan Linders en Ben Pelzer. Gert-
Jan, jij hebt me in het begin wegwijs gemaakt in programma’s als Access en STATA. 
Het feit dat ik op bestaande syntaxen kon voortborduren heeft mij veel tijd bespaard. 
Hoofdstuk 6 van dit proefschrift is het tastbare resultaat van onze samenwerking. 
Daarnaast heb je als kamergenoot altijd heel geduldig vele vragen beantwoord. En er was 
(en nu nog steeds) ook altijd tijd voor een gezellig praatje. Ben, wij hebben – alles bij 
elkaar opgeteld – vele uren aan de telefoon gehangen om de geheimen van multilevel 
analyse (hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift) te ontrafelen. Of het onze Limburgse 
achtergrond is weet ik niet, maar dit alles gebeurde altijd op een bijzonder relaxte manier.  
Vera en Rosalinde, lieve paranimfen. Ik heb niet lang hoeven nadenken wie ik zou 
vragen als paranimf. Jullie zijn beiden zelf gepromoveerd. En jullie hebben altijd 
enthousiast meegeleefd. Vera, jij was er zelfs al bij in Maastricht! Het geeft mij veel 
vertrouwen jullie bij de verdediging aan mijn zijde te weten.  
Dan een speciaal woordje voor mijn vrienden uit Amsterdam. Jullie hebben 
gedurende de periode van de promotie gezorgd voor vele momenten van ontspanning 
(onder het motto: “je moet ontspannen om te kunnen inspannen!”). Met sommige van 
jullie heb ik soms over het onderzoek gesproken. Het was fijn om dat te delen en ook om 
te testen of ik de boodschap in simpele bewoordingen aan jullie kon overbrengen. Met 
anderen heb ik vrijwel nooit over de inhoud gesproken en ook dat is prima. Het 
bijzondere van onze vriendenkring is dat het niet uitmaakt wat iedereen doet. Het gaat 
om de persoon, en ieder van ons heeft een eigen, bijzonder verhaal. Wat we wel delen is 
de kunst om van het leven te genieten, met volle teugen (letterlijk). Jullie zijn een mooi 
stel: cheers! 
Dank ook aan ooms en tantes, neven en nichten, die over de jaren heen hebben 
meegeleefd en regelmatig hebben geïnformeerd naar mij en de stand van zaken rondom 
het proefschrift. Ik waardeer dat enorm.  
Strings, a special word of thanks to you for the wonderful job you did in designing 
the cover. I think you are a great designer and you’re a dear friend. I am looking forward 
to many more of your classic one-liners in the future! 
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Het laatste woord tenslotte is voor hen die de meeste dank verdienen. Ik draag dit 
boek op aan mijn ouders. Lieve pap en mam, het heeft even geduurd en ik denk dat er 
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Introduction and Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
In The world is flat, Thomas Friedman warns us for the consequences of globalisation in 
the 21st century.1 Because of much improved communication technologies, distance has 
become less important. As a result, our jobs are increasingly contested by far-away 
workers in China and India. The book is a huge success and was on the New York Times 
bestseller list for a long time.  
 Friedman addresses one of the key issues in (international) economics: what happens 
to the location of economic activity (who, where, what) when borders between countries 
disappear. Friedman’s ominous take on the effects of globalisation is not shared by 
everybody, though.2 According to the new economic geography (NEG), economic 
activity clusters in certain countries or regions (e.g., Fujita et al., 1999, Brakman et al., 
2001). The reason is that, on the one hand, the location of activity in one or only a hand 
full locations, yields economies of scale. In addition, clustering yields benefits due to 
agglomeration. In a review of The world is flat, Leamer (2007) argues that relationships 
                                                          
1 The book is mainly written from the perspective of the U.S., but the message can easily be extended to all of 
North America, Europe and Australia. 
2 See Leamer (2007) for a review of The world is flat. Below, we only summarise the gist of Leamer’s 
comments on Friedman’s economic analysis.  
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rather than “markets” are the key in economic exchanges.3 Most exchanges involve 
various degrees of organisation, contact (including face-to-face) and communication 
between buyers and sellers, and trust (cf. Williamson, 1975, on markets versus 
hierarchies). Relationships are to large extent a ‘local’ affair, whether physical, cultural 
or informational. Thus, the contestability of our labour markets is limited by ‘geography’. 
As Leamer (2007, p. 92) puts it, “far-away, low-skilled workers [are] an unlikely 
alternative to nearby folks whom we have come to know and trust.” The message of the 
NEG is that the impact of globalisation on the location of economic activity depends on 
the advantages of agglomeration relative to the benefits of moving to the periphery. The 
impact of globalisation will be limited if the advantages of agglomeration are large. 
Globalisation may even promote the clustering of economic activity if the costs of 
trading with the periphery decline (lower transport costs or lower trade barriers) relative 
to the benefits of agglomeration. If, on the other hand, agglomeration externalities are 
small, globalisation can have huge effects (Brakman et al., 2005). The NEG version of 
Friedman’s rather ominous story about the consequences of globalisation in the 21st 
century is: it depends. 
 One important element has not yet been addressed in the discussion above: mobility 
of firms and production factors. This brings us to the role of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). MNEs are key players in the global economy. Recent empirical facts by 
McCann (2008) illustrate the economic significance of multinational activity. 
Multinationals account for 10% of global GDP and 12.5% of global gross fixed capital 
formation. Multinational affiliate sales are 2.25 times the size of global exports. 
Multinational affiliate employment is 73 million (equivalent to 3% of global workforce). 
Finally, multinationals account for over half of global R&D and two thirds of private 
sector R&D.4 Table 1.1 presents statistics on the growth in different indicators of 
multinational activity in the last two decades. The data are from UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report (WIR) 2007. The table indicates that MNE activity in the form of FDI 
has grown rapidly in the last two decades. The growth of FDI stocks and flows has 
exceeded the expansion of GDP, capital stocks and trade.5 
                                                          
3 “Countless faceless buyers meet countless faceless sellers, and carry out exactly the same transaction. … The 
exchange is completely impersonal.” (Leamer, 2006, p. 99). 
4 Multinational activity is concentrated in a limited number of very large firms. For instance, 500 multinationals 
account for 90% of ($1.4 billion per annum) foreign direct investment (FDI) and 50% of global trade; 100 
multinationals account for 10% foreign assets of multinational enterprises, 17% foreign sales, and 13% of total 
foreign employment. 
5 Global FDI flows fell sharply in 2001 and 2002 but growth resumed in 2003 (WIR 2003 and 2004). 
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Table 1.1. Selected indicators of multinational activity, 1986–2006 
 Average annual growth rate (per cent) 
 1986–1990 1991–1995 1996–2000 2006 
FDI inflows 21.7 22.0 40.0 38.1 
FDI outflows 24.6 17.3 36.4 45.2 
Inward FDI stock 16.9 9.4 17.4 19.4 
Outward FDI stock 17.7 10.6 17.3 17.9 
Sales of foreign affiliates 19.3 8.8 8.4 17.7 
Exports of foreign affiliates 21.7 8.5 3.3 12.2 
Employment of foreign affiliates 
(in thousands) 
5.3 5.5 11.5 13.9 
     
Comparison Average annual growth rate (per cent) 
GDP (in current prices) 9.4 5.9 1.3 8.6 
Gross fixed capital formation 11.5 5.5 1.0 13.1 
Exports of goods and non-factor 
services 
13.9 8.4 3.7 12.2 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2007. 
 
 
 What is the impact of FDI on the distribution of economic activity across space? 
Empirical evidence (see, e.g., Brakman et al., 2001) reveals a strong clustering of activity 
across space.6 What is the role of FDI in this? Does FDI lead to even more clustering of 
economic activity in important centres, thus increasing the gaps between countries? Or 
does it promote a more even spread of economic activities globally? These are interesting 
(from the perspective of the economic researcher) and important (from the perspective of 
society) research questions. These questions provide the background for this study. These 
questions demand that we understand what fundamental factors drive FDI location. That 
is the purpose of the present study. 
 
1.2. Stylised facts 
It is commonly understood that FDI arises from the possession by MNEs of firm-specific 
assets such as particular types of technology or organisational skills (cf. Dunning, 1980, 
1988, 2001). These assets give the firm a competitive advantage in supplying any 
particular market or set of markets. Due to market failure connected with the assets (high 
                                                          
6 The world is actually far from flat: the economic landscape has many hills and many valleys. See Nordhaus’ 
spinning globe for a graphical representation, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/homepage.htm. 
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transaction costs and/or difficulties to (fully) appropriate rents), it is in the best interest of 
the firm to exploit the assets internally (i.e. within the boundaries of the firm) rather than 
to sell these or the right of use to some foreign-based enterprise. This entails setting up 
foreign production subsidiaries.  
 Besides internal motives, FDI is motivated by characteristics of host countries. The 
firm must have a reason to locate production abroad. The sources of location advantage 
are mixed. We can distinguish between market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI. In 
the case of market-seeking FDI, or horizontal FDI, the main motive is to access markets 
and to avoid transport costs and trade barriers. In the case of efficiency-seeking, or 
vertical, FDI, the main motive is to exploit factor-cost differences. In the description so 
far, FDI is primarily a means to exploit assets. However, FDI can also be asset-seeking. 
MNEs are increasingly looking across national borders to create or gain access to assets 
which complement their existing core competencies.7 This is pertinent particularly in the 
sourcing of technological assets (Dunning, 2001). Asset-seeking FDI is attracted by 
rather different factors than asset-exploiting FDI (to which horizontal and vertical FDI 
belong). The former is attracted by human capital or (high-quality) innovation systems, 
factors that are rather similar to the characteristics in the home country that gave rise to 
the MNE in the first place. This study examines what characteristics make countries 
attractive locations for FDI. 
 Table 1.2 presents data on inward and outward FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP.8 
The table illustrates the size of investments from and into countries. The table first of all 
shows that the share of world inward and outward stock in GDP has increased steadily 
since 1980, as already suggested by the data on growth rates in Table 1.1. Second, Table 
1.2 bears out stylised facts noted also by Markusen (2002). First, developed countries are 
net investors, while developing countries are net recipients of FDI.9 Second, during the 
1980s and 1990s, the least developed countries have inward FDI stocks that are smaller 
than the inward FDI stocks of developing countries as a whole. Most significant, these 
stocks are also below the world average. In other words, the least developed countries 
attracted little FDI. It is not until the year 2000 that inward FDI in the least developed 
countries catches up to the world average. However, looking at the inward and outward 
FDI stocks of countries as a percentage of their GDP hides a third important stylised fact 
concerning the distribution of FDI. 
 
 
                                                          
7 This is reflected in the increasing importance of mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances since the 
second half of the 1990s (Dunning, 2001). 
8 The stylised facts below are an update of Section 1.3 in Markusen (2002). Those who have read Markusen’s 
book will be familiar with the stylised facts presented below.  
9 Outward stocks in South, East and South-East Asia have increased substantially in the late 1990s. Still, they 
remain (well) below the world average to date. 
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Table 1.2. FDI stock as a percentage of GDP  
 1980  1985 1990  1995 2000 2003  
World        
- inward 6.6 8.3 9.3 10.2 19.3 22.9 
- outward 5.8 6.6 8.6 10.0 19.1 23.0 
Developed countries       
- inward 4.9 6.2 8.2 8.9 16.6 20.7 
- outward 6.2 7.3 9.6 11.3 21.4 26.4 
Developing countries       
- inward 12.4 16.3 14.7 16.3 29.3 31.4 
- outward 3.6 3.6 3.8 5.7 12.4 12.2 
      Least developed countriesa    
- inward 4.0 4.9 5.5 9.3 19.1 24.5 
- outward 0.6 2.6 1.1 2.1 2.9 2.7 
      Africa    
- inward 8.2 9.8 10.9 15.4 24.6 25.3 
- outward 2.2 4.1 5.3 7.3 8.6 6.6 
      Latin America and the Caribbean    
- inward 6.5 11.0 10.4 11.7 25.6 36.8 
- outward 6.5 7.7 5.5 5.2 7.9 10.7 
      South, East and South-East Asia    
- inward 27.4 24.6 20.8 20.8 36.6 34.6 
- outward 1.0 1.0 2.6 6.7 18.1 15.9 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2004. 
a  UN definition.      
 
 
 Table 1.3 gives the distribution of total world FDI stock in the period 1980–2006 by 
(groups of) source and destination country. The data are again from the WIR 2007. The 
first column of Table 1.3 indicates that developed economies account for the bulk of total 
outward FDI: the share amounts to almost 90 per cent of total outward FDI stock in the 
period 1980–2006. In other words, the developed countries are the major source of 
outward FDI. Within the group of developed economies, the OECD countries are the 
main investors. South, East and South-East Asia, the second largest source of outward 
FDI, accounts for only 7 per cent of total outward FDI. At the same time, Table 1.3 
indicates that developed countries, and notably the OECD, are also the main recipients of 
FDI.10 The share of the developed countries in inward FDI is lower than in the case of 
outward FDI, but they nevertheless account for over 70 per cent of total inward FDI.  
 
                                                          
10 FDI is largely ‘regional’ as well: over 70 per cent of sales of the top 500 MNEs are within the same region, 
e.g., EU, NAFTA, ASEAN (McCann, 2008). 
6     Introduction                   
Table 1.3. Pattern of world FDI stock in 1980–2006 (percentage share in total) 
 Outward Inward 
Developed economies 88 72 
- OECD 85 70 
South, East and South-East 
Asia 
7 14 
- East Asiaa 6 9 
- South-East Asiab 1 4 
- South Asiac  0 1 
South and Central America 2 7 
Africa 1 3 
South-East Europe and the 
CIS (Transition economies) 
1 2 
a Including, China, Hong Kong, Korea. 
b Including, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. 
c Including, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka. 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2007. 
 
 
Table 1.4 gives the distribution of inward and outward FDI stock across countries in 
selected years. The table shows that the role of East Asia as a source and recipient of FDI 
has increased since 1995, led in particular by China (including Hong Kong). 
Nevertheless, the predominance of developed economies as the main source and 
destination of FDI is rather persistent over time. The predominance of developed 
economies as the main source and destination of FDI implies that FDI flows foremost 
between developed countries. Data on bilateral FDI of the OECD in the period 1982–
1992 confirm this: 87 per cent of outward FDI stock is with other OECD-countries.11 
Summing up the statistics presented above we arrive at the following stylised facts: 
1. Developed countries are the main recipients of FDI. The least developed 
countries attract relatively little FDI (at least during the 1980s and 1990s); 
2. Developed economies are not only the main recipients but also the main source 
of FDI.  
3. FDI is foremost between developed, high-income countries. This stylised fact 
follows logically from the first two.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 These data will be described in more detail in Chapter 3.  
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Table 1.4. Pattern of world FDI stock in selected years (share in total) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 
Developed economies      
  Outward 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.86 
  Inward  0.75 0.72 0.79 0.75 0.69 0.70 
- OECD       
  Outward 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.88 0.85 0.82 
  Inward  0.75 0.74 0.80 0.75 0.69 0.64 
East Asia a       
  Outward 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 
  Inward  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.10 
South-East Asia b      
  Outward 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  Inward  0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 
South Asia c      
  Outward 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Inward  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
South and Central America      
  Outward 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  Inward  0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Africa       
  Outward 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
  Inward  0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
South-East Europe and the CIS (Transition economies)    
  Outward 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
  Inward  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
a Including, China, Hong Kong, Korea. 
b Including, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. 
c Including, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka. 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2007. 
 
1.3. Aim and structure of the study 
The aim of this study is to explain the distinct pattern of world-wide FDI presented by 
the stylised facts in the previous section. Why do some countries attract large amounts of 
FDI, whilst others attract only small amounts? What are the fundamental factors that 
drive FDI? We introduce the following overall research question to serve as a guideline 
for the analysis: what are the sources of attraction for FDI?  
 Figure 1.1 provides a graphical outline of the study. Overall, the study is made up of 
three parts that are interlinked in the following manner. Part I consists of Chapters 2 and 
3. Chapter 2 serves as a first introductory empirical analysis in the investigation into the 
sources of attraction for FDI using data on FDI inflows. The analysis is not based on an 
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explicit theoretical framework. The latter is given in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 presents 
general equilibrium models of bilateral FDI. Chapter 3 subsequently motivates and 
describes the approach in Part II. Part II contains our empirical analysis of bilateral FDI. 
Part II consists of Chapters 4–6. Part III concludes, considers implications for policy and 
suggests areas for further research. 
 The chapters are organised as follows. Chapter 2 empirically investigates the stylised 
fact that developed countries attract the bulk of FDI whilst the least developed countries 
attract only a little. What factors can explain this marked pattern in world-wide FDI? The 
chapter investigates the importance of human capital, inflation, institutional quality and 
geographic characteristics in attracting FDI inflows by host countries. These factors are 
regarded important determinants of economic development in the literature on economic 
growth. To what extent do they explain the variation in FDI inflows across host 
countries? The main contribution of Chapter 2 is its additional investigation of the role of 
human capital in attracting FDI. In the new growth theory, human capital is considered to 
be important with respect to technological progress. In view of that, we investigate 
whether human capital is more conducive to attracting FDI in technology-intensive 
sectors than total FDI. We also investigate whether attracting FDI in technology-
intensive sectors requires a particular type of skills, namely technical as opposed to 
managerial skills. For this purpose, we use new indicators of human capital. We look at 
enrolment in science; enrolment in engineering, manufacturing and construction; and 
enrolment in social sciences, business and law. 
 Chapter 3 first of all presents two main theoretical models of bilateral FDI, i.e., the 
knowledge-capital model by James Markusen and co-authors (Markusen et al., 1996, 
Markusen, 1997 and 2002) and the proximity-concentration trade-off hypothesis by Lael 
Brainard (Brainard, 1997). The presentation of the models is followed by a critical 
review of the two models and the empirical work related to them. Subsequently, Chapter 
3 presents the extensions and contributions to the existing literature of the present study 
and gives an outline of the empirical analysis in Part II. Chapter 3 also introduces the 
gravity model. The gravity model is the most commonly used model in the empirical 
literature to explain variation in trade or investments between countries. Furthermore, the 
chapter discusses lessons from the empirical literature on the importance of culture and 
institutions as intangible barriers to trade and investment. 
 One of the contributions in Part II pertains to the data. We use data on bilateral FDI of 
the OECD. The advantage of the OECD data is that it substantially increases the number 
of observations on bilateral FDI compared to using data that are bilateral with the U.S. 
only. Key contributions in the previous empirical literature on bilateral FDI reviewed in 
Chapter 3 use data that are bilateral with the U.S. only. These studies use data on affiliate 
sales. Detailed data on the activities of foreign affiliates is available for the U.S., but is 
often sparse or unavailable for other countries. This entails an increase in the number of 
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Figure 1.1. Structure of the study 
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observations on bilateral FDI by two-thirds compared to using data that are bilateral with 
the U.S. only.  
 Chapter 4 is largely methodological in nature. An issue in the data used in Part II is 
dependence. The data is a panel data set for multiple parent and host countries. There are 
several repeated observations: for parents over all host countries, for host countries over 
all parents, for parent and host countries over time, and for specific parent-host 
combinations. This study uses multilevel techniques to account for clustering of 
observations of FDI within parent and host countries and parent-host combinations. 
Chapter 4 explains the multilevel approach and illustrates the approach by fitting a 
multilevel version of the knowledge-capital model to the bilateral FDI data of the OECD. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, multilevel estimation is used as an additional robustness analysis to 
take account of clustering.12   
 In Chapter 5 we empirically examine the specification of the knowledge-capital 
model. The distinctive feature of the knowledge-capital model is that, within aggregate 
FDI, it distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI. To capture the distinction 
between horizontal and vertical FDI, the empirical specification imposes a particular 
structure on the data. In Chapter 5 we test the robustness of the empirical specification of 
the knowledge-capital model for the OECD data. Are the linear constraints imposed in 
the empirical specification supported by the data? And how appropriate is the linear form 
of the model? In the second part of the chapter we estimate a gravity model of bilateral 
FDI. With respect to skilled labour we distinguish measures of human capital and skilled-
labour abundance.  
 Chapter 6 investigates empirically the effect of different dimensions of distance on 
the choice between export and FDI as alternative modes of serving foreign markets. 
Conventional proximity-concentration theory suggests that FDI substitutes for trade if 
distance between countries is large, while exports become more important if scale 
economies in production are large. Chapter 6 extends the framework for analysing the 
trade-off between exports and FDI empirically. Our approach explicitly takes into 
account intangible barriers related to cultural and institutional differences. Unlike the 
mechanisms described by the proximity-concentration trade-off, these ‘intangible’ 
barriers can affect the costs related to FDI as well as trade. We estimate gravity equations 
for total foreign sales (sum of exports and sales related to FDI) and the share of FDI-sales 
in total sales. For this purpose we derive a proxy variable for FDI-related sales in the 
foreign market by using capital-output ratios.  
 Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings from this study and links the conclusions 
from this study back to the question posed at beginning of this section, i.e., regarding the 
sources of attraction for FDI. We also present policy implications and suggest areas for 
further research. 
                                                          
12 This is indicated by the arrows on the right-hand side of Figure 1.1. 
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2.1. Introduction 
The stylised facts presented in Chapter 1 indicate a distinct pattern of FDI at the macro-
level: developed countries are the main source of FDI but also the main recipients; least 
developed countries attract only little FDI. What factors explain this marked distribution 
of FDI inflows across host countries? Why do developed countries attract the bulk of FDI 
whilst the least developed countries attract so little? This chapter investigates FDI 
inflows, regardless of where they come from. With this, we relate to an extensive, but in 
general somewhat earlier, literature on cross-country FDI regressions (see, e.g., 
Chakrabarti, 2001, for a survey of the most cited studies).13 The chapter serves as a first 
introductory empirical analysis in the investigation into the sources of attraction for FDI. 
In this chapter we examine the importance of a number of factors that are important 
determinants of economic development in the empirical growth literature (e.g., Barro, 
1997 and 2000): human capital, inflation, institutional quality and geographic 
                                                          
13 Most recent empirical studies on FDI use bilateral FDI data (see, e.g., Blonigen, 2005, for a survey). Yet, 
bilateral FDI data have been available only fairly recently. In Part II of this study we use bilateral FDI data.  
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characteristics. To what extent do these factors explain the variation in FDI inflows 
across host countries?   
 The main contribution of this chapter is its additional investigation of the role of 
human capital in attracting FDI. In the new growth theory, human capital is considered to 
be important with respect to technological progress (e.g., Nelson and Phelps, 1966, 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Ch. 8). In view of that, we 
investigate whether human capital is more conducive to attracting FDI in technology-
intensive sectors than total FDI. Furthermore, we investigate whether attracting FDI in 
technology-intensive sectors requires a particular type of skills, namely technical as 
opposed to managerial skills. For this purpose, we use new indicators of human capital. 
We look at: enrolment in science; enrolment in engineering, manufacturing and 
construction; and enrolment in social sciences, business and law. 
 The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 motivates the selection of the 
explanatory variables. Section 2.3 presents the econometric framework. Section 2.4 
presents the results of the model estimations for total FDI. Section 2.5 looks at the effect 
of human capital on inflows of high-tech FDI. The importance of the type of skills in 
attracting high-tech FDI is investigated in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
2.2. Motivation of explanatory variables  
Human capital, inflation, institutional quality and geographic characteristics are 
commonly regarded as important determinants of economic development in the literature 
on economic growth. In this section, we build on the arguments in the growth literature 
and indicate why human capital, inflation, institutional quality and geographic 
characteristics may also be relevant for FDI. We emphasise that the selection of 
explanatory variables in the empirical analysis in this chapter is not tied back to a specific 
theoretical model of firm decision making.14 As mentioned above, we are interested to 
know what factors can account for the fact that developed countries attract more FDI. 
That is, what distinguishes developed countries from other countries? Our point of 
departure for this analysis, therefore, is the macro-perspective: what are important 
determinants of economic growth established by the literature? For the factors identified 
in this manner, we then assess whether they may also be relevant for FDI, in the sense 
that they represent an important condition for FDI or act as a barrier.  
 The theoretical underpinnings for the role of human capital in economic development 
are given by the ‘new growth’ models. Important contributions in this area have been 
made by Romer (1986, 1990), Grossman and Helpman (1989, 1991) and Aghion and 
Howitt (1990). In new growth models long-run growth is driven by endogenous 
                                                          
14 The latter is given in Chapter 3.  
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technological change.15 Technological progress is generated by investments in 
knowledge by forward-looking, profit-maximising, firms. These investments lead over 
time to new and better products and improved production methods. Human capital is 
important in new growth models because it is a key input in the production of new 
knowledge. An abundance of well-educated human resources also helps to facilitate the 
absorption of advanced technologies from developed countries (Barro and Lee, 2000). In 
the convergence literature, growth rates in less advanced countries are, in part, explained 
by a catch-up process in the level of technology. In a typical model of technology 
diffusion, backward countries achieve substantial technological progress and reduce the 
technology gap with leading countries by assimilating superior production techniques 
developed in the more advanced countries and by modernising obsolete plants and 
equipment accordingly. As a result, they will gradually catch up with technological 
leaders.  However, the convergence literature goes on to note that less advanced countries 
do not unequivocally catch up with advanced countries: in order to assimilate foreign 
technology, countries need absorption capacity.16 This means that the level of technology 
that a country is able to assimilate from elsewhere depends on the current level of 
knowledge in the country. One of the factors determining countries’ absorption capacity 
most commonly recognised in the convergence literature is human capital. In addition to 
the importance of human capital in economic development through technological 
progress (the new growth models), the level and distribution of educational attainment 
also has a strong impact on social outcomes, such as child mortality, fertility, education 
of children and income distribution (Barro and Lee, 2000). 
 Why would human capital be relevant for FDI? As described in Chapter 1, 
multinationals account for about two thirds of private sector R&D. Second, they produce, 
own and control most of the world’s advanced technology (e.g., Blomström and Kokko, 
2003). To the extent that multinationals acquire this technology from existing firms in 
other countries (through mergers and acquisition), they will invest predominantly in host 
countries with an abundance of human capital since these are the countries that generate 
this type of firms. To the extent that multinationals set up new plants in a host country, 
the latter needs sufficient human capital to adopt the advanced technology of the 
multinational.17  
 Besides such ‘positive’ growth determinants like human capital, the growth literature 
distinguishes a number of factors that represent risks and costs, and that accordingly may 
                                                          
15 A key feature in these models is the notion of knowledge as a partially public good (cf. Romer, 1986). There 
may be spill-overs from the original inventor to other firms because knowledge cannot be perfectly patented or 
kept secret. The creation of new knowledge by one firm is thus assumed to have a positive external effect on the 
production possibilities of other firms. 
16 Lankhuizen (2000) investigates the absorptive capacity of the Baltic States after their independence in the 
early 1990s. The paper investigates whether the Baltics have the capacity to become ‘Bal-techs’.  
17 Markusen (2002) assumes that branch plants of foreign multinationals are more skilled-labour intensive than 
the economy as a whole, especially in developing countries. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed analysis.  
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hamper economic growth. In a similar vein, the factors may also impose costs on or pose 
risks to FDI. Such factors are discussed in the next paragraphs.  
 A category of factors that is considered an important condition for economic growth 
is macroeconomic stability. Inflation has received considerable attention in the 
literature.18 Barro (2000) shows that inflation has a negative, direct effect on economic 
growth. Furthermore, the rate of inflation also has a significantly negative effect on the 
investment ratio. With respect to FDI, inflation represents the cost disadvantage from 
macroeconomic instability in the host country suffered by multinational firms. 
 The impact of institutions has received a lot of attention in the literature on economic 
growth and development (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999, Acemoglu et al., 2001, Rodrik et 
al., 2002).19 Institutions influence the uncertainty surrounding transactions and hence the 
costs associated with this. As a result, they are recognised as variables that affect 
productivity and economic growth. Institutions are relevant for FDI for much the same 
reason. The quality of institutions in a host country affects expropriation risks, securing 
of intellectual property rights, the degree of corruption, the enforceability of private 
contracts, and the security of investment in general. In this way, they affect the cost of 
doing business in a foreign market. The impact of institutions has received increasing 
attention in the literature on FDI. Some studies investigate the impact of corruption, 
finding a negative effect on FDI (Wei, 2000a). Others have included more 
comprehensive measures of institutional quality to capture investment barriers. For 
instance, Globerman and Shapiro (2003) confirm that institutional quality in the host 
country has a positive effect on inward investment.  
 Geography (location and climate) can affect the level of development through three 
channels (Gallup et al., 1999). Location has an impact on income levels and income 
growth through its effect on transport costs (e.g., Gallup et al., 1999, Mellinger et al., 
2000): coastal economies will generally have much lower transport costs than landlocked 
economies and countries near core economies will generally have lower transport costs 
than distant countries. These lower transport costs have a positive effect on income and 
income growth because (i) they lower the price of capital goods because some investment 
goods must be imported and/or (ii) they lower the price of importing intermediate inputs 
in export processing activities. In the words of Gallup et al. (1999): “almost all modern 
production depends on multistage processing of output, with inputs often produced in 
many specialized enterprises. The low-cost transport of such intermediate products is 
crucial, especially in developing countries, where many intermediate components are 
imported” (Gallup et al., 1999, p. 190). Second, climate affects income and income 
                                                          
18 Other macroeconomic factors with impact on growth that have received a lot of attention in the literature are 
fiscal policy, budget deficits and tax burdens. 
19 Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that institutions are important for less developed countries to benefit from 
development aid. Ederveen et al. (2002) perform a similar analysis for the European Structural Funds. They 
reach similar conclusions: on average the Structural Funds are ineffective. Yet, for countries with the ‘right’ 
institutions they are effective.  
2  Determinants of FDI Inflows      17 
 
growth through its effect on productivity (e.g., Gallup et al., 1999, Mellinger et al., 
2000): infectious diseases (like malaria) are heavily concentrated in tropical ecological 
zones. In the former two cases, geography has a direct effect on economic development. 
Third, geography can have an indirect effect on economic development through its 
influence on the choice of economic policies (e.g., Gallup et al., 1999)20 or on institutions 
(e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001, Wei, 2000b). Wei (2000b) shows that countries in 
unfavourable geographic circumstances (e.g. in terms of climate, inland waterways and 
distance to the coast) do not have the incentive to invest in good institutions in contrast to 
countries that are naturally more open. The case by Acemoglu et al. (2001) on the impact 
of geography on institutions is more indirect. They argue that lower mortality (related to 
the local disease environment) at the time of colonisation encouraged permanent 
settlements by European colonists and the subsequent implementation of European 
institutions. These early institutions have persisted over time. 
 
2.3. Data and method  
In order to investigate the importance of human capital, inflation, institutional quality and 
geographic characteristics in attracting FDI inflows by host countries, we use a simple 
model in which market size is the main control variable alongside the variables of 
interest. Market size, measured by GDP, is generally considered a key determinant of 
FDI (see, e.g., Chakrabarti, 2001, Markusen, 2002).21  
 The specification for our analysis looks as follows:  
 
0 1 2 3
4
log β β log β log β log
β ε
i i i i
i i
TotalFDI GDP HC Stability
Geographic
    
                        (2.1) 
 
The dependent variable TotalFDIi is the simple average of annual FDI inflows in current 
US$ over the period 1995–2004. Data were taken from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) Online of the International Monetary Fund. GDP was calculated as the 
simple average over the period 1995–2004. Data are from the World Development 
Indicators. The data are in current US$.  
 We use the indicator of labour-force quality constructed by Hanushek and Kim 
(1995) as a proxy for human capital (HC). In the empirical literature on economic growth 
and FDI, the measures of educational attainment from the Barro and Lee (1993 and 1996) 
                                                          
20 Gallup et al. (1999) estimate that coastal economies may be more likely to adopt open trade policies. 
21 Markusen distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI (see Chapter 3 for a detailed presentation of the 
so-called knowledge-capital model). Market size of the host economy has a positive effect on both types of 
FDI.  
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dataset on education are commonly used indicators of human capital. However, the Barro 
and Lee indicators merely measure the quantity (years) of schooling. They do not adjust 
for quality differences across countries. As observed by Hanushek and Kim, “few people 
would believe that a year of secondary schooling in the U.S. was equivalent to a year at 
the same grade level in Egypt” (Hanushek and Kim, 1995, p. 2). Hanushek and Kim have 
constructed a measure of schooling quality based on student cognitive performance on 
various international tests of academic achievement. The measure, henceforth denoted by 
QL, combines all the information on international mathematics and science tests 
available for countries from 1965 through 1991.22 Performance series are observed for 39 
countries, but Hanushek and Kim extend these quality measures to other countries by 
imputing missing values from international test score regressions.  
 Macroeconomic instability is proxied by inflation. Inflation is the average annual 
growth (in percentage) of the GDP deflator over the period 1995–2004. Data are from the 
World Development Indicators Online 2006. We use institutional quality as an indicator 
that equally reduces costs, but it is a more encompassing measure of stability of the 
macro environment than inflation. Data on institutional quality are from the database 
constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2005). Kaufmann et al. have constructed six indicators 
of perceived institutional quality. These indicators are: voice and accountability; political 
stability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption. 
Institutional quality is calculated by taking the simple average of the scores across all six 
indicators. Next, we took the average over the period 1996–2004.23   
 Lastly we include a number of geographic characteristics. We use two variables. The 
first variable is a dummy variable indicating whether countries are landlocked.24 This 
variable proxies physical transport costs. The second variable, climate, is the percentage 
of population living in temperate ecozones. Data are from Mellinger et al. (2000). 
 
High-tech FDI 
As explained in Section 2.2, in the new growth theory human capital is particularly 
important for technological progress. Sectors differ according to the possibilities for 
technological progress. The OECD Classification of High-Technology Products and 
Industries lists products (at the 5-digit level) according to R&D intensity (R&D 
expenditures/total sales). It considers aerospace, computers and office machinery, 
electronics, instruments, pharmaceuticals, electric machinery, chemicals, non-electrical 
                                                          
22 In order to be able to make comparisons of performance over time, performance series are benchmarked to 
the U.S. performance on the NAEP.  
23 The aspects of institutional quality are highly positively correlated. An investigation using Cronbach’s alpha 
suggests that all indicators reflect the same underlying characteristic and can be combined into a single measure 
(De Groot et al., 2004). 
24 Information was obtained from the CIA factbook (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook). 
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machinery and armament as product categories with high-tech products.25 Marasco 
(2005) finds that the stock of human capital is important for attracting high-tech FDI. 
 We are interested to see whether human capital (proxied by the Hanushek and Kim 
(1995) measure of schooling quality as before) is more important in high-tech FDI than 
total FDI. Using the OECD product classification as a point of reference, we investigate 
the importance of human capital for FDI inflows in ISIC Rev.3 sector 29 (machinery and 
equipment) and sector 30, 31, 32 (electrical and electronic equipment).26 The indicators 
are the simple average of annual FDI inflows in the period 1995–2004. Data are from the 
UNCTAD FDI/TNC database.  
 So far, we have used a proxy of human capital in general. Depending on the type of 
FDI, however, specific knowledge is required. So, a measure taking into account 
different types of human resources would be more appropriate. This study uses new 
indicators of human capital. We look at: enrolment in science; enrolment in engineering, 
manufacturing and construction; and enrolment in social sciences, business and law. This 
distinction enables us to examine whether technical skills are more important than, e.g., 
managerial skills in attracting high-tech FDI. The data are the average percentage (of 
total enrolment) of students in tertiary education (ISCED levels 5–6) enrolled in science, 
engineering, manufacturing and construction, and social sciences, business and law, 
respectively, in the period 1998–2004. Data were taken from the UNESCO Global 
Education Digest 2005 CD-Rom.27  
 The number of observations for high-tech FDI is quite small, limiting the degrees of 
freedom. Therefore, we initially estimate the following equations: 
  
0 1 2log β β log β log εi i i iFDIMachinery GDP HC                                            (2.2) 
 
 0 1 2log β β log β log εi i i iFDIElectrical GDP HC                             (2.3)
                                   
The variables of macroeconomic uncertainty/stability, i.e. inflation and institutional 
quality, are added as part of a sensitivity analysis. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
included in the regressions are presented in Appendix 2A. 
 
                                                          
25 The list is the outcome of calculations concerning R&D intensity (R&D expenditures/total sales) for six 
countries, United States, Japan, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands (European Commission, 1997). 
26 These are the high-tech sectors for which most data were available. Not all products in these categories are in 
fact high-tech. Yet, data at a more detailed level are not available for a wider set of countries.  
27 UNESCO uses national data. Hence, the data may contain a certain degree of noise due to differences in 
classifications across countries. Also, school enrolment “reflects current flows of education, and the 
accumulation of these flows will be one element in the stocks of human capital that will be available later” 
(Barro and Lee, 1993, p. 2).  
20     Part I – Introductory Empirical Analysis and Theoretical Background                   
 
2.4. Results total FDI  
This section presents the results of the model estimations for total FDI. We have 
complete observations for 69 countries. Table 2.1 shows the results.  
 In the first specification, we regress FDI inflows on the level of GDP. The results 
indicate that market size is an important factor in explaining FDI inflows. The coefficient 
is positive and highly significant. This is true for any specification in Table 2.1. What’s 
more, GDP alone explains over 60 per cent of the total variation in FDI inflows across 
countries. 
 The next specification includes institutional quality. The coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that institutional quality is an important determinant of 
FDI inflows. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficient on institutional quality in 
specification (2) is somewhat overestimated. The coefficient on institutional quality in 
specification (2) captures some of the effect of the omitted human capital and geographic 
characteristics. This is illustrated in the next two specifications. Specifications (3) and (4) 
add human capital and geographic characteristics. The coefficient on institutional quality 
is now smaller and has a somewhat lower significance level.  
 The coefficients on human capital and climate have the expected positive sign in 
specifications (3) and (4). The landlocked dummy has a positive coefficient. Being 
landlocked is expected to be a particular disadvantage for developing countries (see 
Section 2.2 above). If we distinguish the least developed countries as a separate group in 
the regressions, we do indeed find a negative effect of the landlocked variable for this 
group, whilst the effect is positive for the other countries.28 On the whole, adding human 
capital and the geographic characteristics adds little additional explanatory power: the 
share of the explained variation increases only slightly. The coefficients on human capital 
and geography have low significance levels. The results indicate that, when institutional 
quality is controlled for, we can be less confident that human capital and, especially, 
climate contribute to FDI inflows. The reason is intuitively clear: countries with high 
institutional quality most likely also have the highest level of human capital and are 
located in temperate climate zones.29  
 
                                                          
28 There are three landlocked developing countries in the sample. At the same time, there are landlocked 
European countries like Luxembourg and Switzerland that attract a lot of FDI. This explains why the overall 
effect is positive (though insignificant). Because a Chow-test (see below) indicates that do not differ 
significantly between the least developed countries on the one hand and other countries (developed and 
developing) on the other (i.e., no structural break), we do not report the regression results separately.  
29 See the correlation matrix in Appendix 2A.  
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 In specifications (5) – (7) we proxy macroeconomic instability by inflation. Inflation 
has the expected negative coefficient. It is significant at the 10 per cent level in 
specifications (5) and (6) and nearly significant in (7). Human capital and geography are 
statistically significant in specifications (5) and (6), respectively. Controlling for 
inflation, human capital and geography all at once (specification (7)) explains up to 73 
per cent of the total variation in FDI inflows, but the variables are no longer significant 
statistically.  
 
Discussion of results  
Of the specifications in Table 2.1 our preferred specification includes measures of 
macro(economic) stability/certainty, human capital and geographic characteristics 
simultaneously. Not including these variables simultaneously causes omitted variable 
bias as the variables are correlated (see Table 2A.3 in Appendix 2A). Thus we are 
looking at either specification (4) or (7). Specification (4) is our most preferred 
specification for two reasons. First, institutional quality is estimated to have a positive 
and rather robust effect on FDI inflows across all its specifications. Second and related to 
the first point, the fact that institutional quality is not included in specification (7) 
probably biases the coefficients on human capital and climate upwards. 
 The relation between GDP, human capital and inflation on the one hand, and FDI 
inflows on the other is expressed in a logarithmic form. The coefficients on these 
variables in Table 2.1 thus reflect elasticities. For instance, in specification (4), a 1 per 
cent increase in GDP raises FDI inflows on average by an estimated 0.67 per cent. The 
relation between institutional quality, climate and the landlocked dummy and FDI 
inflows cannot be log-linearised. The indicator of institutional quality varies between 
1.91 and –1.17. The landlocked dummy assumes values of either 0 or 1, and the indicator 
of climate can also assume the value of 0 (if the share of a country's population in 
temperate ecozones is zero). The coefficients on institutional quality, climate and the 
landlocked dummy in Table 2.1 reflect semi-elasticities. To interpret the impact of 
institutional quality and the geographic variables on FDI suggested by the semi-
elasticities in specification (4), we use a measure of variation that is consistent with the 
respective samples, i.e. a change of one standard deviation from the mean. For instance, 
the mean institutional quality in the enrolment sample is 0.46, with a standard deviation 
of 0.90 (see the descriptive statistics in Appendix 2A). Given the semi-elasticity of 
institutional quality in specification (4) of 0.66, increasing institutional quality above its 
mean by one standard deviation would have an average impact on FDI of 81 per cent.30 
                                                          
30 This is computed as follows: d ln(TotalFDIi) = 0.66  0.9 so 0.66 0.90 1i
i
dTotalFDI
TotalFDI
e    0.81. 
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Increasing the climate variable above its mean is thus estimated to raise FDI inflows by 
almost 7 per cent. Being landlocked increases FDI inflows by an estimated 82 per cent.31 
 As a robustness check on the results in Table 2.1, we performed Chow-tests to 
investigate whether the impacts from the independent variables are the same across 
different groups of countries. We perform separate Chow-tests for two different sub-
groups: the least developed countries and the most developed countries (using UN 
definitions to classify countries in one category or another). For the purpose of the Chow-
test, we estimate the following specification of the model in equation (2.1): 
  
0 1 2 3
4 2 0 2 1 2 2
2 3 2 4
log β β log β log β log
β g β' g β' log g β' log
g β' log g β' ε
i i i i
i i i
i i i
TotalFDI GDP HC Stability
Geographic GDP HC
Stability Geographic
    
   
 
  
 
              (2.1’) 
 
In this specification, g2 is a dummy variable indicating whether a country belongs to a 
certain category. Note that, if g2 denotes whether a country belongs to the group of least 
developed countries (developed countries), the coefficients βi indicate the effects of the 
explanatory variables (i = 0, …, 4) when g2 = 0 (the ‘other’ countries), while (βi + β’i) 
gives the effects for the least developed countries (developed countries). The Chow-test 
is then a joint test on the null hypothesis that the interacted coefficients g2βi are zero.  
 We perform the Chow-tests for specification (4) in Table 2.1. We find that, when g2 is 
a dummy variable indicating whether or not a country belongs to the group of least 
developed countries, the null hypothesis that the interacted coefficients g2βi are zero 
cannot be rejected. The F-statistic is 0.19. In other words, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that coefficients for the least developed and the other countries are by and large alike. 
That is, the least developed countries do not appear to constitute a case of their own. This 
evidence does not indicate that the relation between FDI inflows and, e.g., human capital 
and institutional quality only exists above a certain threshold, which the least developed 
countries do not meet (an argument often made in development economics). However, 
the number of observations for the least developed countries is small, so these 
conclusions are tentative. Still, based on the results, it seems justified to estimate a 
pooled model in this case. If, on the other hand, we use g2 to indicate whether a country 
is a most developed country or not, the F-statistic for the Chow-test is 2.43, in which case 
the null hypothesis that the g2βi are zero is rejected at the 5 per-cent level. This suggests 
that the model does not equally apply to both the most developed and other countries.32 
Columns (8) and (9) in Table 2.1 give the results for specification (4) estimated 
separately for the most developed countries and the other countries in the sample. The 
                                                          
31 The percentage impact of a dummy variable is calculated as 1) *100%( .ke   
32 If one applies a 2.5 per-cent level, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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most evident difference between the results for the two samples is with respect to the 
effect of human capital: the effect is negative and statistically significant in the 
developed-country sample. Still, we believe this is very much the result of the data. In the 
developed-country sample, countries like, e.g., Norway and New Zealand have a high 
score on schooling quality (QL) but attract lower levels of FDI.33 At the same time, the 
U.S., Germany and Luxembourg attract high levels of inward FDI but have a relatively 
low score on the QL-indicator. However, the variance in QL within the developed-
country sample is relatively small: the standard deviation of QL for the developed 
countries is only approximately one-third of that for the entire sample (against 70 per 
cent in the case of FDI inflows). 
 In order to get a sense of the relative importance of the explanatory variables in 
specification (4) in Table 2.1 in explaining FDI, we calculate standardised coefficients, 
also known as beta coefficients. A beta coefficient is defined as the product of the 
estimated coefficient of an independent variable and the variable’s standard deviation, 
divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2003, Helpman 
et al., 2004). It reflects how much of the average variation in the dependent variable is 
caused by variation in the independent variable. By looking at the contribution of each of 
the independent variables to the average variation in FDI we can assess their relative 
importance. The statistics needed to calculate the beta coefficients are given in the 
Appendix 2A.  
 Table 2.2 gives the results. We present the beta coefficients for all variables in 
specification (4), including the ones that are not statistically significant. Statistical 
significance merely indicates that, taking into account the standard error of the estimate, 
we cannot confidently rule out the possibility that a coefficient is zero. Nevertheless, the 
(size of the) estimate is still best linear unbiased (BLUE).34 The results in Table 2.2 
suggest that market size accounts for most of the variation in FDI by far. The beta 
coefficients indicate that a one standard deviation increase in GDP raises FDI inflows by 
almost two thirds of a standard deviation. This finding is consistent with previous 
findings in the FDI literature (e.g., Markusen, 2002). The variation in FDI inflows 
accounted for by the average variation in institutional quality is 27 per cent. The variation 
in human capital explains 10 per cent of the variation in FDI inflows when institutional 
quality and geography are controlled for. The geographic factors account for 0.03 
(climate) and 0.09 (landlocked dummy) per cent of the variation in FDI inflows. 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 The relative remoteness of these countries may explain why they attract lower levels of FDI within the group 
of developed countries (see, e.g., Redding and Venables, 2004, on distance-weighted GDP).  
34 Ziliak and McCloskey (2004), e.g., warn that economists put too much emphasis on statistical significance. 
They argue that the (economic) importance of a variable depends on the size of its coefficient, not its statistical 
significance.  
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Table 2.2. Beta coefficients total FDI  
 Specification  (4) in Table 2.1 
Log GDP 0.62 
Log Human capital 0.10 
Institutional quality 0.27 
Climate 0.03 
Landlocked  0.09 
 
 
2.5. Human capital and high-tech FDI   
In this section we investigate the importance of human capital in attracting high-tech 
FDI. Due to limited data availability the results are based on a small group of countries.35  
 Table 2.3 gives the estimation results. The first three columns in Table 2.3 present the 
results regarding FDI inflows in machinery and equipment. Specifications (4) – (6) 
present the results for FDI inflows in electrical and electronic equipment. 
 The results in columns (1) – (3) indicate that neither human capital nor institutional 
quality has a significant effect on FDI in machinery and equipment.36 This type of FDI is 
explained primarily by GDP. On the other hand, human capital is important for FDI 
inflows in electrical and electronic equipment. FDI inflows in electrical and electronic 
equipment increase with both human capital and institutional quality in the host country 
(columns (4) and (5)). The effect of human capital is statistically significant at the 10 per 
cent level. Controlling for the effect of human capital and institutional quality 
simultaneously (column (6)), neither variable is statistically significant. Still, human 
capital explains a larger share of the variation in FDI inflows in electrical and electronic 
equipment. This is illustrated in Table 2.4. 
 
 
                                                          
35 In the data set a lot of observations on inflows in high-tech sectors are recorded as missing. We attempted to 
estimate a sample selection model to properly deal with zero flows. The basic idea of the sample selection 
model is that zero flows of the dependent variable, here FDI, are not random. The sample selection model has 
two stages. The first stage models a binary choice problem, which determines whether or not we will observe 
investment. The choice to invest or not is dependent on some underlying (latent) variable – let’s say 
profitability. Firms will only decide to enter a market when the action is sufficiently profitable. Next, the 
selection model estimates the expected value of FDI, given that FDI is observed. Estimating FDI without first 
estimating whether FDI is observed can lead to a sample selection bias (cf. Heckman, 1979). OLS regression 
coefficients for the observed sample of non-zero FDI would then underestimate the true effect on FDI. 
Intuitively we can say that the sample selection model takes into account that FDI has to be profitable in the 
first place. Variables like GDP, human capital and institutional quality for instance have an effect on this. It 
follows that the impact of these variables is larger than would appear from OLS on the observed sample. 
Unfortunately, the number of observations in our data set proved too small to estimate a sample selection 
model.   
36 Checking the samples used to estimate specifications including inflation and institutional quality in Tables 
2.3 and 2.7 and 2.8 below, it is not the case that only a few highly developed (homogeneous) countries are left.  
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Table 2.3. The impact of human capital on high-tech FDI 
 Machinery & equipment Electrical & electronic equipment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log GDP 1.45*** 1.44*** 1.44*** 0.98*** 0.94*** 0.97*** 
 (7.87) (7.79) (7.63) (5.98) (6.44) (6.53) 
Log Human 
capital 0.11  0.10 1.98*  1.70 
 (0.08)  (0.06) (2.11)  (1.18) 
Institutional 
quality  –0.01 –0.04  0.72 0.15 
  (0.03) (0.08)  (1.49) (0.20) 
Constant –34.03*** –33.35*** –33.72*** –28.34*** –20.14*** –27.19*** 
 (5.26) (6.87) (4.47) (5.10) (4.90) (4.98) 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.48 0.44 0.45 
Observations 32 31 31 19 19 19 
Robust (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  
 
 The first column in Table 2.4 presents the beta coefficients for specification (6) in 
Table 2.3. Human capital explains approximately thirty per cent of the total variation in 
FDI in electrical and electronic equipment. The contribution of institutional quality is 
small. In the specification excluding institutional quality human capital is estimated to 
account for one third of the variation in FDI in electrical and electronic equipment.37 The 
beta coefficients on human capital in Table 2.4 are larger than the one in Table 2.2 (total 
FDI), which suggests that the quality of human capital is relatively more important for 
FDI in electrical and electronic equipment than total FDI. This result can be attributed 
primarily to the magnitude of the effect of human capital on FDI in electrical and 
electronic equipment. The results in Table 2.3 indicate that FDI inflows in this sector are 
highly elastic with respect to human capital: a one per cent increase in the quality of 
human capital increases FDI inflows more than proportionally. Similar to total FDI, GDP 
accounts for most of the variation in FDI in electrical and electronic equipment as well. 
 
 
Table 2.4. Beta-coefficients high-tech FDI 
 Spec. (6) in Table 2.3 Spec. (4) Table 2.3 
Log GDP 0.66 0.66 
Log Human capital 0.29 0.33 
Institutional quality 0.06  
 
                                                          
37 This specification has in fact the highest explanatory power.  
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2.6. High-tech FDI and type of skills  
In this section we investigate whether technical skills as opposed to managerial skills are 
more important for attracting high-tech FDI. First, we examine the impact of different 
types of skills on total FDI inflows.38 The results are given in Table 2.5.39 In specification 
(1) we regress FDI inflows on the level of GDP and the types of skills; next we regress 
FDI inflows on the level of GDP, different types of skills and institutional quality; in the 
last specifications we add the geographic characteristics.40  
 
  
Table 2.5. Type of skills – total FDI  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP 0.79*** 0.60*** 0.63*** 
 (10.60) (6.64) (6.99) 
Log Enrolment science 0.29 0.13 0.15 
 (1.28) (0.64) (0.77) 
Log Enrolment engineering 0.43*** 0.30** 0.21 
 (2.81) (2.13) (1.34) 
Log Enrolment social science 0.89 0.83* 0.88** 
 (1.57) (1.96) (2.09) 
Institutional quality  0.77*** 0.55** 
  (3.17) (2.62) 
Climate   0.58* 
   (1.86) 
Landlocked   0.54 
   (1.43) 
Constant –17.01*** –11.92*** –12.84*** 
 (8.09) (6.21) (6.17) 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.79 0.80 
Observations 73 73 73 
Robust (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  
 
                                                          
38 The enrolment and QL samples differ. Hence, so does the average variation of FDI (see the descriptive 
statistics in Appendix 2A). 
39 Similar to Section 2.4 we performed Chow-tests to see whether the impacts from the independent variables 
are the same for different sub-groups. We once again performed two tests: one in which the estimation 
coefficients for the least developed countries are examined and one in which we do the same for the most 
developed countries. In both cases, we find that the null hypothesis that the interacted coefficients g2βi are zero 
cannot be rejected. F-statistics are 0.97 and 1.44. Thus, the least developed or developed countries do not 
appear to constitute a case of their own. As a result, we estimate a pooled model to investigate the effect of the 
type of skills on total FDI inflows. 
40 We also ran regressions with inflation. But its coefficient was statistically insignificant in every specification. 
We omit these results here. They are available on request. 
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 Table 2.5 indicates that the enrolment variables are all positive. Yet, only enrolment 
in social sciences, business and law is statistically significant when institutional quality 
and geography are controlled for. These results suggest that managerial skills in the host 
country are important for attracting total FDI. The effect of technical skills (measured by 
enrolment in science and in engineering, manufacturing and construction) cannot be 
verified at conventional significance levels. Similar to the regressions with human 
capital, institutional quality again has a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI 
inflows in the sample with the enrolment variables. The effect of climate (third column) 
is positive and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The landlocked dummy 
once again has a positive coefficient, against expectation. It is not significant statistically. 
 Table 2.6 gives the beta coefficients for specification (3) in Table 2.5. The 
results indicate that managerial skills account for thirteen per cent of the variation in FDI. 
Technical skills together account for eleven per cent of the variation in total FDI, 
although this effect cannot be verified statistically as explained above. Although we 
cannot directly compare beta coefficients across Table 2.2 and Table 2.6 (see the 
descriptive statistics in Appendix 2A), GDP, institutional quality and the landlocked 
variable account for rather similar shares of the variation in FDI as in the regression with 
human capital. The results once again suggest that market size accounts for about sixty 
per cent of the standard deviation in FDI inflows. The variation in FDI inflows accounted 
for by the average variation in institutional quality and the landlocked dummy is 23 and 9 
per cent, respectively. The relative importance of the climate variable is somewhat larger 
in the regressions with the type of skills than with the human capital sample.41 
Table 2.7 presents the results for the effect of the different types of skills on FDI 
inflows in machinery and equipment. Column (1) gives the results for technical skills. 
 
 
Table 2.6. Beta coefficients total FDI  
 Spec. (3) Table 2.5 
Log GDP 0.61 
Log Enrolment science 0.04 
Log Enrolment engineering 0.07 
Log Enrolment social science 0.13 
Institutional quality 0.23 
Climate 0.12 
Landlocked 0.09 
 
  
   
                                                          
41 This is probably the result of lower correlation between the climate variable and the enrolment variables. See 
Appendix 2A.  
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Table 2.7. High-tech FDI and type of skills – machinery and equipment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP 1.29*** 1.37*** 1.40*** 
 (5.58) (7.23) (6.96) 
Log Enrolment science 0.01   
 (0.02)   
Log Enrolment engineering 1.05   
 (1.33)   
Log Enrolment social science  –0.36  
  (0.31)  
Institutional quality   –0.23 
   (0.44) 
Constant –32.30*** –30.15*** –31.97*** 
 (7.09) (4.94) (6.38) 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.63 0.64 
Observations 26 26 26 
 Robust (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Enrolment in engineering, manufacturing and construction is estimated to have a positive 
effect on FDI in machinery and equipment but this effect is not significant 
statistically.The effect of enrolment in science is highly uncertain. Columns (2) and (3) 
indicate that enrolment in social sciences, business and law and institutional quality play 
no significant role in attracting FDI in machinery and equipment. The t-statistics of these 
variables are very low. Also, the share of total variation in FDI inflows in machinery and 
equipment specifications explained by these specifications is less than the specification 
with technical (engineering) skills. Specifications (2) and (3) are explained by GDP 
primarily. Thus, the results in Table 2.7 suggest that in the case of machinery and 
equipment technical, i.e. engineering, skills matter most for attracting FDI. 
 Table 2.8 presents the results for FDI in electrical and electronic equipment. 
Specification (1) once again gives the results for technical skills. Both coefficients are 
positive and the coefficient on enrolment in science is statistically significant at the 10 
per cent level. Enrolment in social sciences, business and law once again has no 
significant effect (specification (2)). Specification (3) suggests that institutional quality 
also has a positive effect on FDI in electrical and electronic equipment. The coefficient is 
nearly significant statistically at 10%. Specification (4) combines technical skills and 
institutional quality. Enrolment in engineering, manufacturing and construction, and 
institutional quality in particular now have but a statistically weak effect on FDI in 
electrical and electronic equipment. 
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Table 2.8. High-tech FDI and type of skills – electrical & electronic equipment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log GDP 0.46* 0.89*** 0.77*** 0.50* 
 (1.94) (6.71) (6.02) (1.99) 
Log Enrolment science 1.24*   0.90 
 (1.86)   (1.12) 
Log Enrolment engineering 0.61   0.54 
 (1.01)   (0.79) 
Log Enrolment social 
science  0.59   
  (0.48)   
Institutional quality   0.71 0.38 
   (1.53) (0.62) 
Constant –11.64** –20.49*** –16.09*** –12.18** 
 (2.26) (5.24) (5.45) (2.31) 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.39 0.47 0.44 
Observations 17 17 17 17 
Robust (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 Table 2.9 presents the beta coefficients for specification (1) in Table 2.7 and 
specification (4) in Table 2.8. The beta coefficients on technical skills measured by 
enrolment in science and in engineering, manufacturing and construction in Table 2.9 are 
larger than those for total FDI (in Table 2.6). This suggests that technical skills are 
relatively more important for attracting FDI in high-tech sectors than total FDI. 
 
 
Table 2.9. Beta-coefficients high-tech FDI 
 Machinery & equipment Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
 Spec. (1) in Table 2.7 Spec. (4) in Table 2.8 
Log GDP 0.77 0.37 
Log Enrolment science 0.00 0.32 
Log Enrolment engineering 0.18 0.14 
Institutional quality  0.16 
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2.7. Conclusion  
This chapter has empirically examined the role of human capital, inflation, institutional 
quality and geographic characteristics in attracting FDI inflows: to what extent do these 
factors explain the variation in FDI inflows across host countries? We find that 
institutional quality is an important determinant of total FDI inflows across host 
countries. Institutional quality explains up to 27 per cent of the average variation in total 
FDI. The effect of institutional quality is robust across different specifications. Inflation, 
which we have used as an alternative, less encompassing, measure of macro (in)stability 
than institutional quality, is much less robust. Human capital and geography each explain 
about 10 per cent of the total variation in total FDI inflows, but the effects are not robust 
when the effects of human capital, institutional quality or inflation, and geography are 
simultaneously controlled for. Still, the single most important determinant of total FDI is 
GDP. GDP has a statistically significant effect in all regressions and explains over 60 per 
cent of the average variation in total FDI inflows across countries. 
 We extend the analysis of human capital to FDI in technology-intensive sectors. Is 
human capital more conducive to attracting FDI in technology-intensive sectors than total 
FDI? High-tech FDI is proxied by FDI in machinery and equipment and electrical and 
electronic equipment. The proviso concerning the number of observations applies. 
Having said this, the quality of human capital appears to be relatively more important for 
FDI in electrical and electronic equipment than for total FDI. Our results indicate that 
FDI inflows in this sector are highly elastic with respect to human capital: a one per cent 
increase in the quality of human capital increases FDI inflows more than proportionally. 
Human capital is also more important than institutional quality in explaining FDI in 
electrical and electronic equipment. The latter is less important in FDI in electrical and 
electronic equipment than in total FDI. In fact, the effect of institutional quality on FDI in 
electrical and electronic equipment is highly insignificant when human capital is 
included. Human capital and institutional quality have no significant effect on FDI in 
machinery and equipment. This type of FDI is explained almost entirely by GDP.  
 We also investigated whether attracting FDI in machinery and equipment and 
electrical and electronic equipment requires technical rather than managerial skills. Our 
conclusion is affirmative: technical skills (measured by enrolment in science and in 
engineering, manufacturing and construction) are more important for attracting FDI in 
machinery and equipment and electrical and electronic equipment than managerial skills. 
The latter (measured by enrolment in social sciences, business and law) have no 
significant effect on FDI in machinery and equipment nor electrical and electronic 
equipment, whilst having a statistically significant positive impact on total FDI inflows. 
The statistical significance of institutional quality on FDI in machinery and equipment 
and electrical and electronic equipment is very low in specifications that control for 
technical skills as well.  
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 This chapter demonstrates what factors can potentially explain the variation in FDI 
inflows across host countries. Yet, the approach is rather eclectic: the stylised facts in 
Chapter 1 indicate that FDI flows mainly towards developed countries and human 
capital, inflation, institutional quality and geographic characteristics like being located in 
temperate ecozones are characteristics of developed countries. The selection of 
explanatory variables is, however, not tied back to a specific theoretical model of 
location selection by firms. This can lead to omitted variable bias in the empirical 
specification (see also, e.g., Chakrabarti, 2001). General-equilibrium models of FDI exist 
for bilateral FDI. These models explain how FDI comes about and specify long-term 
factors that determine the magnitude of FDI between countries based on a 
microeconomic theory of firm decision making. The empirical analysis in Part II of this 
study is based on bilateral FDI. The unit of examination is FDI from parent country i 
directed toward host j. Chapter 3 motivates and describes the research approach for the 
analysis in Part II. 
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Appendix 2A – Data 
Table 2A.1 gives the descriptive statistics for the data used in the estimations with human 
capital. 
 
Table 2A.1 – Descriptive statistics regressions with human capital 
 Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations 
Log total FDI 7.35 2.19 11.89 1.99 69 
Log FDI machinery 4.21 3.09 8.28 –3.22 29 
Log FDI electrical 5.70 1.96 9.37 1.51 18 
Log GDP 24.76 2.02 29.87 20.66 69 
Log Human capital 3.76 0.31 4.21 2.90 69 
Log Inflation 1.67 0.93 4.02 –0.41 69 
Institutional quality 0.46 0.90 1.91 –1.17 69 
Landlocked 0.13 0.34 1 0 69 
Climate 0.47 0.45 1 0 69 
 
 
Table 2A.2 gives the descriptive statistics for the data used in the estimations with 
enrolment. 
 
Table 2A.2 – Descriptive statistics regressions with enrolment 
 Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations 
Log total FDI 6.75 2.24 11.48 0.44 73 
Log FDI machinery 3.51 3.16 8.10 –3.22 22 
Log FDI electrical 4.61 2.04 7.44 0.36 14 
Log GDP 24.16 2.16 29.12 20.37 73 
Log Enrol. science 2.01 0.63 2.97 –0.26 73 
Log Enrol. engineering 2.35 0.77 3.58 –0.09 73 
Log Enrol. social science 3.47 0.33 4.05 2.41 73 
Institutional quality 0.32 0.95 1.91 –1.42 73 
Climate 0.51 0.45 1 0 73 
Landlocked 0.18 0.39 1 0 73 
 
 
Tables 2A.3 and 2A.4 present correlation matrices.  
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The Literature on Bilateral FDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 served as a first introductory empirical analysis in the investigation into the 
sources of attraction for FDI using data on FDI inflows. The analysis was not based on an 
explicit theoretical framework. General-equilibrium models of FDI do exist for bilateral 
FDI. The analysis in Part II of this study is therefore based on bilateral FDI. In this 
chapter we motivate and describe the research approach for the empirical analysis in Part 
II. The chapter is organised as follows. We begin by presenting the main theoretical 
contributions in the literature on bilateral FDI. Section 3.2 briefly presents Dunning’s 
OLI-paradigm of international production. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 describe the knowledge-
capital model and the proximity-concentration trade-off. This is followed by a critical 
review of these two models and the empirical work related to them in Section 3.5. 
Section 3.6 presents the extensions and contributions of Part II and the outline of the 
empirical analysis in Chapters 4–6.  
 
3 
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3.2. Dunning’s OLI-framework 
The eclectic paradigm of international production by John Dunning (e.g., 1980, 1988 and 
2001) offers a general, but very useful, conceptual framework to explain FDI. Rather 
than offering a theory of the multinational enterprise, the eclectic paradigm points to “a 
methodology and to a generic set of variables which contain the ingredients necessary for 
any satisfactory explanation of particular types of foreign (…) activity” (Dunning, 2001, 
p. 177). The eclectic paradigm explains international production undertaken by MNEs 
and financed though FDI by a set of three variables: ownership (O) advantages, location 
(L) advantages and internalisation (I) advantages.42  
 Ownership-specific advantages give firms a competitive advantage over local 
competitors in supplying any particular market or set of markets. These advantages stem 
from the firms’ privileged ownership of assets. Assets may be created by the firm itself 
(e.g., types of technology and organisational skills), but the firm can also purchase assets 
created elsewhere. In doing so, the firm obtains proprietary right of use over existing 
assets. While in the OLI-framework FDI is, in the first instance, thought of as a means to 
exploit ownership-specific advantages, FDI can also be a vehicle to create or augment 
existing advantages.43 According to Dunning (2001) this is pertinent particularly in the 
sourcing of technological assets. Ownership-specific advantages may then also consist of 
the ability of MNEs to access new assets and co-ordinate these assets with existing assets 
across national boundaries.  
 Ownership-specific advantages explain which firms will supply a particular foreign 
market. Internalisation advantages explain why firms choose to use these assets 
themselves (i.e. through owned subsidiaries) to exploit foreign markets rather than to sell 
the assets or the right of use to some foreign-based enterprise.44 Such internalisation 
advantages stem from market failure connected with the assets (difficulty to (fully) 
appropriate rents and/or high transaction costs).  
Third, firms must have a reason to want to locate production abroad. Location-specific 
characteristics of the host country make it more profitable to locate activities abroad 
rather than in the home country.  
  The general equilibrium models of FDI discussed in this chapter build on the OLI-
idea that firms possess ownership-specific advantages and examine the external factors 
that determine (the pattern of) FDI. 
                                                          
42 The exact form and significance of each of the OLI parameters will vary across industries, countries and 
firms. 
43 This is reflected in the increasing importance of mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances since the 
second half of the 1990s (Dunning, 2001). 
44 Dunning acknowledges that internalisation may also constitute ownership advantages of its own. Transaction 
ownership advantages reflect the capacity of MNE hierarchies vis-à-vis external markets to capture 
transactional benefits arising from the common governance of a network of assets (Dunning, 1988). 
Nevertheless, he notes, “the ability of a firm to benefit from [internalisation] must be related to the assets which 
it possesses prior to the act of internalisation” (Dunning, 2001, p. 175).  
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3.3. The knowledge-capital model 
The knowledge-capital model provides the most articulate general equilibrium model of 
MNE with proper microeconomic foundations (Markusen et al., 1996, Markusen, 1997 
and 2002).45 The model integrates two motivations for FDI in a single general 
equilibrium model of MNEs: to access markets in the face of trade frictions (horizontal 
FDI) and to exploit factor-cost differentials due to different relative factor supplies 
(vertical FDI). The model typically has two countries, two factors of production and two 
sectors. Both sectors produce homogeneous goods, Y and X. Y is produced with constant 
returns to scale by perfectly competitive firms. The X sector is imperfectly competitive, 
with Cournot firms, free entry and exit and increasing returns to scale. There are scale 
economies at the plant level and at the firm level, the latter arising from fixed costs 
associated with the knowledge asset. The X sector is one in which (entering) firms choose 
their organisational structure, i.e., horizontal or vertical multinationals or national firms.  
 Scale economies at the firm level give rise to horizontal, type-h, firms. Type-h firms 
have production plants in several markets. The model assumes that knowledge assets 
have a joint-input or public good character: once created, the knowledge assets can be 
supplied to foreign production facilities at relatively low additional costs. Whether firms 
decide to service foreign markets through exports (i.e. be a type-d or national firms) or 
through an additional local plant (type-h firms) depends on the plant-level scale 
economies relative to trade costs. Foreign markets should be large for firms to be able to 
exploit scale economies at the plant level. 
 Furthermore, the knowledge-capital model assumes that production can be 
fragmented from the location of the knowledge assets (typically associated with the 
headquarters). This motivates firms to locate a single production plant and headquarters 
in different countries when factor endowments differ between countries. These properties 
give rise to vertical, or type-v, MNEs. The knowledge-capital model makes a number of 
assumptions regarding factor intensities. First, the activities associated with headquarters, 
i.e. the knowledge-based and knowledge-generating activities, and the managing and 
coordinating of plants are skilled-labour intensive. Therefore, production plants are less 
skilled-labour intensive than an integrated firm with headquarters and a plant in the same 
location.46 Next, since horizontal firms require additional skilled labour in the home 
                                                          
45 The knowledge-capital model and the proximity-concentration model (see Section 3.4 below) draw heavily 
on theoretical advances in models of international trade in the late 1970s, i.e. the incorporation of imperfect 
competition and economies of scale in formal models of trade (see, e.g., Krugman, 1979, 1980). 
46 Multinational production is considered unskilled-labour intensive relative to headquarter activities. 
Considered in its own right, multinational production will in most cases be quite advanced. Empirical evidence 
suggests that multinationals are an important source of superior knowledge or technology: multinationals 
undertake a major part of the world’s private R&D efforts and produce, own, and control most of the world’s 
advanced technology (Blomström and Kokko, 2003). In the knowledge-capital model this is reflected by the 
assumption that a plant alone (no headquarters) is more skilled-labour intensive than firms in the composite Y 
sector.  
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country so as to manage and coordinate the second plant, horizontal firms are assumed to 
be more skilled-labour intensive than either vertical MNEs or national firms. A foreign 
plant (of both horizontal and vertical firms) is assumed to be more skilled-labour 
intensive than national firms. The added skilled labour comes from the host country and 
reflects that technology transfer is not costless. That is, some additional skilled labour is 
needed in the host country so as to implement a blueprint in the foreign plant. 
 The knowledge-capital model predicts that type-h firms dominate when markets in 
both countries are large and countries are similar in relative skill endowments. 
Economies of scale explain the need for size in both markets. The reason for skill 
similarity in this type of FDI is that if countries are dissimilar it becomes more profitable 
to concentrate production in the skilled-labour scarce country and headquarters in the 
skill abundant country (vertical FDI). Moreover, when trade costs are very high, firms 
will seek proximity to markets and avoid trade costs involved in exporting. Type-v firms 
dominate when countries differ in size and relative skill endowments. In particular, if 
country i is small and relatively skilled-labour abundant, while country j is large and 
relatively skilled-labour scarce, this motivates firms to locate headquarters in country i 
and a single production plant in country j. Type-v firms may or may not export back to 
the parent country depending on trade costs in the parent country. High investment costs 
in the host country reduce both horizontal and vertical FDI. 
 Carr et al. (2001) (henceforth CMM) are the first to test the knowledge-capital model 
empirically. A problem is how to translate the general equilibrium theory to an empirical 
specification (Blonigen, 2005). The knowledge-capital model is complex (many 
dimensions and many inequalities in addition to a few equalities) and does not have 
closed-form solutions. The predictions are generated by numerically solving the model 
(simulation). From the numerical simulations CMM derive the following equation to 
estimate the knowledge-capital model:   
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GDPDIFF SKDIFF INVC TC TC SKDIFF
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     
 
               (3.1) 
 
where FDIij denotes FDI from parent i to host j. SUMGDPij is the sum of real GDP in 
both countries and captures the horizontal motives for FDI. Its coefficient is expected to 
be positive. (GDPDIFFij)2 is the squared difference in real GDP between the parent 
country and the host country and is expected to have a negative influence, since theory 
suggests an inverted U-shaped relation to differences in country size, with FDI attaining 
a maximum when differences in GDP between countries are zero. The variables 
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SKDIFFij and (GDPDIFFij SKDIFFij) are the key variables that distinguish vertical FDI 
within the knowledge-capital model. SKDIFFij measures the skill abundance in the parent 
country relative to the host country. Its coefficient is expected to be positive because the 
headquarters of firms are expected to be located in the skilled-labour-abundant country. 
The interaction term (GDPDIFFij SKDIFFij) is expected to have a negative coefficient. 
Relative skill abundance in the parent country is reinforced if the parent country is small 
(GDPDIFF<0) and relatively skill abundant compared to the host country (SKDIFFij>0). 
The fifth and sixth variable, INVCj and TCj, respectively, measure the cost of investing in 
and exporting to the host country j. The coefficient of INVCj is expected to be negative; 
the cost of investing in the host country is likely to reduce FDI. The coefficient of TCj is 
expected to be positive as high trade costs will induce substitution of horizontal FDI for 
exports to the host market. The positive effect of TCj on FDI is reduced if the two 
countries are very dissimilar in relative endowments. If countries are dissimilar, 
horizontal FDI will be less important. Therefore the coefficient of (TCj SKDIFFij2) is 
expected to be negative.47 TCi is a measure of the cost of exporting to the parent country, 
and is expected to negatively influence FDIij as trade costs diminish the incentive to 
locate plants abroad and export back to the parent country. Finally, geographical distance 
DISTij is added to the relation. According to CMM the sign of this variable is ambiguous 
in theory as distance can be an element in export costs or investment and monitoring 
costs. In the former case, one would expect the coefficient to be positive as distance 
encourages the substitution of exports by FDI. In the latter case, the coefficient will be 
negative as investment and monitoring costs act to reduce FDI.48  
 CMM use data on sales of foreign affiliates of American MNEs and sales of U.S. 
affiliates of foreign MNEs to estimate the knowledge-capital model. The data are from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce). CMM conclude 
that the knowledge-capital model explains much of the variation in affiliate sales. The 
model has a strong statistical fit and coefficients by and large all have the expected 
sign.49 The estimates yield strong statistical significance for the variables SUMGDPij, 
(GDPDIFFij)2, SKDIFFij and (GDPDIFFij SKDIFFij).50 In their own words (p. 704), 
“the evidence suggests more weakly that affiliate activity depends on investment costs 
and trade costs in the hypothesised directions”. We have reproduced the results from 
CMM Tables 3 and 4 in Table 3.1. 
 
 
                                                          
47 However, according to CMM, this is not a theoretically sharp hypothesis.  
48 See Chapter 6 below for an elaborate analysis of the (relative) impact of distance on FDI and trade.  
49 Only the interaction variable TCj SKDIFFij2 is not significant in any of their regressions. 
50 In specifications with fixed effects the role of skill differences becomes smaller both in terms of size and 
statistical significance (see Table 3.1). CMM: “Most of the countries in the sample are less skilled-labour-
abundant than the U.S. It may be that the country dummies capture some of this effect that should be correctly 
attributed to endowment differences” (Carr et al., 2001, p. 704).  
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Table 3.1. Estimating the knowledge-capital model: results from Carr et al. (2001) 
 
Basic results  
(CMM Table 3) 
Fixed effects estimation  
(CMM Table 4) 
 OLS WLS  Tobit a OLS WLS  Tobit a 
SUMGDPij 10.80*** 13.92*** 15.04*** 13.41*** 13.72*** 16.57*** 
 (7.01) (9.80) (10.27) (12.81) (13.62) (17.44) 
(GDPDIFFij)2 –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** 
 (6.89) (8.94) (5.89) (8.07) (9.81) (8.01) 
SKDIFFij 33,743*** 31,044*** 61,700*** 20,084 15,042 29,366** 
 (3.77) (4.01) (7.28) (1.57) (1.34) (2.34) 
GDPDIFFij  
SKDIFFij –6.34** –4.27** –10.20*** –5.91** –4.44** –7.71*** 
 (2.62) (2.12) (4.34) (2.42) (2.09) (3.22) 
INVCj –516.6*** –455.6*** –387.6*** –198.8 –173.2 –41.3 
 (3.79) (3.92) (2.82) (1.49) (1.52) (0.32) 
TCj 119.2 190.6** 156.2 74.9 69.4 144.0* 
 (1.16) (2.20) (1.51) (0.96) (1.02) (1.93) 
TCj
SKDIFFij2 605.2 –569.9 –1,264 –388.2 –811.6 –2,273 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.75) (0.24) (0.57) (1.49) 
TCi –93.7 –93.3 –122.0 –87.7 –75.5 –112.6** 
 (0.99) (1.14) (1.46) (1.63) (1.60) (2.43) 
DISTij –1.82*** –1.34*** –1.48*** –1.08*** –0.87*** –0.77*** 
 (7.75) (6.63) (6.47) (5.45) (4.95) (4.28) 
Constant 16,630 –5,381 –23,282 –22,492** –24,552** –53,341*** 
 (1.08) (0.42) (1.61) (2.00) (2.57) (5.24) 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.60  0.83 0.87  
Observations 509 509 628 509 509 628 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a Adding an additional 119 cases for which observations are missing but assumed to be zeros.   
Source: reproduced from Carr et al. (2001), their Tables 3 and 4. 
 
 
 Markusen and Maskus (2002) compare the knowledge-capital model against a 
restricted horizontal and a restricted vertical version, using the U.S. data on affiliate sales 
as Carr et al. (2001). The prediction that FDI is important between countries that are 
similar in both size and skill endowments, finds the most confirmation in the data.An 
independent vertical model provides a poor characterisation of the overall pattern of 
world FDI.51The coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant. Yet, 
                                                          
51 Nevertheless, Carr et al. (2003) state that the weak support in Markusen and Maskus (2002) for an 
independent vertical model may be partly the result of the data. The U.S. is relatively large whereas the vertical 
model predicts FDI when the parent is small and skilled-labour abundant. Hence, there is not much ‘power to 
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the model has much lower explanatory power than the horizontal model and the 
knowledge-capital model. The results provide strong support for the knowledge-capital 
model, but the results do not permit a distinction between the knowledge-capital and 
horizontal models. Markusen (2002) concludes that he results in Markusen and Maskus 
(2002) are consistent with the stylised fact that the overwhelming share of world 
investments is between high-income, developed countries. 
 
3.4. The proximity-concentration trade-off 
To serve foreign markets, firms can decide either to export or to service the foreign 
markets locally by setting up a subsidiary through horizontal FDI. Brainard (1997) 
models the production-location decision of firms as a trade-off between achieving 
proximity to local markets so as to circumvent transport costs and trade barriers, and 
concentrating production so as to exploit economies of scale. This is referred to as the 
proximity-concentration trade-off.  
 The model in Brainard (1997) assumes two factors, two countries, and two sectors. 
One sector produces a homogeneous good, using constant returns to scale, the other 
sector produces differentiated goods with increasing returns to scale. Scale economies at 
the firm level arise due to the existence of firm-specific fixed costs at the corporate level 
R(w), such as R&D. There are also scale economies at the plant level due to fixed costs in 
production, F(w). Both fixed costs are a function of the local wage in market i (wi). 
Assuming Chamberlinian monopolistic competition in the differentiated goods sector, 
firms in both markets simultaneously choose their plant configuration and prices, taking 
their competitors’ configuration and prices as given. Equilibrium in this sector is 
determined by pricing equations (marginal revenue equals marginal cost) and free-entry 
conditions (profits are zero). The wage rate w equals the value marginal product of labour 
in the production of the homogeneous good. Assuming symmetry in factor endowments, 
wages will be equal across the two countries. In the absence of factor price differences, 
firms choose between producing overseas and exporting by comparing the additional 
variable cost of exporting against the additional fixed cost of opening a new plant 
abroad.52 Exporting is assumed to incur per-unit transport costs and costs associated with 
trade barriers. For some amount q produced in market i, the amount that survives 
shipment to the foreign market j decreases in the distance between the markets, D, and 
the transport costs, T, i.e. ( )T Dijq e
  . 
                                                                                                                                                
the test’ to distinguish between the horizontal and the knowledge-capital model when the U.S. is parent (Carr et 
al., 2003). Braconier et al. (2002) add more power to the test by adding Swedish data to the Markusen and 
Maskus data set. This entails adding more observations in which the parent is small and skilled-labour 
abundant. They find more support for a vertical model. 
52 The proximity-concentration model is essentially a model of horizontal FDI. 
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 On the demand side, Brainard assumes homothetic preferences across the two 
aggregated goods. Demand for the differentiated good is characterised by a constant 
elasticity of substitution σ.  
 The equilibrium location decision depends on the sign of the following expression: 
 
              (3.2)
   
  
There are three possibilities:  
- Expression (3.2) < 0. This holds if transport costs and trade barriers are high and 
fixed plant costs are small relative to fixed corporate costs. In the associated 
equilibrium, all firms have plants in both markets (multinational equilibrium); 
- Expression (3.2) > 0. This holds if transport costs and trade barriers are low and fixed 
plant costs are high relative to fixed corporate costs. All firms then have a single plant 
located in the same market as their corporate headquarters. They export to the foreign 
market, resulting in two-way intra-industry trade in differentiated goods (trade 
equilibrium); 
- Expression (3.2) = 0. In this case, some fraction ( , , )F T D of all firms exports to the 
foreign market, while the others are multinationals (mixed equilibrium). The fraction 
of firms that export increases (decreases) the lower (higher) are transport costs and 
trade barriers and the size of each market, and the higher (lower) are fixed plant costs:   
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 
 

 
                                                                                 (3.3) 
 
where X and S denote exports and local affiliate sales, respectively.  
 Brainard uses the following equation to test the proximity-concentration trade-off 
empirically:53  
 
  (3.4) 
 
 
where EXSH is the log of the share of exports from country i in total foreign sales 
(affiliate sales plus export sales) from country i in country j; FREIGHTij is the log of the 
                                                          
53 Our subscript notation is slightly different from Brainard (1997) so as to keep notation consistent throughout 
the study.  
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freight factor between country i and country j; TARIFFj is the log of the foreign average 
tariff on imports in country j. TRADEj and FDIj are logged measures of trade and FDI 
openness, where TRADEj captures the absence of non-tariff barriers and other trade 
barriers. TAXj is the log of the average effective corporate income tax rate in j. Higher 
taxes in the destination country are expected to have a negative effect on affiliate sales 
since they increase the cost of local investment. Scale economies are explicitly 
measured.54 PSCALEi and CSCALEi are the log of plant scale economies and corporate 
scale economies, respectively.  
 While the proximity-concentration model assumes symmetry in factor endowments, 
Brainard does include the difference in per-worker GDP between the countries 
(PWGDPij) in the empirical specification to control for factor-proportions differences. If 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin explanations of trade or FDI apply, the effect of per capita 
GDP differentials on affiliate sales and exports should be positive. If, on the other hand, 
the Linder effect prevails, the effect of per capita GDP differentials on affiliate sales and 
exports should be negative (FDI and exports will be between countries with similar levels 
of per capita income). Because all affiliate sales are – due to scale economies – in the 
differentiated sector, while trade might in principle55 occur in both homogeneous and 
differentiated goods, Brainard expects affiliate sales to be better explained by the Linder 
effect.  
 Lastly, Brainard includes a number of additional controls. First is a dummy variable 
indicating whether countries share a common language (LANG). This serves as a general 
control for cultural familiarity. Next is a dummy indicating whether a country has had a 
political coup in the last decade (COUP) to proxy political risk. Two final controls are 
dummies capturing adjacency (ADJ) and EU membership (EC).  
 To check whether the proximity-concentration hypothesis is correct, Brainard also 
estimates equation (3.4) for the share of affiliate sales from country i in total foreign 
sales.56 This should yield a reversed sign pattern on the explanatory variables.  
 Using shares Brainard avoids the problem of simultaneity between affiliate 
production and exports encountered in earlier studies.57 Many studies investigating the 
                                                          
54 A more common approach (cf. the knowledge-capital model and gravity models more generally) is to include 
GDP as a measure of country size. 
55 The model assumes symmetry in factor endowments and consumer preferences, as well as constant returns to 
scale in the homogeneous sector. Hence, in this particular version of the model there is little incentive for firms 
to trade in the homogeneous sector.  
56 Brainard uses a generalised tobit specification to estimate affiliate shares. The dependent variable export 
share incorporates observations of both pure trade and mixed equilibria. The reason is that the data on exports 
(or imports) do not distinguish between a pure trade equilibrium and a mixed equilibrium. To ensure that there 
is a mixed and not a pure trade equilibrium when estimating the share of affiliate sales, Brainard first estimates 
the probability that affiliate sales exist and then the share of affiliate sales in total foreign sales when a mixed 
equilibrium is observed. 
57 She does also estimate specifications with levels. She uses two-stage least squares. The effect of trade and 
investment barriers and scale economies on levels of affiliate sales and trade (exports and imports) is similar to 
their effect on shares. The estimated effect of transportation costs on trade is higher for levels than shares, while 
the effect on affiliate sales is lower for levels than shares.  
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relationship between trade and FDI typically regress exports on FDI and a host of other 
explanatory variables.58 A solution to the simultaneity problem is using instrumental-
variables estimation, but instruments must ideally satisfy three conditions (Head and 
Ries, 2004): the instrument must be correlated with FDI; not itself simultaneously 
determined with exports; holding FDI constant, the instrument must have no effect on 
exports. The third condition is hard to satisfy (Head and Ries, 2004). 
 Brainard estimates equation (3.4) using data on outward activity (outward affiliate 
sales and exports) and inward activity (inward affiliate sales and imports) of the U.S. The 
results provide broad support for the proximity-concentration hypothesis for both the 
outward and inward equations. Affiliate sales increase relative to exports the higher are 
transport costs and trade barriers, indicating that firms choose local presence over 
exporting when the costs of the latter are high. On the other hand, the share of affiliate 
sales is decreasing in investment barriers. The results also provide strong support for the 
effect of scale economies on affiliate sales: the share of affiliate sales decreases the 
higher are scale economies at the plant level and increases the higher are scale economies 
at the corporate level. The tax variable on the other hand has the predicted sign only in 
the case of inward activity. However, it is not possible to reject a model with only 
country and industry effects, both in the case of outward and inward equations. 
 The results also indicate that per-worker income differentials (PWGDP) reduce the 
share of affiliate sales as well as the probability of observing any affiliate sales. In other 
words, affiliate sales are better explained by the Linder hypothesis and factor-proportions 
similarities. Brainard concludes that this evidence is inconsistent with the factor-
proportions differences motive for vertical FDI. 
 As mentioned above a language dummy LANG is included to control for cultural 
familiarity, COUP proxies political risk. Both variables are expected to be particularly 
important for FDI. The results are in accordance with the predictions. The affiliate share 
(export share) is increasing (decreasing) in the language dummy. The reverse is true for 
                                                          
58 These studies usually find a positive relationship between exports and FDI, suggesting a complementary 
relationship (e.g. Lipsey and Weiss, 1981 and 1984, Swedenborg, 1979 and 1982, Blomstrom et al., 1988). Yet, 
examining the relationship between exports and FDI at the appropriate level of aggregation is the key 
(Swenson, 2004). Blonigen (2001) uses data at the product level for Japanese automobiles and parts. He finds a 
substitutive relationship. Swenson (2004) extends the results of Blonigen universally across the broad spectrum 
of products. At the same time, Swenson finds the familiar complementary relationship when foreign investment 
aggregation is left at the high level of overall manufacturing. Besides, Amiti and Wakelin (2003) show the 
importance of distinguishing different types of FDI. Trade and FDI are likely to be complements when FDI is 
vertical, and substitutes when FDI is horizontal. Amiti and Wakelin show that investment liberalisation 
stimulates exports when countries differ in relative factor endowments and trade costs are low. These are the 
conditions in which the knowledge-capital model (see Section 3.3) predicts that vertical FDI will dominate. On 
the other hand, investment liberalisation reduces exports when countries are similar in terms of relative factor 
endowments and size, and trade costs are moderate to high. In this case, the knowledge-capital model predicts 
that horizontal FDI dominates. Alternatively, a few studies use a cross-price elasticity approach. When FDI or 
trade increases in response to an increase in the ‘price’ (variables reflecting the cost of FDI and exports) of the 
other, the two are substitutes. In contrast, the two are complements when an increase in the price of the one 
leads to a increase in the ‘demand’ for the other (Head and Ries, 2004). Examples include Grubert and Mutti 
(1991), Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998) and Amiti and Wakelin (2003). 
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the coup dummy: a political coup in the last decade has a negative effect on the share of 
affiliate sales and a positive effect on the export share. The coefficients are statistically 
significant as well, except for the COUP variable in the case of U.S. inward activity.59 
 Helpman et al. (2004) extend the model in Brainard (1997) by taking into account 
firm heterogeneity besides the standard variables of the proximity-concentration trade-
off. They show that firms sort into different organizational forms according to 
productivity. Low-productivity firms serve only the domestic market. The remaining 
firms serve both foreign and domestic markets. Yet, only the most productive ones in this 
group choose to invest in foreign markets. The less productive firms choose to export. 
The empirical analysis for U.S. multinationals in Helpman et al. confirms that in sectors 
with large differences in productivity there is relatively more FDI than exports.60 
 
3.5. Review of the existing literature on bilateral FDI  
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we merely presented the knowledge-capital model and the 
proximity-concentration trade-off. In this section we evaluate the two models of bilateral 
FDI and the empirical work related to them. There are three main issues in this literature 
that warrant further investigation. The first issue has to do with the use of FDI data; the 
second with the assumptions and empirical specification of the knowledge-capital model; 
and the third with the specification of distance in the proximity-concentration model.  
 
                                                          
59 The latter is very plausible given that political instability of the host country is more of an issue from the 
perspective of American MNEs than the other way around.  
60 Empirical work in the trade literature indicates that the causality runs from the ex ante performance of the 
firm to export performance, rather than the other way around. The seminal paper on the causality between 
export and productivity is Bernard and Jensen (1999). Using data for American firms, they find that exporting 
plants and firms show superior performance characteristics relative to non-exporters. Several years before they 
actually ship any goods abroad, future exporters are larger, more productive and they pay higher wages to all 
types of workers. In the years just prior to the start of exporting, they also grow faster than their non-exporting 
counterparts. This pattern is confirmed by subsequent studies for other countries: exporting firms are more 
productive and the higher productivity is manifest prior to exporting. Greenaway and Kneller (2005) and 
Wagner (2006) give overviews of the literature. On the other hand, the literature is less unanimous about the 
reverse causality, i.e. the performance of plants once they become exporters. Bernard and Jensen (1999) 
investigate the impact of exporting on performance by comparing performance characteristics of exporters with 
those of non-exporters. Employment growth is significantly higher for exporters (in the short run, medium and 
long run) and they have significantly lower failure rates than non-exporters with similar characteristics. 
However, as indicated by Bernard and Jensen, most plant attributes, especially productivity, grow no faster, and 
even slower, at today’s exporters. This is especially the case in the long run. In principle, only the moment of 
entry is a time of growth and improved performance. Greenaway et al. (2005) summarise the results of the 
additional literature as follows: a small number of studies (Castellani, 2002, Kraay, 1999, Girma et al. 2004) 
report that export intensity matters: the productivity premium increases as the share of output exported 
increases. There is a growing body of evidence to suggest a further increase in productivity following entry, 
albeit for specific (e.g., young) firms (e.g., Kraay, 1999, Castellani, 2002) or certain time periods (Girma et al., 
2004). 
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3.5.1. U.S. bilateral FDI  
A first observation concerning the literature presented above concerns the FDI data that 
are used. The empirical contributions by Brainard (1997), Carr et al. (2001), and 
Markusen and Maskus (2002) presented above all use data on affiliate sales from the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The advantage of using affiliate sales over, 
e.g., FDI stocks is that they may be a better measure of multinational activity. Lipsey 
points out that data on FDI stocks “do not purport to measure the size of multinational 
firms or their foreign affiliates, or their activities in their host countries. They measure 
only the value of the parent firms’ financial stakes in their foreign affiliates” (Lipsey, 
2001, p.14).61 A drawback of using affiliate sales is that detailed data on the activities of 
foreign affiliates is only sparsely or not available for countries other than the U.S. As a 
result, data are bilateral with the U.S. only. This leaves out many observations of FDI 
between other countries.  
 
3.5.2. The knowledge-capital model and the role of skilled labour 
The knowledge-capital model is Markusen’s instrument for explaining the stylised fact 
that the overwhelming share of world investment in between high-income, developed 
economies. The explanation is that FDI is of a predominantly horizontal nature. As 
explained above, the knowledge-capital model predicts that horizontal FDI dominates 
when countries are similar in size and relative skill endowments.  
 The distinctive feature of the knowledge-capital model is that, within aggregate FDI, 
it distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI. To capture the distinction between 
horizontal and vertical FDI, the empirical specification in CMM imposes a certain 
structure on the data. This is illustrated by comparing the empirical specification of the 
knowledge-capital model with a standard gravity equation. Box 3.1 presents the gravity 
equation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 On the other hand, matters may not be so bad after all. Blonigen and Davis (2004, note 17) report a strong 
correlation between U.S. bilateral affiliate sales and U.S. bilateral FDI stock: 0.92 for inbound FDI activity and 
0.90 for outbound FDI. 
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Box 3.1. The gravity model 
 
 
 
 In the empirical literature, the gravity equation is the most commonly used model to 
explain the variation in trade or investments flows between countries. As with trade 
flows, the gravity equation fits the data on FDI well (Blonigen, 2005).62 The knowledge-
                                                          
62 Bergstrand and Egger (2007) show that both trade and FDI are well approximated by (different specifications 
of) a trade gravity equation. This result presents a puzzle. It implies that both trade and FDI increase in GDP 
size and similarity. However, the knowledge-capital model predicts that horizontal FDI attains a maximum 
when two countries are of equal size and factor endowments. In this case, horizontal MNEs (HMNEs) 
completely displace national, exporting firms. Bergstrand and Egger solve the puzzle by introducing to the 
2x2x2 knowledge-capital model a third factor, physical capital, and a third country. They assume that plant set-
ups are relatively more physical-capital intensive, whereas headquarter set-ups are relatively more human-
capital intensive. Let’s start by assuming that some parent i is large relative to host j. In this case, the host 
market j will be most profitably served through exports by national firms. If, however, the share of j(i) increases 
(falls), it becomes more profitable to serve j by horizontal investments to avoid trade costs. Nothing new so far. 
The key in the 3-factor model is that a change in the countries’ size causes trade and FDI to move in opposite 
The gravity model is the most commonly used model in the empirical literature to 
explain variation in trade or investments between countries. Following Newton’s 
gravity equation in physics, which relates the gravitational force between two bodies 
proportionately to the product of their masses and inversely to the square of the 
distance between them, standard gravity equations typically link bilateral flows of 
some sort between two partners to their combined economic size (increasing 
function) and (negatively) to the geographic distance. A standard gravity model of 
bilateral FDI is given by 
   
,ij
i j
ij
Y Y
FDI K
D
 
                                                                                                     (1) 
where FDIij denotes FDI from country i to j, K is a scalar, Y presents the level of GDP 
and Dij reflects distance between the two countries. Considering a loglinear model to 
deal with heteroskedasticity is very common when the size of observations differs 
substantially (Verbeek, 2004). This is typically the case in data on trade or FDI. The 
transformed basic gravity equation used in estimation then becomes: 
  
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) β ln( ) δ ln( ) ε .αij i j ij ijFDI K Y Y D                                                (2) 
 
In the trade literature the theoretical foundations for the gravity equation have been 
established in a series of papers (e.g., Anderson, 1979, Bergstrand, 1985, Anderson 
and Van Wincoop, 2003). The theoretical models of FDI discussed in this chapter are 
also gravity-type models, each in their own specific way.  
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capital model by and large gives theoretical foundations for a gravity-type equation to 
explain the pattern of FDI across countries. Still, compared to a standard gravity model, 
the empirical specification of the knowledge-capital model is rather complex. The 
empirical specification in CMM (i) imposes linear constraints on the coefficients of 
parent and host country GDP, and of parent and host country skilled-labour abundance; 
and (ii) includes interactions between variables. To allow for such interaction terms, 
CMM do not log the data, but use a linear specification instead. To what extent do the 
data support such a structure, in particular in the face of other data than the data on U.S. 
bilateral affiliate sales? 
 A second issue is that vertical FDI may in practice also be directed towards countries 
with relative skill abundance, depending on the industry. Yeaple (2003) re-estimates a 
model of U.S. outward FDI similar to Brainard (1997). The novelty of his approach is 
that he inter-acts the relative skilled-labour abundance of countries with the skilled-
labour intensity of sectors. The interaction enters the estimation equation through the unit 
costs of production. Yeaple assumes that low cost of production attracts FDI. 
 Multinational firms operating in high-skilled-labour intensive industries are then 
expected to be attracted to skilled-labour abundant countries, and multinationals 
operating in low-skilled-labour intensive industries are expected to be attracted to skilled-
labour scarce countries. He finds that “in industries with high skilled-labour intensities, 
U.S. multinationals favour skilled-labour abundant countries over skilled-labour scarce 
countries, whereas in sectors with low skilled-labour intensities U.S. multinationals 
favour skill-scarce countries over skilled-labour abundant countries” (Yeaple, 2003, p. 
727). This evidence indicates that U.S. multinationals locate types of production abroad 
in a manner that exploits host countries’ particular comparative advantage. It follows 
from Yeaple’s results that, to the extent that FDI occurs in skill-intensive industries, 
vertical FDI will also be directed towards countries with relative skill abundance rather 
than relative skill scarcity. Vertical FDI as defined in the knowledge-capital model, i.e. 
the relocation of production to relatively skilled-labour scarce countries, will then show 
up significantly only in labour-intensive industries. Yeaple’s results imply that vertical 
FDI may very well be driven by skill similarities too, depending on the industry. Thus, 
the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI on the basis of skill 
differences/similarities may not be so sharp in practice. 
                                                                                                                                                
directions. As single-plant national firms (NE) are being increasingly replaced by HMNEs, as the two countries 
become more similar, the relative demand for physical capital increases and that for human capital declines. “A 
higher price of physical capital in i raises the relative price of multi-plant HMNE firm set-ups, reducing the 
displacement of single-plant national firms and helping to secure their coexistence with HMNEs. Second, a 
lower price of human capital in i lowers the price of HMNE and NE firm set-ups, also securing coexistence of 
both types of firms” (Bergstrand and Egger, 2007, p. 294). Adding a third country sharpens the increase (fall) in 
the price of physical (human) capital thereby dampening the increase in HMNEs and the decrease in NEs more. 
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3.5.3. The proximity-concentration trade-off and the specification of distance  
The proximity-concentration trade-off hypothesis states that FDI substitutes for trade if 
distance between countries is large, while exports become more important if scale 
economies in production are large. The model is in essence a model of international 
trade. It builds on the notion that international trade decreases with ‘distance’ as 
predicted by the gravity model. When distance increases, firms will rely relatively more 
on FDI to access foreign markets. The proximity-concentration trade-off hypothesis pays 
relatively little attention to the fact that FDI may incur costs related to distance of its 
own.63  
 In economic terms, distance affects international transactions through various 
channels. The most obvious dimension of distance is physical distance, which conditions 
bilateral trade because it raises transport costs. We divide other factors that raise distance 
between countries into tangible and intangible barriers. Trade policy barriers (tariff and 
non-tariff barriers) and currency exchange barriers are examples of tangible barriers to 
trade. Examples of intangible barriers to trade include incomplete information barriers, 
cultural barriers and institutional barriers (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). 
 Recently, the trade literature has considered explicitly the role of intangible trade 
barriers in explaining patterns of bilateral trade (e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002, 
Loungani et al., 2002, Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004, De Groot et al., 2004). The 
importance of search costs and networks in trade (see, e.g., Rauch, 1999, 2001) illustrates 
the importance of information costs for patterns of trade. The effect of cultural barriers 
consists of two aspects, cultural unfamiliarity and cultural distance. Much like other 
sources of incomplete information, unfamiliarity with foreign cultures leads to search 
costs and adjustment costs incurred in international interactions. Apart from that, distance 
in terms of cultural values and norms, causes barriers related to trust and understanding 
(Linders et al., 2005). Institutions influence the uncertainty surrounding transactions and 
hence the costs associated with this. The quality of institutions affects expropriation 
risks, the degree of corruption, the enforceability of private contracts, and hence the 
security of trade (see Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002). Cultural and institutional barriers 
are relevant for FDI for much the same reasons as for trade (see, e.g., Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1997; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). In fact, these factors determine the 
cost of doing international business as such.  
 Table 3.2 summarizes the results of some recent studies that examine the effects of 
institutional and cultural barriers on both trade and FDI.64  
                                                          
63 Brainard does include a language dummy to control for cultural familiarity and a dummy indicating whether 
a country has had a political coup in the last decade to proxy political risk. The share of sales associated with 
FDI (export sales) is increasing (decreasing) in language similarity and decreasing (increasing) in political risk, 
as expected. 
64 The overview is not exhaustive. It focuses on the most recent studies and studies that include variables of 
both institutional and cultural barriers.  
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 The table suggests that intangible barriers matter for both exports and FDI. The 
effects of the cultural and institutional variables are commonly significant, even with a 
host of control variables or even fixed effects (Guiso et al., 2005). Linders et al. (2005) 
find a positive (and highly significant) effect of cultural diversity on exports. This result 
may be explained by a substitution-effect: if the costs of cultural distance weigh heavier 
on local presence than on exports, firms substitute exports for sales by local affiliates. 
The results in Table 3.2 underline the importance of mutual trust, security of trade, and 
cultural diversity in explaining total observed bilateral interactions between countries.  
  
3.6. Contributions of Part II and outline of empirical analysis  
In this section we present the extensions and contributions to the existing literature in 
Part II of this study and we give an outline of the empirical analysis in Chapters 4–6.  
 
3.6.1. FDI of the OECD  
The first contribution of this study pertains to data: throughout Part II, we use data on 
bilateral FDI stock of the OECD. Data are from the International Direct Investment 
Statistics database of the OECD.65 This significantly increases the amount of 
observations on bilateral FDI. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 gives the 
distribution (in per cent) of total outward FDI stock from the OECD to a large number of 
partner countries (OECD and non-OECD) in the period 1982–1992.66 Figure 3.1 
distinguishes between the U.S. and OECD excluding the U.S. The light-shaded areas 
indicate bilateral FDI involving the U.S. (as a parent or host country). This amounts to 60 
per cent of total FDI from the OECD. But, the OECD data also include observations on 
FDI not involving the U.S. (indicated by the dark-shaded areas in Figure 3.1). This 
accounts for another 40 per cent of total outward FDI stock. Hence, using bilateral FDI 
data of the OECD entails an increase in observations on bilateral FDI by two-thirds 
compared to using data that are bilateral with the U.S. only.  
 Table 3.3 presents the minimum and maximum set of countries in the different 
regressions of bilateral FDI in this study. 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 The data were kindly provided by Bruce Blonigen. 
66 There are no observations on FDI from non-OECD countries. However, in Chapter 1 we calculated that the 
OECD accounts for 85 per cent of total outward stock in the period 1980–2006. In other words, FDI from the 
OECD accounts for the bulk of outward FDI. 
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Figure 3.1. Distribution of FDI stocks from OECD in 1982–1992 by parent and host country, per 
cent 
 Host  OECD Non-OECD  
Parent 
 U.S. 
OECD excl. 
U.S. 
 Total parent 
 
OECD 
 
U.S 
 
0 30 5 35 
 
OECD excl. 
U.S. 
 
25 32 8 65 
 
Non-OECD 
 
 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Total host 25 62 13 100 
 
 
 
Table 3.3. Countries in sample  
Parent (OECD) Host countries (OECD and non-OECD)  
Australia Australia Indonesia Spain 
Austria  Austria Ireland Sweden 
Canada  Belgium/Luxembourg Israel Switzerland 
Finland Brazil Italy Thailand 
France Canada Japan Turkey 
Germany Chile Korea UK 
Iceland China Malaysia USA 
Italy Colombia Mexico Venezuela 
Japan Denmark Morocco Plus: 
Korea Egypt The Netherlands Argentina 
The Netherlands Finland Nigeria Iceland 
Norway France Norway New Zealand 
Sweden Germany Philippines Panama 
UK Greece Portugal Saudi Arabia 
USA India Singapore UAE a 
a United Arab Emirates    
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3.6.2. Transforming FDI stocks into sales using capital-output ratios 
The OECD data on FDI represent FDI stocks. As mentioned above, FDI stocks measure 
the value of the parent firms’ financial stakes in their foreign affiliates. They do not 
(necessarily) measure the size of multinational firms or their foreign affiliates, or their 
activities in their host countries. Affiliate sales are thought to be a better measure of 
multinational activity. It also allows for a comparison of local sales through FDI and 
exports. Still, data on affiliate sales is available for the U.S. but sparse or unavailable for 
other countries.  
 This study derives measures of FDI sales. We use capital-output ratios to transform 
FDI stocks into a measure of FDI-related sales in the foreign market. Comparison of data 
on affiliate sales from the BEA and our measures of FDI-related sales for the U.S. shows 
high levels of correlation: 0.99 or 0.90 in the case inward FDI sales, and 0.85 or 0.92 for 
outward sales.67 The calculation is based on data for 1990. FDI sales are used in Chapter 
6 (see below). 
 
3.6.3. Multilevel analysis 
An issue in the data used in Part II is dependence. The data is a panel data set for 
multiple parent and host countries, so we have repeated observations: for parents over all 
host countries, for host countries over all parents, for parent and host countries over time, 
and for specific parent-host combinations. The issue of clustering of observations in 
bilateral trade and FDI data has remained largely unaddressed in the literature on trade 
and FDI. Failure to take correlation of observations into account leads to an 
underestimation of the standard errors of the regression coefficients and can result in 
spuriously significant results. Even small levels of correlation can cause the standard 
errors from OLS to be seriously biased downwards (e.g., Moulton, 1990, Barcikowski, 
1981).  
 This study uses multilevel techniques to account for clustering of observations of FDI 
within parent and host countries and parent-host combinations. Chapter 4 explains the 
multilevel approach and fits a multilevel version of the knowledge-capital model to the 
FDI data of the OECD. Doing so extends the analysis in Blonigen et al. (2003).68 The 
latter estimate the knowledge-capital model using the FDI data used in this study, but 
their estimates are obtained by OLS. In Chapters 5 and 6, multilevel estimation is used as 
an additional robustness analysis. 
 
                                                          
67 Depending on whether the capital-output ratio of the parent country or the host country is used.  
68 See also Section 3.6.6 below.  
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3.6.4. Robustness analysis of knowledge-capital model with OECD data 
In Chapter 5 we test the empirical specification of the knowledge-capital model. Are the 
linear constraints imposed in the empirical specification supported by data on FDI of the 
OECD? And how appropriate is the linear form of the model? In the second part of the 
chapter we investigate the importance of size and skilled labour as sources of attraction 
for FDI using a gravity model.  
 
3.6.5. Culture and institutions and the mode of serving foreign markets  
Chapter 6 extends the empirical framework for analysing the trade-off between exports 
and FDI. Our approach explicitly takes into account intangible barriers related to cultural 
and institutional differences. Unlike the mechanisms described by the conventional 
proximity-concentration hypothesis, these ‘intangible’ barriers can affect the costs related 
to FDI as well as trade. The regressions include multiple dimensions of distance 
suggested by the literature on international trade as control variables.  
 
3.6.6. Indicator sets in Chapter 4 and 5 
Chapters 4 and 5 empirically investigate the knowledge-capital model using the FDI data 
of the OECD. In these analyses we use two indicator sets for the explanatory variables. 
First is the indicator set in Blonigen et al. (2003). In fact, we are not the first to use the 
FDI data of the OECD. Blonigen et al. (2003) estimate the knowledge-capital model 
using the FDI data used in this study. Still, the main purpose in Blonigen et al. 
(henceforth referred to as BDH) is to show that estimating a version of the knowledge-
capital model with absolute size and skill differences rather than a version with simple 
differences like the CMM specification, no longer supports the knowledge-capital model 
but simply favours of a horizontal model. The estimations with the OECD data merely 
serve as a robustness check to strengthen this point. A more in-depth analysis of the 
estimations or the data like this study does (i.e., taking into account the clustering of the 
FDI data and a robustness analysis of the knowledge-capital model as such) is not given. 
The estimations in BDH serve as a benchmark in Chapters 4 and 5. In addition to the 
BDH indicators we use the indicators of skilled-labour abundance, trade and investment 
costs used in CMM in Chapters 4 and 5 to check the robustness of our results with the 
BDH indicators.  
 In the estimations of the gravity model in Chapter 5, we also use the measure of 
schooling quality QL by Hanushek and Kim (1995) in addition to the BDH and CMM 
indicators of human capital and skilled-labour abundance, respectively. QL adjusts for 
quality differences in human capital across countries whilst the Barro and Lee indicator 
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merely measure the quantity (years) of schooling. Hence, QL gives a better indication of 
the stock of human capital than the Barro and Lee indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II 
Empirical Analysis of Bilateral FDI 
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Bilateral FDI and Clustering – a Cross-
Classified Multilevel Approach69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The data to be used in Part II of this study is a panel data set. The use of panel data has 
become increasingly prominent in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Baltagi, 1995, Hsiao, 
2003, Verbeek, 2004). The use of a panel data set will generally yield more efficient 
estimators than cross-sectional or time series data because data vary over two 
dimensions, countries and time. In addition, with panel data, one can control for time 
invariant country-specific effects (e.g., Egger, 2000). An issue that has remained largely 
unaddressed in the literature is the clustering of observations. Because we repeatedly 
observe the same units, it may no longer be appropriate to assume that observations are 
independent (Verbeek, 2004, Ch. 10). Failure to take correlation of observations into 
account leads to an underestimation of the standard errors of the regression coefficients 
and can result in spuriously significant results. Even small levels of correlation can cause 
                                                          
69 This chapter is based on Lankhuizen et al. (2008). 
4 
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the standard errors from OLS to be seriously biased downwards (e.g., Moulton, 1990, 
Barcikowski, 1981).70 
 We use multilevel techniques to account for clustering of observations in this study. 
In particular, we use the analogy of a cross-classified multilevel model. The data used in 
Part II of this study is a panel data set for multiple parent and host countries. This means 
we have several repeated observations: for parents over all host countries, for host 
countries over all parents, for parent and host countries over time, and for specific parent-
host combinations. The cross-classified multilevel model in this study accounts for 
clustering of FDI within parent and host countries and parent-host combinations. 
 This chapter introduces the multilevel approach and fits a cross-classified multilevel 
version of the knowledge-capital model to the FDI data of the OECD. Doing so extends 
the analysis in Blonigen et al. (2003). The latter estimate the knowledge-capital model 
using the FDI data used in this study, but their estimates are obtained by OLS.  
 The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains the multilevel approach and 
describes the cross-classified multilevel model to be used in this chapter. Section 4.3 
addresses the issue of consistency of the regression coefficients. Section 4.4 presents the 
estimation results. We compare the estimates of the cross-classified multilevel approach 
with cluster-robust linear regression. In Section 4.5, we interpret the effects on FDI of the 
explanatory variables implied by the knowledge-capital model. Section 4.6 summarises 
our main conclusions.  
 
4.2. Cross-classified multilevel regression model 
Multilevel models deal with hierarchical data structures. Hierarchical data are often 
found in social science research. Consider, e.g., a population consisting of schools and 
pupils within these schools. In this example, pupils (level 1) are clustered, or nested, 
within schools (level 2). In addition, schools may be nested in yet a higher level like, e.g., 
districts or countries. This is an example of a strict hierarchy. Data structures need not 
always be strictly hierarchical as in the previous example. Pupils can be nested within 
other level-2 units alongside schools, e.g., the area in a city they live in 
(neighbourhoods). School and area are two parallel higher-level units: pupils attending 
the same school are not necessarily from the same area and vice versa. This is an 
example of a cross-classified data structure. Graphical representations of these examples 
are given in Appendix 4B. 
                                                          
70 Barcikowski (1981) illustrates what happens to the true probability of making a type-I error in statistical 
testing when intra-class correlation is ignored. Assume that OLS results indicate that the p-value of a coefficient 
is 0.05. If one has a sample with N=10 observations and an intra-class correlation of 0.01, the true p-value is 
0.06. If, however, one has 100 observations and an intra-class correlation of 0.20, the true p-value is 0.70. 
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 Multilevel models model variability at each level of the hierarchy (Houchens et al., 
2007).71 They take into account that higher-order heterogeneity may have an impact on 
the dependent variable. If, in the example above, the dependent variable is school 
performance of pupils, then school effects (level 2) may be every bit as important in 
explaining the variation in performance as the characteristics of the pupils (level 1). 
Second, they also take into account that, because of these school (or area) effects, pupils 
going to the same school (from the same area) tend to be more like each other than pupils 
chosen at random from the population of children at large (Fielding and Goldstein, 2006). 
Multilevel models thus also take clustering into account. 
 This chapter uses the analogy of a cross-classified multilevel model (see, e.g., 
Snijders and Bosker, 1999, and Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, Ch. 12) to estimate the 
knowledge-capital model. In this study, we presume that observations of FDI over time 
are nested in the higher-level units: parents, hosts, and parent-host combinations. That is, 
the general idea of the multilevel analysis taken in this study is that higher-level parent, 
host or parent-host-combination heterogeneity has an impact on the dependent variable. 
Next, that because of these higher-level effects, ‘years’ (annual FDI values) for the same 
parent country i, host country j, or the same parent-host combination tend to be more 
alike.  
 We estimate a random intercept model with two main effects (parent and host 
countries) and a parent-by-host interaction effect.72 We start from a baseline model that 
has no independent variables (predictors). For level-1, the baseline model for the bilateral 
FDI stock in a given year t from parent country i to host country j can be written as: 
 
    ( ) ( ) ( )0
ε ,t ij ij t ijbFDI                                                                                              (4.1) 
 
where 2( )ε 0~ ( , )t ij N  . 
 
In equation (4.1),  
b0(ij) represents the 1982–1992 period mean value of the bilateral FDI stock, i.e., the 
mean of the yearly figures for the interval 1982–1992, in host country j 
originating from parent country i; 
                                                          
71 See Appendix 4B for an explanation of the basic ideas of multilevel analysis through a simple example. 
72 Multilevel models also allow slopes to be random. We have no theoretical reason to assume that the effects of 
the explanatory variables in the knowledge-capital model vary across different country groups and 
combinations, i.e. random slopes, so we do not pursue this route. But this point serves to illustrate the flexibility 
of multilevel modelling. 
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( )ε t ij  represents the individual year residual, i.e. the deviation of the FDI stock in 
year t from mean value b0(ij) for parent country i and host j. 
 
In simple OLS, instead of b0(ij), a constant or “non-varying” intercept b0 is used, while in 
multilevel models b0(ij) is typically assumed to vary randomly across higher level units, 
which, in the present case, are host and parent countries and parent-host combinations. 
For level-2, the baseline model for the 1982–1992 mean FDI stock in host country j 
originating in parent country i is written as: 
  
0( ) 00 0 0 0 ,ij i j ijb b p h c= + + +                                                                      (4.2) 
 
where, 
b00 is the grand mean, i.e. the expected FDI amount invested by a randomly selected 
parent country in a randomly selected host country, in a randomly selected year; 
p0i is the deviation of parent country i from grand mean b00, where 
2
0 00~ ( , )i pp N   and 00 0ib p+  is the 1982–1992 mean investment of (parent) 
country i collapsed over host countries;73 
h0j is the deviation of host country j from grand mean b00, where 
2
0 00~ ( , )j hh N   
and 00 0 jb h+  is the 1982–1992 mean investment in (host) country j collapsed 
over parent countries; 
c0ij is a random interaction effect, i.e., the deviation from grand mean b00 that is not 
fully captured by the main deviations p0i and h0j, where 
2
0 00~ ( , )ij phc N  . 
 
The term c0ij captures that parent and host countries may interact in their effects on 
FDIt(ij). That is, the effect of a parent may be different for different host countries and 
vice versa. In either case the ij means cannot be modelled simply by knowing the size of 
the main effects. An additional parameter must be used. This parameter is called an 
interaction (Stockburger, 1996). In our context, c0ij essentially captures the effect on FDI 
of parent-host combinations. The variances 20 p , 20h  and 20 ph  represent the amount of 
heterogeneity in the 1982–1992 mean FDI stock values attributable to the main effects 
parent and host country and to parent-by-host interaction, respectively.  
                                                          
73 The multilevel model assumes that expected values of the level-2 random effects are zero. If this is the case, 
the level-2 random effects and the explanatory level-1 variables are uncorrelated and the level-1 estimators will 
be consistent (Snijders and Berkhof, 2007). See Section 4.3 for a treatment of consistency.  
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 By substituting equation (4.2) in (4.1), we obtain the following overall baseline 
model:  
  
( ) 00 0 0 0 ( ) .t ij i j ij t ijFDI b p h c e                                                                    (4.3) 
 
Model (4.3) is often called the ‘variance component’ model. The total variance in FDIt(ij) 
is decomposed into different components, 20 p + 20h + 20 ph + 2e :  variance between parent 
countries 20 p , variance between host countries 20h , and the residual between-variance 
2
0 ph  (i.e., the variance between parent-by-host combinations), and the within-variance 
2
e  in FDI, that occurs between years for parent country i and host j. By accounting for 
the between-country variances, the multilevel model deals with the clustering in the data. 
Departing from baseline model (4.3), the correlation of two FDI values drawn from the 
same parent country, host country or the same parent-host combination can be written as 
2
0 p /( 20 p + 20h + 20 ph + 2e ), 20h /( 20 p + 20h + 20 ph + 2e ) and ( 20 p + 20h + 20 ph )/( 20 p +
2
0h + 20 ph + 2e ), respectively (see Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).  
 By adding to model (4.4) the explanatory variables we are able to explain the 
variances in FDI. Building on Carr et al. (2001), we specify the following multilevel 
version of the knowledge-capital model: 
  
00 0 0 0
2
2
( )
1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( )
4 ( ) ( ) 5 ( ) 6 ( )
7 ( ) ( ) 8 ( ) 9 ( ) .
t ij i j ij
t ij t ij t ij
t ij t ij t j t j
t j t ij t i ij t ij
b
e
FDI p h c
b SUMGDP b GDPDIFF b SKDIFF
b GDPDIFF SKDIFF b INVCH b TCH
b TCH SKDIFF b TCP b DIST
    
  
   
   
                                   (4.4) 
  
In model (4.4), the effects of parent, host and parent-host combinations are netted out, as 
these are represented by p0i , h0j , and c0ij respectively. As a result, the interpretation of 
the coefficients bi in (4.4) changes compared to OLS (see equation (3.1)): the multilevel 
model focuses on explaining the variance of FDI over the years for parent country i and 
host j (within-variance). The OLS-estimates The OLS-estimates include country and 
temporal effects. Second, for a parent/host pair ij the intercept of model (4.4) is given by 
the expression b00 + p0i + h0j + c0ij. The interpretation of b00 has, compared to model (4.2), 
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changed from ‘grand mean’ to ‘grand intercept’, with p0i, h0j and c0ij now being parent, 
host and parent-by-host deviations from this ‘grand intercept’. 
 An alternative way to take into account the intra-class correlations is through cluster-
robust linear regression (see, e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002). Cluster-robust linear 
regression adjusts the standard errors of the regression coefficients to account for the loss 
of independence. It leaves the OLS-regression coefficients unaltered. A drawback of 
cluster-robust linear regression compared to the multilevel model in the face of the 
present data is that in cluster-robust linear regression one can only use one cluster 
variable at a time. Besides, it does not take into account the effects on the estimated 
parameter of country-specific or parent/host-specific heterogeneity. The cross-classified 
multilevel approach accounts for three cluster effects simultaneously. 
 
4.3. Consistency 
The multilevel model in this paper deals with intra-class correlation by accounting for the 
effects of parent, host or parent-host-combination heterogeneity on FDI. The multilevel 
model then explains the variance between years for parent country i and host j. 
Controlling for time-invariant country-specific effects is done frequently in the literature 
on international trade and FDI to check the sensitivity of the estimation results to omitted 
variables bias. Contrary to common practice in the gravity literature, the multilevel 
model captures these effects through random rather than fixed effects. An advantage of 
the multilevel approach over regression with fixed effects is that we can keep all 
variables in the specification because only the variances over countries are explicitly 
estimated. In the fixed effects estimation, the effect of (time-invariant) distance can no 
longer be estimated. Also, and related to the previous advantage, is that, because the 
multilevel model only estimates variances over countries and parent-host combinations, it 
is parsimonious with degrees of freedom. Instead, in the fixed effects regression, 
coefficients for each separate country and pair are estimated. 
 A possible drawback of random effects is the existence of correlation between the 
time-varying explanatory variables in (5) and the random effects p0i , h0j , and c0ij. A 
crucial assumption in view of consistent estimators is that such correlation is non-
existent. This is reflected by the assumption of zero expected values of the random 
effects. If, for example, the expected value of p0i equals some non-zero value zi, then by 
ignoring zi in the regression model, the effect of zi will be absorbed by the regression 
coefficients b (Snijders and Berkhof, 2008), thus creating a bias. 
 The Hausman-test is commonly used as test of the assumption of non-orthogonality 
in a random effects model. This test investigates whether the random effects estimator 
differs significantly from a fixed effects estimator (see, e.g., Verbeek, 2004). In general, 
economists are of the view that, if there is a significant difference between the random 
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effects estimator and the fixed effects estimator, the fixed effects specification and OLS 
estimation should be used. However, according to Fielding (2004), abandoning a random 
effects framework based on a significant Hausman test is premature.74 For one, the test is 
sensitive to misspecifications. A significant value for the test may thus be misleading as a 
diagnostic for this misspecification. Fielding (2004) points out that dropping a key 
variable in the model can have this effect. Also, the null distribution might not be well 
approximated by the asymptotic Chi-square in finite samples, which can lead to an 
overstated size of the test (Fielding, 2004, p. 6). Next, there are the advantages of random 
effects over fixed effects mentioned in the previous section, i.e. the possibility to retain 
all explanatory variables in a random effects model (this is particularly critical when 
there are strict criteria governing the addition of explanatory variables) and the fact that it 
is parsimonious with degrees of freedom.  
 What’s more though, there is an alternative procedure to ensure unbiased estimators 
in a model with random effects. Snijders and Berkhof (2008) argue that it is useful to add 
the cluster means (here by parent, host and parent-host combination) of the explanatory 
variables as additional level-1 variables to the equation. Lack of orthogonality of the 
explanatory variables and an omitted zi will materialise through these cluster means. 
There will be a bias due to the lack of orthogonality if the cluster means are non-zero. By 
adding the cluster means to the model, the orthogonality of an unobserved zi to the cluster 
means can be tested implicitly by testing the null-hypothesis that the effects of the cluster 
means are equal to zero (Baltagi, 1995, Snijders and Berkhof, 2008).75 Yet, Snijders and 
Berkhof (2008) argue that using this test for deciding between fixed or random effects is 
slightly beside the point: by adding the cluster means as additional explanatory variables, 
the random-effects model yields unbiased estimates of the within-cluster effects b.76 
 So, to ensure consistency of the estimators, we include cluster means of the 
explanatory variables. A few words are in order, here. In a number of cases, correlation 
between the explanatory variables and cluster means is very high (>0.98). In particular, 
such high correlations exist between the bilateral variables of the model (SUMGDPt(ij), 
SKDIFFt(ij), etc.) and the means by country pair; between INVCt(j) and TCHt(j) and their 
means by host country; and between TCPt(i) and its mean by parent country. Besides, 
distance is constant over time, so the value for a particular parent-host combination is the 
same across all years and is identical to the mean by country pair. This is the case in both 
indicator sets. Hence, we exclude eight cluster means on these grounds. In addition, high 
                                                          
74 See Fielding (2004) for a more detailed review of the reservations regarding the Hausman test uncovered in 
the literature. 
75 This can be interpreted as testing the equality between the within-cluster regression coefficient and the 
between-cluster coefficient. The test for equality of the within-cluster and the between-cluster coefficients is a 
special case of the Hausman test (Snijders and Berkhof, 2008).  
76 We point out that the addition of the cluster means changes the characterization of the level-2 variation 
(Fielding, 2004). But since we are not interested in the study of the level-2 effects themselves, we shall not 
dwell on this point here. Our primary concern is with obtaining consistent estimates of b. 
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correlations also exist between some of the cluster means. The multilevel model cannot 
be estimated as a result of these high correlations. We therefore dropped cluster means 
that were highly correlated with another cluster mean in a step-by-step procedure, 
starting with cluster means that had the highest correlation until the model could be 
estimated. This resulted in the model being estimated with twelve (ten) cluster means for 
the BDH (CMM) indicator set. As it turns out in the regressions, several cluster means 
are statistically insignificant.77 Although, in principle we want to include as many cluster 
means as possible (so as to ensure consistent estimators), we also estimated specifications 
that include only cluster means that are statistically significant to investigate the 
estimations’ sensitivity for varying the number of cluster means.   
 
4.4. Estimation results 
In the estimations we use the indicator set of BDH. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
estimations in BDH provide a benchmark for our empirical analysis. To check the 
robustness of our results with the BDH indicators we also use the CMM indicators of 
skilled-labour abundance, trade and investment costs.  
 As argued above, the estimates of between-variances can be used to calculate 
correlation of observations belonging to the same parent and host country and the same 
parent-host combination. How large is the intra-class correlation in the FDI data? We use 
maximum likelihood estimation to fit the cross-classified multilevel model.78 For the 
BDH indicator set  Table 4.1 gives the estimates of the within-variance 2e  as well as the 
between-variances, 20 p , 20h  and 20 ph , respectively, for two different baseline models, 
one including and the other excluding the interaction effect c0ij. Note that the model 
including c0ij has a much better fit in terms of the log likelihood (–2LL). All three 
variances are statistically significant.79 Based on the estimates of this model, the 
correlation of two FDI values drawn from the same parent-host combination is 0.78. 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 There is a high degree of multicollinearity even after cluster means have been excluded on a priori grounds 
as explained above. This is especially the case in the regressions with the BDH indicators. 
78 Baltagi and Chang (1994) compare alternative estimators of the variance components. 
79 To test the significance of the variances we proceed as follows (see Snijders and Bosker, 1999). We compare 
the log likelihood of the model including all three effects with the corresponding log likelihood value of the 
model without p0i, h0j and c0ij, respectively. An effect is significant if its inclusion decreases the log likelihood. 
The difference in log likelihood is Chi-squared distributed with 1 degree of freedom. (In general, the number of 
degrees of freedom equals the number of parameters in an unrestricted model, including random effects, that 
have to be set to zero to obtain the restricted model.) In the case at hand, not including p0i, h0j or c0ij causes the 
value of the log likelihood to increase by 25, 47 and 2118, respectively. These increases are highly significant. 
4  Bilateral FDI and Clustering – Multilevel Approach   67 
 
Table 4.1. Estimates of covariance parameters and intra-class correlations  
 Estimates of model  
( ) 00 0 0 (t ij i j t ij
FDI b p h e  
 
Estimates of model 
( ) 00 0 0 0t ij i j ij
FDI b p h c   
 
Level 1   
   Individual variance, 2e  85393849 25768340 
Level 2   
   Parent country variance, 
2
0 p  20392486 10502087 
   Host country variance, 20h  38130613 19750797 
   Parent-host combination variance,
 
2
0 ph  - 62116747 
Intra-class correlation   
   Same parent country (
2
0 p /( 20 p + 20h + 20 ph + 2e )) 0.09 
   Same host country ( 20h /( 20 p + 20h + 20 ph + 2e )) 0.17 
   Same parent / host combination (( 20 p + 20h + 20 ph )/( 20 p + 20h
+ 20 ph + 2e )) 
0.78 
–2LL 29423 27305 
Dependent variable: FDIt(ij). 
 
 
We conclude that intra-class correlation is a serious issue in these data that needs to be 
taken into account in order to make correct inferences. OLS neglects this clustering of 
observations and may thus lead to an overestimation (underestimation) of the 
coefficients’ significance levels (standard errors). The higher is the correlations between 
observations from any of the three groups, the greater the bias in the estimated standard 
errors from OLS.  
 Table 4.2 demonstrates the effects of re-estimating the knowledge-capital model with 
the BDH data set using different estimation methods. Column (1) reproduces the BDH 
results using OLS. Most coefficients are statistically significant. TCHt(j) is the exception. 
Columns (2) – (4) in Table 4.2 present the results of OLS estimates with cluster-robust 
standard errors. The table presents the results of clustering by parent and host country 
and by country pair. As expected, the t-values decrease across the board.  
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 The values in columns (2) – (4) appropriately reflect that there is less independence in 
the data than is implicitly assumed by the OLS procedure. Skill differences SKDIFFt(ij) 
and investment costs in the host country INVCt(j) are no longer statistically significant 
with clustering either by parent country, host country or country pair. The variables 
GDPDIFFt(ij)2, TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2 and TCPt(i) become insignificant with clustering by 
host country. GDPDIFFt(ij)2 is also insignificant with clustering by country pair.  
 Specifications (5) and (6) in Table 4.2 present the results for the cross-classified 
multilevel model with parent, host, and parent-by-host random effects. Specification (5) 
includes as many cluster means (parent and host-country and parent-host-combination) as 
possible. Specification (6) contains only the two statistically significant cluster means. 
Note that the interpretation of the coefficients in the multilevel regression is different 
from OLS: the multilevel results focus on the within-country and within-parent-host-
combination changes instead of cross-country-level and cross-combination-level 
differences. The random effects entail using country- and parent-host-combination-
specific means of 1982–1992 FDI stocks (see the explanation relating to equation (4.3)). 
The interpretation of the intercept in the multilevel model also changes compared to 
OLS. The results in the multilevel specifications reflect the expected amount of FDI 
invested by a randomly selected parent country in a randomly selected host country, in a 
randomly selected year. The random effects capture the deviations of parent i and host j 
and parent-host combination ij from this overall intercept. 
 The results in column (5) illustrate that taking account of clustering of FDI within 
parent and host countries and parent-host combinations and looking at the within-country 
and within-parent-host-combination changes makes a difference. First, coefficient sizes 
from the multilevel estimation are quite different from OLS. Most notable is the big 
increase in the coefficient of the skill-difference term vis-à-vis the coefficient from 
OLS.80 This indicates that the impact of skill differences on FDI is particularly large for 
parent i and host j over time.81 In addition, the coefficients on INVCHt(j), (TCHt(j)  
SKDIFFt(ij)2) and TCHt(j) change sign. Concerning investment costs we find that a higher 
level of investment costs in one host country versus another will increase the level of 
investment in the latter (results from OLS). However, an increase in investment costs 
within one host country over time does not have this effect (multilevel), even though as 
CMM (p. 702) point out “the theoretical results [should] apply equally well to time-series 
                                                          
80 On account of the size of the coefficients in general, note that the regression of the knowledge-capital model 
is specified as linear in levels as opposed to log linear. Hence, different from common procedure in, e.g., the 
gravity literature, the coefficients do not represent elasticities. This explains the large absolute size of some of 
the coefficients (e.g., on the skill-difference term). 
81 The partial derivative of FDI with respect to skill differences is b3+b4GDPDIFFt(ij)+2 b7 TCHt(j) 
SKDIFFt(ij) (see below). Using the coefficients in column (5) of Table 3, a marginal increase in skill differences 
for a pair of countries, that are equal in size and with zero trade costs in the host country, increases FDI between 
them by 3,039 million U.S. dollars. 
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and cross-section processes”. As for the remaining variables, the multilevel results are 
qualitatively similar to their OLS counterparts. 
 Column (6) presents the results from the specification with only two (statistically 
significant) cluster means. Although the results in this specification are qualitatively 
similar to those in (5) (only TCPt(i) changes sign), the coefficient sizes differ. This 
illustrates that, if one includes (too) few cluster means, the within-regression coefficients 
may incorporate (part of) the between-cluster effects (cf. Snijders and Berkhof, 2008). 
 Column (7) presents the results from the estimation of the knowledge-capital model 
with country and pair wise fixed effects. That is, the specification includes country 
(parent and host) and parent-host-combination dummy variables. This specification too, 
focuses on the within-country and within-parent-host-combination effects. Because 
distance is constant, this variable has to be dropped with (time-invariant) fixed effects. 
Summing up the evidence in specification (7), we find that the results with fixed effects 
estimation are largely consistent with the results from the multilevel analysis. Parameters 
by and large have similar signs and magnitudes.82 Similar to the multilevel results 
(columns (5) and (6)) the coefficient of INVCHt(j) is positive with fixed effects. The sign 
reversal of the multilevel estimate of TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2 vis-à-vis OLS is equally 
mirrored by the fixed effects estimation. 
 We also ran the estimations using the CMM indicators of skilled-labour abundance, 
and trade and investment costs. Table 4.3 presents the results. Again, we find that the 
sizes of coefficients in the multilevel estimation (columns (5) and (6)) differ substantially 
from OLS and that there are even sign reversals (in this case, for INVCHt(j), TCHt(j), and 
TCPt(i)).83 The multilevel coefficient of TCPt(i) is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of the knowledge-capital model, whereas the multilevel coefficient of 
INVCHt(j) is not consistent with the theory (cf. the results with the BDH indicators). The 
sign reversals in the multilevel regression vis-à-vis OLS of INVCHt(j) and TCPt(i) are 
again mirrored by results from the fixed effects estimation (specification (7)).84 
 
 
 
                                                          
82TCHt(j) and TCPt(i) are the main exceptions. These variables are statistically insignificant in all three 
specifications, though. In other words, the confidence intervals wrap around zero.  
83 The differences between specifications (5) and (6) in Table 4.3 are smaller than in Table 4.2. In fact, there is 
less multicollinearity in the multilevel regressions that include cluster means with the CMM indicators. Hence, 
more cluster means are retained in specification (6) in Table 4.3 compared to Table 4.2 (the regressions with the 
BDH indicators). 
84 The coefficient of TCHt(j) differs across the multilevel and the fixed effects estimation methods. Yet, it is 
highly insignificant statistically with either method. 
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4.5. Interpretation of the coefficients 
A distinctive feature of the knowledge-capital model is that the effects on FDI due to a 
change in GDP differences, skill differences and trade costs of the host are not 
monotonous. This is the result of the interaction terms used in the knowledge-capital 
model. It implies that effects of the independent variables are different for different types 
of countries.  
 The partial derivative of FDI with respect to GDP differences, skill differences and 
host-country trade costs is 2 b2 GDPDIFFt(ij)+ b4 SKDIFFt(ij), b3+b4
GDPDIFFt(ij)+2 b7 TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij) and b6+b7 SKDIFFt(ij)2, respectively. It 
follows that the effect on FDI resulting from a change in, e.g., parent-country GDP vis-à-
vis the host country, varies according to the differences between the two countries in 
GDP and skilled-labour abundance. The first column in Table 4.4 gives these partial 
derivatives using the estimated coefficients from Tables 4.2 and 4.3.85  
 Consider the impact on FDI of GDP differences first (panel A in Table 4.4). The OLS 
derivatives in column (1) of Table 4.4 indicate that the impact of GDP differences on 
FDI switches from negative to positive for smaller values of GDPDIFF and SKDIFF. 
This can be illustrated as follows. If the parent country is large (GDPDIFF > 0), an 
increase in parent-country GDP (ΔGDPDIFF > 0) will decrease FDI for zero skill 
differences. The negative effect of an increase in parent-country GDP, when the parent is 
large, is further reinforced by large skill differences (SKDIFF > 0). To put it in a 
different way, if the parent is relatively skilled-labour abundant as well, an increase in 
parent-country GDP will reduce FDI for lower levels of GDP differences. On the other 
hand, if the parent is small (GDPDIFF < 0) and/or relatively skilled-labour scarce 
(SKDIFF < 0), an increase in parent-country GDP will increase FDI abroad. In this case, 
the increase in parent-country GDP implies income convergence. The effect of income 
convergence also works in the opposite direction: when a parent country is large, an 
increase in the host-country’s GDP (ΔGDPDIFF < 0) will increase FDI from parent i to 
host j. Columns (2) through (5) in Table 4.4 illustrate this numerically. We use the 
maximum values of GDPDIFF and SKDIFF in the sample to express that the parent is 
large and skill-abundant relative to the host, and the minimum value of GDPDIFF and 
SKDIFF (both of which < 0) as a proxy for a small (large) and relatively skilled-labour 
scarce (abundant) parent (host).86  
 
                                                          
85 Concerning the multilevel derivatives, we employed the coefficients in column (5) of Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
86 In the calculation of the partial derivatives in Table 4.4, we always use the maximum or minimum value for 
only one variable, whilst fixing the other variable(s) in the expression to its sample mean. The values used in 
the calculations are given in Appendix 4A. 
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 Second, concerning the impact of differences in skill endowments (panel B in Table 
4.4), the OLS derivatives indicate that an increase in the skilled-labour abundance of the 
parent has a positive effect on FDI when countries are similar, or when the parent is 
relatively small or skilled-labour scarce (GDPDIFF and SKDIFF < 0). Larger GDP 
and/or skill differences reduce this effect. That is, when the parent is large and/or skilled-
labour abundant relative to a host, an increase in skill abundance of the parent will reduce 
its FDI abroad. In this case, FDI will rather increase as a result of an increase in the 
skilled-labour abundance of the host country (ΔSKDIFF < 0). This result implies that 
FDI from large and skill abundant countries is attracted to more skilled-labour abundant 
host countries. CMM find similar results based on bilateral FDI for the U.S. CMM 
conclude that this result is “consistent with the well-known stylised fact that the poorest 
countries in the world receive a much smaller share of world investment than their share 
of world income” (p. 706). Our results for the OLS derivatives are consistent with the 
empirical findings, as well as the predictions from theory and the simulations in the 
original paper by CMM.  
 Next, consider the multilevel derivatives in panels A and B in Table 4.4. The 
multilevel derivatives express the effects of the explanatory variables on FDI over time. 
The results in Table 4.4 indicate that the effects of GDP differences and relative 
endowment differences on FDI over time are qualitatively similar to the country/temporal 
effects from OLS. An increase in parent-country GDP over time vis-à-vis the host will 
increase FDI if the parent is small (GDPDIFF < 0) and/or more skilled-labour scarce 
(SKDIFF < 0), and decrease FDI if the parent country is large and/or more skilled-labour 
abundant. Similarly, the multilevel derivatives also suggest that an increase over time in 
the skilled-labour abundance of the parent will reduce FDI from the parent if the parent is 
relatively large and/or skill abundant, whilst an increase in host-country skill abundance 
will increase FDI from the parent to the host in that case.87 Hence, the effects of GDP 
differences and relative endowment differences on FDI apply across countries and over 
time.  
 Panel C of Table 4.4 gives the results for the impact of host-country trade costs. The 
results are mixed. They differ across estimation methods and, with the same estimation 
method, across indicator sets. This is due to the fact that the coefficient of TCHt(j) is 
positive on one occasion and negative on the next. So, we cannot draw any firm 
conclusions as to the effect of host-country trade costs on FDI, across countries nor over 
time. 
                                                          
87 In the multilevel derivative using the BDH indicators, the coefficient b7 > 0. In this case, the change in the 
effect of a difference in skill endowments from positive to negative does not depend on SKDIFF. Nevertheless, 
the results that an increase in the skilled-labour abundance of the parent (ΔSKDIFF > 0) over time may reduce 
FDI from the parent if the parent is relatively large and that an increase in the skilled-labour abundance of the 
host country (ΔSKDIFF < 0) may increase inward investment if this host is small relative to the parent apply 
here too. The term GDPDIFF is dominant in the derivative.  
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4.6. Conclusion 
The data used in Part II of this study involve a panel data set with multiple parent and 
host countries. The use of panel data has become increasingly prominent in the empirical 
literature (see, e.g., Baltagi, 1995, Hsiao, 2003, Verbeek, 2004). The use of a panel data 
set will generally yield more efficient estimators than cross-sectional or time series data 
because data vary over two dimensions, countries and time. Also, with panel data, one 
can control for time invariant country-specific effects (e.g., Egger, 2000). An issue that 
often remains unaddressed in the literature is the clustering of observations in a panel 
data set: because the same units are repeatedly observed, it may no longer be appropriate 
to assume that observations are independent. In particular, if the time-series variation in 
the data is weak, the closer one is to merely running a series of cross-section regressions. 
The estimated standard errors from OLS, which assume independence of observations, 
will be biased accordingly. In the empirical analysis of bilateral phenomena such as 
international trade, FDI, migration, etc., with panel data, the issue of clustering is 
particularly complex since there are several repeated observations: for countries of origin 
(over all destination countries), for destination countries (over all origin countries), for 
origin and destination countries over time, and for specific origin-destination 
combinations.  
 This chapter holds relevant lessons for empirical investigations of bilateral trade, FDI, 
migration, etc., with panel data. The chapter illustrates that multilevel analysis offers a 
useful framework to address intra-class correlation when there are several cluster 
variables at the same time. We use a cross-classified multilevel technique to account for 
clustering of FDI within parent and host countries and parent-host combinations. The 
general idea of the multilevel analysis in this study is first that higher-level (here, parent, 
host or parent-host-combination) heterogeneity has an impact on the dependent variable. 
Next, that because of these higher-level effects, ‘years’ (annual FDI values) for the same 
parent country i, host country j, or the same parent-host combination tend to be more 
alike. The multilevel model therefore accounts for the effects of parent, host or parent-
host-combination heterogeneity on FDI and subsequently explains the variance between 
years for parent country i and host j. The advantage of the cross-classified multilevel 
model over cluster-robust linear regression in this study is that the former accounts for 
three cluster variables simultaneously. With cluster-robust linear regression one can only 
use one cluster variable (host, parent or combination) at a time.  
 Contrary to common practice in the gravity literature, the cross-classified multilevel 
model uses random rather than fixed effects for controlling for the effects of parent, host 
and parent-host-combination heterogeneity. A possible drawback of random effects is the 
correlation between the random effects and the explanatory variables. This chapter shows 
that unbiased estimates can equally be obtained with random effects, provided that the 
cluster means of the explanatory variables are added to the model.  
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 This chapter fits a cross-classified multilevel version of the knowledge-capital model 
to the FDI data of the OECD. The multilevel approach entails estimating the effect of the 
explanatory variables over time for parent i and host j. We find that, for the most part, the 
predictions of the knowledge-capital model as derived from theory and simulations (see 
CMM) equally apply over time. That is, coefficient sizes from the multilevel estimation 
are different from OLS, yet the effects of the explanatory variables on FDI over time are 
qualitatively similar to the country/temporal effects from OLS. Summing up, the results 
indicate that FDI between two countries increases in the sum of their GDPs. 
Convergence in income between two countries increases FDI from parent i to host j in 
both directions. In other words, both size and similarity between countries in terms of 
size are important for FDI. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the 
knowledge-capital model regarding horizontal FDI. Economies of scale to a large extent 
explain the need for size (in both markets) in this type of FDI. Third, an increase in the 
skilled-labour abundance of the parent will increase FDI if the parent is relatively small 
and/or skilled-labour scarce. On the other hand, when the parent is large and/or relatively 
skill abundant, an increase in host-country skill abundance will increase FDI from the 
parent to the host. The latter indicates that FDI from large and skill abundant OECD 
countries is attracted to more skill-abundant hosts. Here, we find an explanation for the 
stylised fact that FDI is foremost between developed, high-income countries. Concerning 
investment costs we find that, on the one hand, a higher level of investment costs in one 
host country versus another increases the level of investment in the latter (OLS-results 
and consistent with theoretical prediction). However, an increase in investment costs 
within one host country over time does not have this effect (multilevel). The results 
concerning the impact over time of trade costs of the host country are inconclusive. The 
theoretical prediction is that high trade costs in a host country induce horizontal FDI as a 
substitute for exports. Yet, our results differ across the indicator sets.   
 The distinctive feature of the knowledge-capital model is that, within aggregate FDI, 
it distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI. To capture the distinction between 
horizontal and vertical FDI, the empirical specification in CMM imposes a certain 
structure on the data. In particular, to capture the predictions of the vertical model, the 
specification: (i) imposes the subtractive linear constraint that the coefficients on parent 
and host country skilled-labour abundance are of equal size but opposite in sign; and (ii) 
includes the interaction between income differences and skill differences. To allow for 
such interaction terms, CMM do not log the data, but use a linear specification instead. 
The empirical specification of the knowledge-capital is derived from theory. Yet, to what 
extent do the data support such a structure? We investigate this question in the next 
chapter.  
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Appendix 4A. Data 
Table 4A.1 gives the descriptive statistics for the sample with the BDH indicators.  
 
 
Table 4A.1 – Summary statistics for sample with BDH indicators (N=2460) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
FDIt(ij) 4,322 11,762 –357.1 176,781 
SUMGDPt(ij) 1,674 1,498 73.0 6,449 
GDPDIFFt(ij)2 3.2e+06 5.8e+06 1.2e-04 2.1e+07 
SKDIFFt(ij) 1.65 2.69 –5.40 8.1 
GDPDIFFt(ij) SKDIFFt(ij) 3,401 6,460 –6,996 31,012 
INVCt(j) 42.0 12.3 17.3 65 
TCHt(j) 31.3 59.3 –286.2 87.3 
TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2 422.6 1,050 –6,559 5,599 
TCPt(i) 52.0 22.3 –18.8 82.4 
DISTij 6,303 4,792 174 18,372 
 
 
Table 4A.2 gives the descriptive statistics for the sample with the CMM indicators.  
 
 
Table 4A.2 – Summary statistics for sample with Carr et al. indicators (N=1474) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
FDIt(ij) 5290.5 14049.9 –357.1 176,781 
SUMGDPt(ij) 1591.1 1539.2 88.6 6,449 
GDPDIFFt(ij)2 3.2e+06 6.1e+06 0.004 2.1e+07 
SKDIFFt(ij) 0.04 0.12 –0.26 0.29 
GDPDIFFt(ij) SKDIFFt(ij) 57.4 211.6 –297. 8 1,086.8 
INVCt(j) 38.3 11.3 14. 9 68.3 
TCHt(j) 34.7 12.4 7.86 81.4 
TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2 0.56 0.76 0 5.50 
TCPt(i) 34.3 9.46 14.3 56.6 
DISTij 6,111 4,963 174 18,837 
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Appendix 4B. Basic ideas of multilevel analysis through a simple illustration 
In this appendix we explain the basic ideas of multilevel analysis through a simple 
illustration. 
 
4B.1. Hierarchical data  
In social science research data are often hierarchical. Consider, e.g., a population 
consisting of schools and pupils within these schools. In this example, pupils (level 1) are 
clustered, or nested, within schools (level 2). In addition, schools may be nested in an 
even higher level like districts or countries. This is an example of a strict hierarchy (see 
Figure 4B.1 panel (a)). Data structures need not always be a strict hierarchy as in the 
previous example. Cross-classified data are examples of non-hierarchical multilevel data. 
Cross classifications exist when several higher-level units exist next to each other. For 
instance, pupils (level 1) are nested within schools and areas, which are two parallel 
level-2 units (see Figure 4B.1 panel (b)).  
 
4B.2. Multilevel analysis 
Each level of the hierarchy, from pupils at the first level to schools and areas at level 2, 
or school districts at the highest level, can conceivably contribute to variation in the 
level-1 dependent variable, pupils’ school performance (Houchens et al., 2007). In other 
words, there may be influential ‘school, area or district effects’ which are every bit as 
important in explaining the variation in pupils’ school performance as the characteristics 
of the children. If the effects of school (and in more complex structures the effects of, 
e.g., area or district) are strong, children from the same school etc., will tend to be more 
like each other than pupils chosen at random from the population of children at large 
(Fielding and Goldstein, 2006). An analysis that takes higher-level effects into account is 
clearly desirable in these examples.  
 Multilevel models are an appropriate way of handling hierarchical data structures 
(see, e.g., Snijders and Bosker, 1999, Hox, 2002, Fielding and Goldstein, 2006). 
Multilevel models model (the different sources of) variability at each level of the 
hierarchy and properly adjust estimates to account for them (Houchens et al., 2007).  
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Figure 4B.1 – Illustrations of multilevel data structures  
 
Panel (a). Three-level structure of pupils within schools within Local Education Authorities (districts) 
 
 
 
Panel (b). Pupils at level 1 nested within a school and an area cross-classified at level 2 
Source: Fielding and Goldstein (2006). 
 
 Let’s illustrate the basic ideas of multilevel analysis by keeping with the example of 
pupils’ school performance. Figure 4B.2 graphically displays variation in pupils’ school 
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performance for a simple two-level hierarchy of pupils and schools, not including any 
explanatory variables.  
 Panel (a) illustrates the variation in pupils’ school performance without accounting 
for clustering. The variation in pupils’ performance is accounted for in its entirety by the 
deviation of individual pupils’ performance from the average (the residuals).  
 
Figure 4B.2 – Sources of variation in a simple hierarchy of pupils and school  
 
 
     Panel (a). Single level ignoring clustering 
Average
Performance
Pupil i
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     Panel (b). Two-level taking into account clustering 
     Source: adapted from Houchens et al. (2007) 
 
 
 In a more formal way, the situation represented by Figure 4B.2(a) can be written as:  
 
0βi iey   .                                          (4B.1) 
 
In equation (4B.1), β0 is the mean school performance across all pupils; ei represents the 
individual residual for pupil i, i.e. the deviation of school performance of pupil i from the 
overall mean β0, where 2~ (0, )i ee N  . 
 Panel (b) in Figure 4B.2(b) gives the same data but taking into account clustering. 
The total variation in pupils’ performance is now the sum of school variance and pupil 
variance. The school variance is represented by the spread of the school-level residuals 
around the overall mean. The pupil variance is represented by the spread of the pupil-
level residuals around the school means. 
 A corresponding model of Figure 4B.2(b) can be written as:  
 
Sc
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School j
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l 
Pupil-level
residual
School-level
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0βij j ijey   ,                     (4B.2) 
 
where, yij denotes school performance of pupil i in school j. β0j represents the mean of the 
dependent variable for school j. eij represents the deviation of school performance of 
pupil i in school j from the mean value β0j for school j. 2~ 0( , )ij eNe  . 
 In (4B.2) we have a model where β0j has a subscript relating to a particular school j 
rather than β0. β0j is typically assumed to vary randomly across schools: 
 
0 00 0β βj ju  .                   (4B.3) 
 
In equation (4B.3), β00 is the grand mean, i.e., the expected school performance of a 
randomly selected pupil i in a randomly selected school j. u0j is the deviation of school j 
from grand mean β00, where 20 00~ ( , )j u jNu  and β00 + u0j is the mean school 
performance of pupils in school j. 
 By substituting equation (4B.3) in (4B.2), we obtain the following baseline model: 
 
00 0βij j ijy u e   .                  (4B.4) 
 
Model (4B.4) is often called a ‘null’, ‘empty’ or ‘variance component’ model. By adding 
to model (4B.4) explanatory variables we can explain the variance in yij. Let’s – for the 
sake of graphical simplicity below – add only one explanatory variable, x1ij. The 
multilevel model then becomes:  
 
00 0 1 1β βij j ij ijy u x e    .                 (4B.5) 
 
The interpretation of β00 in model (4B.5) has, compared to model (4B.4), changed from 
'grand mean' to 'grand intercept', with u0j now being school deviations from this 'grand 
intercept'. Model (4B.5) is commonly called the 'random intercept' model.  
 Figure 4B.3 illustrates the different interpretations of the random parameters u0j and 
eij in the baseline model (4B.4) and the ‘full’ multilevel model (4B.5). 
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Figure 4B.3 – Difference variance component model and random intercept model 
 
 
The model in (4B.5) can be easily extended to include more random effects. Adding 
another level-2 effect (for l = 1, …, L areas) we get a cross-classified multilevel model 
comparable to the one we use in the main text: 
 
000 0 0 1 1β βj lijl ijl ijly u u x e     .                  (4B.6) 
 
Multilevel models also allow slopes to be random:  
 
00 0 1 11 1β βj jij ij ij ijy u x u x e     .                  (4B.7) 
 
In model (4B.7) we have two random effects (u0j and u1j) at the school level. The relation 
between x1ij and yij is now given by β1j = β1 + u1j. In the context of our study, we have no 
theoretical reason to assume that the effects of the explanatory variables in the 
knowledge-capital model should be different for different country groups and 
combinations, so we do not pursue this route. But this serves to illustrate the flexibility of 
multilevel modelling. 
in model (4)
in model (5)
model (4)
model (5)
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Appendix 4C. Calculation of covariance   
In this appendix we compare different ways to estimate the covariance matrix of the OLS 
estimator. 
The true covariance matrix of the OLS estimator of β is: 
  1 2 1( ) ( ) ( )V b X X X V X X X    , where V is the covariance matrix of the random error 
term.  
 Under Gauss-Markov conditions V=IN, where IN is the identity matrix. Consequently, 
the covariance matrix of the OLS estimator of β is:   2 1( )V b X X  . The variance of 
the OLS estimator b is routinely calculated as 2 1ˆ ( )X X  , where 
2
( )2
ˆ
ˆ t ij
e
N k
  
  is an 
unbiased estimator of 2 .  
  In the cross-classified multilevel model in this paper, the off-diagonal components of 
the covariance matrix are not (necessarily) zero. We can illustrate the structure of the 
covariance matrix in our model by a simple example. Consider five observations of 
bilateral FDI with only two parent countries (i = 1, 2) and two host countries (j = 1, 2) as 
presented in Table 4C.1. The table indicates, e.g., that observations 1–3 are for the same 
host and that observations 1, 3 and 5 are for the same parent, and that observations 1 and 
3 are for the same parent and host.  
 Using p, h, c and e to denote the variances 20 p , 20h , 20 ph and 2e  in the main text, 
the structure of the covariance matrix for these five observations is as follows: 
 
 
Table 4C.1 – Five observations of bilateral FDI with 2 parents and 2 hosts 
Observation  Parent (i) Host (j) 
1 1 1 
2 2 1 
3 1 1 
4 2 2 
5 1 2 
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Cells (2,1) and (1,2), e.g., gives the covariance of observations 1 and 2. The matrix 
reflects, e.g., that observations 1 and 2 are for the same host (see Table 4C.1).  
 In this study, we use Maximum Likelihood to estimate the variance components. An 
alternative method is using Baysian estimation such as Monte Carlo Markov Chain 
(MCMC) estimation (Fielding and Goldstein, 2007).   
Cluster-robust linear regression uses the following estimate of the variance of 
the OLS estimator: 1 1
1
ˆ ( ) ( ) ,
cn
Cluster c c
c
V X X u u X X 

    where cn is the total number of 
clusters. ( ) ( )c t ij t ij
c
u e x  . The formula for the clustered estimator is that of the 
heteroskedasticity-consistent (White) standard errors88 with the individual 
( ) ( )t ij t ije x ’s 
replaced by their sum within each cluster.  
                                                          
88  1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
N
Robust t ij t ij t ij t ij
i
V X X e x e x X X
 

    
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The Knowledge-Capital Model –   
Robustness Analysis 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The knowledge-capital model (Markusen et al., 1996, Markusen, 1997 and 2002) 
provides the most articulate general equilibrium model of MNE with proper 
microeconomic foundations. The distinctive feature of the knowledge-capital model is 
that, within aggregate FDI, it distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI. The 
gravity equation presents an alternative model to explain bilateral FDI. The gravity 
equation is the most commonly used model in the empirical literature to explain the 
variation in trade or investments flows between countries. It is only loosely connected to 
theory.  
 Compared to a standard gravity equation, the empirical specification of the 
knowledge-capital model is rather complex. The empirical specification in CMM (i) 
imposes linear constraints; and (ii) includes interactions of variables. To allow for such 
interaction terms, CMM do not log the data, but use a linear specification instead. The 
empirical specification of the knowledge-capital is derived from theory.   
 In this chapter we test the robustness of the empirical specification of the knowledge-
capital model for the OECD data. We raise two questions. First, are the linear constraints 
imposed in the empirical specification supported by the data? And second, how 
5 
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appropriate is the functional form of the model? It turns out that the specification is not 
robust in the confrontation with data on bilateral FDI of the OECD. The subtractive 
linear restriction that parent and host-country skill abundances have equal but opposite 
effects on FDI, which serves to capture that differences in relative skill abundance give 
rise to vertical FDI, is rejected by the data. Also, a log linear specification is more 
appropriate. In the second part of the chapter we therefore estimate a gravity model of 
bilateral FDI. With respect to skilled labour we distinguish measures of human capital 
and skilled-labour abundance. We then extend the specification with GDP per capita and 
institutional quality. 
 The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 tests the linear restrictions and the 
functional form of the knowledge-capital model for FDI data of the OECD. Section 5.3 
presents the gravity model and discusses the results concerning the effect of skilled 
labour. We examine the robustness of the results for specifications that include GDP per 
capita and institutional quality as additional control variables. In Section 5.4 we estimate 
a cross-classified multilevel version of the gravity model to take into account intra-class 
correlation. Section 5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2. The empirical specification of the knowledge-capital model  
In this section we test the linear restrictions and the functional form of the knowledge-
capital model for FDI data of the OECD. As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6.6), we 
use the indicator set of BDH and the CMM indicators of skilled labour and trade and 
investment costs in the empirical analysis of the knowledge-capital model. 
 
5.2.1. Testing the linear restrictions  
The distinctive feature of the knowledge-capital model is that, within aggregate FDI, it 
distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI. As explained in Chapter 3, the model 
predicts that horizontal FDI is high when both countries are similar in size and large; 
vertical FDI is high when countries differ in relative skill abundance. The empirical 
specification imposes linear constraints on the coefficients on parent and host country 
GDP, and of parent and host country skilled-labour abundance. This is illustrated by 
equation (5.1). The model in equation (5.1) gives an unrestricted version of the model: 
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                  (5.1) 
 
The empirical specification of the knowledge-capital model imposes the restriction that 
β1 = β2 and β4 = –β5.  
 The model is estimated using weighted least-squares (WLS). Figure 5B.1 in 
Appendix 5B.2 shows the residuals from estimating the knowledge-capital model for 
bilateral FDI of the OECD plotted against the fitted values (using the BDH indicators and 
the CMM indicators of skilled labour and trade and investment costs, respectively). The 
graphs indicate the clear presence of heteroskedasticity.89 This implies that “routinely 
computed standard errors of the estimators are based on the wrong expression. Thus, 
standard t- and F-tests are no longer valid and inferences will be misleading” (Verbeek, 
2004, p. 80). We assume heteroskedasticity of the form
2 2 exp{ }
ii z   .90 That is, we 
assume that the error variance is related to the explanatory variables of the knowledge-
capital model, with zi denoting the full set of explanatory variables.91 The weights for the 
WLS estimation are then computed by 2 { }expi ih z    .92  
 Table 5.1 presents the results of the WLS regressions. All coefficients have signs that 
are consistent with the predictions of the knowledge-capital model (see Chapter 3) and 
most of them are statistically significant. Different from the results with OLS (see 
Chapter 4), the variable (GDPDIFFij SKDIFFij) is no longer significant in the WLS 
regression with the BDH indicators, whilst the coefficient of host-country trade costs 
TCHj is not significant in the regression with the CMM indicators of skilled-labour 
abundance and trade and investment costs.  
 Next we test the linear restrictions. We test the two restrictions individually (once in a 
model with the other restriction still imposed and once in a model without restrictions) 
and jointly, for the two sets of indicators. The results are given in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.  
 
                                                          
89 In Blonigen and Davies (2004), residuals from estimating the empirical specification of the knowledge-
capital model in (5.1) “are far from white noise” (Blonigen, 2005, p. 27). Blonigen and Davies use the bilateral 
data for the U.S. like CMM, but for a more extended sample of countries (88 developed and less developed) 
and years (1980–1999). They add bilateral tax treaties.  
90 The exponential function is used to guarantee positivity of the error variance for all parameters (Verbeek, 
2004).  
91 In Appendix 5B.1 we test the assumption of multiplicative heteroskedasticity and investigate what 
specification for the form of multiplicative heteroskedasticity is most appropriate. 
92 The parameters α can be consistently estimated by computing the log of the squared residuals of the OLS 
regressions (log ei2) and running a regression of log ei2 on zi and a constant. The exponential of the predicted 
values from this auxiliary regression can be used as weights. 
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Table 5.1. Results WLS using different indicator sets  
 (1) (2) 
SUMGDPt(ij) 3.50*** 4.30*** 
 (19.55) (17.27) 
(GDPDIFFt(ij))2 –0.0005*** –0.0005*** 
 (7.26) (7.06) 
SKDIFFt(ij) 96.24*** 6,660.31*** 
 (2.64) (6.18) 
GDPDIFFt(ij) SKDIFFt(ij) –0.05 –5.69*** 
 (1.28) (4.97) 
DISTij –0.13*** –0.19*** 
 (9.38) (8.25) 
INVCt(j) –61.95*** –105.86*** 
 (10.60) (8.77) 
TCHt(j) 0.10 20.18* 
 (0.11) (1.88) 
TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2 –0.24** –467.81*** 
 (2.33) (3.08) 
TCPt(i) –17.50*** –42.44*** 
 (4.98) (4.20) 
Constant 3,079.89*** 4,860.42*** 
 (11.23) (10.43) 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.29 
Observations 2460 1474 
Absolute (robust) t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
 Table 5.2 indicates that, with the BDH indicators, imposing the restriction that β1 = β2 
and β4 = –β5 at the same time is rejected in favour of an unrestricted model at the 5% 
significance level.93 The table indicates that the restrictions do not hold when the other 
restriction is imposed. The results in Table 5.2 suggest that the data are slightly in favour 
of the constraint on the coefficients of skilled-labour abundance.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 The critical value F(2, ∞) = 2.99.  
94 The hypothesis β1 = β2 is rejected. We find that β1 > β2, a result that is comparable to standard findings in the 
empirical literature on international trade and FDI. 
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Table 5.2. Testing restrictions. BDH indicators  
 Keeping the other linear 
restriction (on GDP or skills) 
Unrestricted model 
H0  
F-statistic 
 
5% 
 
F-statistic 
 
5% 
 
1. β1 = β2  
 
F(1, 2449) = 5.33 
 
Rejected 
 
F(1, 2448) = 3.79 
 
Not rejected 
 
2. β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
 
F(1, 2449) = 4.46 
 
β4 >0 
β5 <0 
 
Rejected 
 
 
 
F(1, 2448) = 2.56 
 
Not rejected 
 
3. β1 = β2 
    and 
   β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
 
 
 
F(2, 2448) = 3.49 
 
 
 
β4 >0 
β5 <0 
 
Rejected 
 
 
 With the CMM indicators of skilled labour and trade and investment costs (Table 
5.3), the null hypothesis that coefficients on parent and host country skilled-labour 
abundance are equal but opposite in sign is rejected both in the model with the restriction 
regarding the coefficients of parent and host-country GDP and without.95 It follows that, 
whilst the WLS estimations in Table 5.1 confirm the theoretical predictions of the 
knowledge-capital model regarding skill differences, the hypothesis that β4 = –β5 is not 
supported empirically. The hypothesis that β1 = β2 is supported by the data.  
 Hence, we find that the linear restriction that parent and host-country skill 
abundances have equal but opposite effects on FDI is rejected for FDI of the OECD. This 
means that, while our estimations confirm the theoretical predictions of the knowledge-
capital model that (vertical) FDI increases with skill differences, the restriction that is 
imposed to capture this effect is not supported empirically. A specification in which 
parent and host-country skilled labour are estimated separately seems more appropriate. 
 
 
 
                                                          
95 Note that both coefficients are positive in a specification in which the aggregation constraint on parent and 
host-country GDP levels is imposed. The coefficient on host-country skill abundance statistically highly 
insignificant, though.  
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Table 5.3. Testing restrictions. CMM indicators of skills, trade and investment costs 
 Keeping the other linear 
restriction (on GDP or skills) 
Specification without linear 
restrictions 
H0  
F-statistic 
 
5% 
 
F-statistic 
 
5% 
 
1. β1 = β2 
 
F(1, 1463) = 
2.04 
 
Not rejected 
 
 
F(1, 1462) = 0.44 
 
Not rejected 
 
2. β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
 
F(1, 1463) = 
55.16 
 
β4>0 
β5>0  
 
Rejected 
 
 
 
F(1, 1462) = 
45.67 
 
Rejected 
 
3. β1 = β2 
    and 
   β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
 
 
 
F(2, 1462) = 
24.03 
 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
 
Rejected 
 
 
5.2.2. Functional form  
A reason for heteroskedasticity may be misspecification of the functional form (see, e.g., 
Verbeek, 2004). We can write the knowledge-capital model as y = g(x) + ε. It is also 
possible to consider a multiplicative model, y = g(x)exp{η}. If ε = g(x)[exp{η}–1], the 
two models are equivalent. If η is homoskedastic it follows that ε is heteroskedastic with 
a variance depending on g(x). Thus, if we find heteroskedasticity in an additive model it 
could be the case that a multiplicative model is more appropriate. The multiplicative 
model can be written as an additive model by taking logarithms. This gives log y = log 
g(x) + η = f(x) + η. The function f typically involves the logs of the x-variables.  
 Considering a loglinear model is actually very common when the data are skewed. 
This is typically the case in our data (see the descriptive statistics in Appendix 5A). 
However, logging the data causes a number of problems. First, once logged the 
interaction terms GDPDIFFt(ij)  SKDIFFt(ij) and TCHt(j)  SKDIFFt(ij)2 become collinear 
with other variables and must be dropped (Blonigen and Davies, 2004). In other words, 
logging the data changes the content of the model. The model then loses one of the key 
variables to capture that (vertical) FDI is high when the parent country is small and 
relatively skill abundant.  
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 Second, the skill difference term SKDIFFt(ij) has both negative and positive values.96 
Logging the data means that negative values will be deleted from the sample. A possible 
solution is to multiply negative values of SKDIFFt(ij) by −1. However, multiplying 
negative values of SKDIFFt(ij) by −1 implies that one is imposing absolute skill 
differences and symmetry around zero.97 Carr et al. (2003) object to taking absolute 
values. First, they argue that the knowledge-capital model does not predict symmetry 
around zero skill differences. Using simulation results they illustrate that, for values of 
skill differences between –0.30 and 0.30, the net volume of FDI increases as the parent 
becomes more skill abundant, both when the parent country i is relatively large and 
small. Second, if FDI from parent i to host j increases in absolute skill differences this 
means that FDI also increases when the host country becomes relatively more skill 
abundant. According to Carr et al. (2003) this is a result that is not consistent with the 
(factor-proportions) theory. According to Carr et al. by taking absolute values, one is no 
longer estimating the knowledge-capital model, but rather testing whether FDI generally 
increases with skill differences or skill similarities. In other words, this entails a test of 
whether FDI is best explained by the horizontal or the vertical model. 
 Hence, if we change the functional form, the empirical specification no longer 
represents the predictions of the knowledge-capital model. Nevertheless, Figure 5B.2 in 
Appendix 5B.2 indicates that changing the functional form goes a long way in solving 
the heteroskedasticity problem. The graphs show the residuals from estimating a log 
linear model for the OECD sample plotted against the fitted values. The graphs are far 
less pronounced than for the linear model. Hence, the graphs suggest that, from an 
econometric point of view, FDI of OECD countries is much better explained by a log 
linear model.  
 
 
                                                          
96 This is true also for the term GDPDIFFt(ij) but the latter would be omitted in a log linear model anyway 
because of multicollinearity.  
97 In this case we could have also used a dummy variable skdifn equal to 1 when SKDIFFij < 0 and 0 otherwise. 
The regression equation would then be as follows:  
2
2
0 1 2 3 4 5
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11 12
ln ln ln( ) ln ln ln
ln ln * ln * ln( ) *
ln * ln * ln
ij ij ij ij j j
i ij ij ij
ij j
FDI b b SUMGDP b GDPDIFF b SKDIFF b INVCH b TCH
b TCP b DIST skdifn b skdifn SUMGDP b skdifn GDPDIFF b skdifn
SKDIFF b skdifn INVCH b skdifn TCH
     
     
  13 14* ln * ln .j i ij ijb skdifn TCP b skdifn DIST u  
 
The first part of the regression equation would then give the estimated coefficients for the sample with positive 
skill differences. The second part (i.e. multiplied by skdifn) would give the difference between coefficients for 
the sample with positive and the sample with ‘negative’ skill differences. 
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5.2.3. Discussion  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the empirical specification of the knowledge-capital model is 
rather complex compared to a more standard gravity equation so as to distinguish the 
different motivations of FDI. As it turns out the specification is not robust in the 
confrontation with data on bilateral FDI of the OECD. The subtractive linear restriction 
that parent and host-country skill abundances have equal but opposite effects on FDI, 
which serves to capture that differences in relative skill abundance give rise to vertical 
FDI, is rejected by the data. Also, a log linear specification is more appropriate. 
However, transforming the data alters the empirical specification, which subsequently no 
longer represents the predictions of the knowledge-capital model.  
 Besides, one may question the underlying assumptions regarding factor intensities 
that are used to distinguish vertical and horizontal FDI. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
evidence for American MNEs by Yeaple (2003) suggests that MNEs locate types of 
production abroad in a manner that exploits host countries’ particular comparative 
advantage: in industries with high skilled-labour intensities, U.S. multinationals favour 
skilled-labour abundant countries over skilled-labour scarce countries, whereas in sectors 
with low skilled-labour intensities U.S. multinationals favour skill-scarce countries over 
skilled-labour abundant countries. Yeaple’s results imply that vertical FDI may very well 
be driven by skill similarities too, depending on the industry.98 Thus, the distinction 
between horizontal and vertical FDI on the basis of skill differences/similarities may not 
be so sharp in practice.  
 Given the evidence in this section, we reject the knowledge-capital model as a model 
to explain bilateral FDI of OECD countries. In the next section we estimate a gravity 
model for bilateral FDI of the OECD. 
 
5.3. A gravity model of bilateral FDI 
In this section we use a gravity equation to investigate the determinants of bilateral FDI. 
This entails that we no longer distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI, but rather 
seek to explain the overall pattern of bilateral FDI of the OECD. We start off with a basic 
gravity specification in which market size and skilled labour are the main explanatory 
variables (cf. the knowledge-capital model). Next, we extend the specification with 
additional variables. 
 
 
                                                          
98 To the extent that vertical FDI occurs in skill-intensive sectors, FDI between countries that are similar in skill 
endowments may be wrongly taken as horizontal. This may – in part – explain why Markusen and Maskus 
(2002) find that a horizontal model FDI finds most confirmation in the data (see Section 3.3). 
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5.3.1. Basic model and data 
Our basic regression equation looks as follows: 
 
( ) 0 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( )
4 ( ) 5 ( ) ( )
ln( ) β β ln( ) β ln( ) β ln( )
β ln( ) β ln( ) ε .
t ij t i t j t i
t j t ij t ij
FDI GDP GDP SKILL
SKILL Dist
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                      (5.2) 
 
The equation takes on market size and skilled labour endowments as important 
determinants of FDI (cf. the knowledge-capital model). We truncate negative values of 
FDI to 0.1 before taking logs (cf. Blonigen and Davies, 2004). 
 With respect to skilled-labour endowments we distinguish measures of human capital 
and skilled-labour abundance. We use the indicator of labour-force quality QL 
constructed by Hanushek and Kim (1995) and the share of skilled labour (the sum of 
ISCO-68 categories 0/1 (professional, technical and kindred workers) and 2 
(administrative workers)) in total employment used by CMM as proxies for skilled 
labour.99 Both indicators measure a different dimension of skilled labour. QL is a proxy 
for the quality of human capital (qualitative); the indicator used in CMM is a 
(quantitative) measure of skilled-labour abundance.  
 The specifications also control for a shared cultural background by way of a dummy 
variable indicating whether countries share a common language and a dummy variable 
indicating whether countries share a colonial past.100 Together with geographical 
distance, these dummy variables capture (distance-related) trade and investment costs. 
Chapter 6 extends this analysis and empirically examines the effect of multiple 
dimensions of distance.  
 We also include year dummies to control for global trends. Most year dummies are 
statistically insignificant and we do not report them. Descriptive statistics are presented 
in Appendix 5A.  
  
 
                                                          
99 As argued in Chapter 2, the Barro and Lee indicators of educational attainment used in BDH merely measure 
the quantity (years) of schooling. They do not adjust for quality differences across countries. Appendix 5C 
presents results of estimating the knowledge-capital model using the QL. 
100 Dummy variables indicating whether countries share a common language, common religion and common 
colonial history have proven to be effective controls for shared cultural background in the empirical trade 
literature (see, e.g., Frankel, 1997).  
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5.3.2. Basic results  
The first two columns in Table 5.4 show the results for the basic specification of the 
gravity model including skilled labour. FDI increases with market size. That is, GDP has 
a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI. The literature often finds that 
international trade and FDI are more elastic with respect to the level of GDP in the origin 
country than GDP in the destination country. Our results confirm this pattern: the 
coefficients of GDPi are larger than those of GDPj. FDI is parent-income elastic: a one 
percent increase in parent-country GDP tends to raise FDI stocks on average by more 
than one per cent. The elasticity of FDI with respect to host-country GDP is below unity.  
 Column (1) indicates that skilled-labour abundance has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on bilateral FDI. FDI increases in both parent- and host-country skilled 
labour. This indicates that skilled-labour abundant countries undertake more outward FDI 
and also attract more (inward) FDI. Skilled-labour abundance of the parent-country has a 
particularly large effect on FDI in the basic specification: a one percentage point increase 
in the level of human capital raises FDI by 1.32 per cent. Human capital (the second 
column in Table 5.4) also has a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI. FDI is 
elastic with respect to human capital: a one percent increase in human capital of parent 
and host-country raises bilateral FDI on average by 1.86 and 1.45 per cent, respectively. 
 The results for the remaining variables in the basic specification are as expected. FDI 
decreases when physical distance increases. Sharing a common language and a colonial 
past has a positive effect on FDI. The semi-elasticities of 1.36 and 0.43 in the first 
column in Table 5.4 imply that bilateral FDI stocks between two countries that share a 
common language are almost four times the amount of bilateral FDI stocks between two 
countries whose languages differ, while FDI between two countries that share a colonial 
past is 53 per cent higher than two countries that do not, respectively.101 
 
5.3.3. Adding GDP per capita  
Our results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.4 indicate that skilled labour (both in terms 
of skilled-labour abundance and human capital) has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on FDI. Yet, to what extent does the positive and statistically significant effect of 
skilled-labour abundance and human capital truly reflect the effect of skilled labour on 
FDI? High-income, developed countries are generally also the ones with high levels of 
human capital and/or large endowments of skilled labour. Since we do not control for the 
                                                          
101 The percentage impact of a dummy variable is calculated as ( 1) *100%.ke   
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Table 5.4. Results gravity specifications of bilateral FDI, OLS  
 Basic specification skills GDP per capita 
Skill indicator: 
Skill 
abundance  
Human capital Skill 
abundance  
Human capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log GDP parent 1.32*** 1.25*** 1.29*** 1.20*** 
 (33.54) (39.20) (29.17) (38.71) 
Log GDP host 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.84*** 0.73*** 
 (24.27) (27.30) (22.19) (27.97) 
Log Distance –0.67*** –0.71*** –0.68*** –0.68*** 
 (18.48) (24.38) (18.63) (24.91) 
Language dummy 1.36*** 1.38*** 1.36*** 1.06*** 
 (10.65) (16.15) (10.47) (12.58) 
Colonial dummy 0.43** 0.38*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 
 (2.51) (2.99) (2.81) (4.13) 
Log Skills parent 1.32*** 1.86*** 1.16*** 2.97*** 
 (11.65) (6.32) (8.12) (10.06) 
Log Skills host 0.62*** 1.45*** 0.73*** –0.04 
 (6.73) (8.91) (4.37) (0.24) 
Log GDP per capita parent   0.49 2.37*** 
   (1.54) (11.74) 
Log GDP per capita host   –0.16 0.76*** 
   (0.86) (11.73) 
Institutional quality parent     
     
Institutional quality host     
     
Constant –12.71*** –27.36*** –15.65*** –54.09*** 
 (16.95) (17.63) (4.56) (20.73) 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.51 0.59 0.57 
Observations 1423 2591 1423 2591 
log likelihood –2718 –5084 –2716 –4920 
Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Year dummies included (not shown).  
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Table 5.4. Continued  
 Institutions 
Skill indicator: Skill abundance  Human capital 
 (5) (6) 
Log GDP parent 1.41*** 1.34*** 
 (30.28) (39.01) 
Log GDP host 1.05*** 0.77*** 
 (22.97) (27.38) 
Log Distance –0.65*** –0.61*** 
 (17.21) (22.16) 
Language dummy 1.35*** 0.97*** 
 (10.52) (11.64) 
Colonial dummy 0.46*** 0.35*** 
 (2.74) (3.26) 
Log Skills parent –0.06 2.81*** 
 (0.26) (9.46) 
Log Skills host 0.36** –0.04 
 (2.00) (0.23) 
Log GDP per capita parent 0.04 0.68*** 
 (0.12) (2.59) 
Log GDP per capita host –1.37*** 0.50*** 
 (5.74) (4.79) 
Institutional quality parent 1.83*** 1.45*** 
 (5.92) (9.24) 
Institutional quality host 1.30*** 0.34*** 
 (7.59) (3.98) 
Constant –11.82*** –40.86*** 
 (3.44) (14.58) 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.59 
Observations 1423 2591 
log likelihood –2682 –4868 
Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Year dummies included (not shown).  
 
 
level of development, the results on skilled labour above may suffer from an omitted 
variable bias. To control for the level of development we include per capita GDP of the 
parent and the host country. Data on GDP per capita are from the Penn World Tables 
(Mark 5.6), in correspondence with our GDP data (see Chapter 3 and the Data Appendix 
in the back of this study). Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5.4 give the results.  
 The third column suggests that skilled-labour abundance is robust to the extension 
with per capita GDP. The coefficient on skilled-labour abundance of the parent is 
smaller, though, indicating that the estimate in column (1) is indeed somewhat biased. 
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GDP per capita of the parent is nearly statistically significant (10 per cent level). GDP 
per capita of the host has no statistically significant effect on FDI. These results could 
indicate that the structure of the labour force offers an explanation why more developed 
countries engage more in FDI: FDI is motivated by skilled-labour abundance, which is a 
characteristic of developed countries (cf. Chapter 2). However, the insignificance of GDP 
per capita of the host in specification (3) is more likely the result of multicollinearity. 
Correlation between host-country skilled labour and GDP per capita is high in the data.102 
In fact, we find the opposite results in the specification with human capital (column (4)): 
in this case, the effect on FDI of per capita GDP of the host is positive and statistically 
significant, whilst the effect of host-country human capital is statistically insignificant. 
These results typically indicate multicollinearity: due to the high correlation between 
host-country GDP per capita and skilled-labour abundance/human capital, it is difficult 
for the model to determine which variable is actually producing the effect on FDI. 
Coefficient estimates on these variables vary across the two samples. On the other hand, 
the effects on FDI of per capita GDP and human capital are both positive and statistically 
significant on the parent side. Thus, the quality of human capital and the level of 
development of the parent country contribute to FDI independently. 
 
5.3.4. Adding institutions 
Next, we include institutional quality. This is based on lessons from the empirical 
literature on international trade that omission of institutional quality in the gravity 
specification biases the estimates of GDP per capita (see, e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller, 
2002, De Groot et al., 2004).103 Is the effect of per capita GDP also biased in gravity 
models of FDI? 
 Kaufmann et al. (2005) have constructed six indicators of perceived institutional 
quality on the basis of principal components analysis. These indicators are: voice and 
accountability; political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of 
law; control of corruption. Institutional quality is calculated by taking the simple average 
of the scores across all six governance indicators. Descriptive statistics are given in 
Appendix 5A. The results are given in the last two columns of Table 5.4.  
                                                          
102 The correlation between host-country skilled-labour abundance and GDP per capita is 0.83; the correlation 
between host-country human capital and GDP per capita is 0.68. See the correlation matrix in Appendix 5A. 
We also estimated specifications with GDP per capita excluding skilled-labour abundance and human capital. 
We then find a positive and significant effect of GDP per capita on FDI for both the parent and the host-country 
side. See Table 5D.1 in Appendix 5D.  
103 GDP per capita proxies for omitted trade costs variables. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and De Groot et 
al. (2004) find a negative relationship between trade and income per capita in gravity specifications that include 
institutions. This may reflect that when countries become wealthier the share of total expenditure devoted to 
traded goods falls, because the structure of production and consumption shifts from commodities towards 
services. Not including institutional effectiveness can obscure this negative relationship, because of the high 
correlation between per capita income and the quality of governance.  
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 Institutional quality has a positive and statistically significant effect for both the 
parent and the host-country side in specification (5). The coefficient on skilled-labour 
abundance of the host is smaller than in the previous two specifications (column (1) and 
(3)). The effect is statistically significant at the ten per-cent level. The effect of skilled-
labour abundance of the parent, on the other hand, can no longer be identified 
independently. The same is true for the effect of per capita GDP of the parent.104 These 
effects are the result, once again, of multicollinearity.105  
 Column (6) gives the results with human capital. Institutional quality once again has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on FDI. The effects of human capital and GDP 
per capita are largely robust to the extension with institutional quality, although the size 
of the parameter estimates on GDP per capita are much smaller compared to specification 
(4), indicating that the estimates in specification (4) capture (part of) the positive effect of 
institutions. 
 
Discussion 
The estimates on skilled labour, GDP per capita and institutional quality vary across 
different specifications. Adding or dropping variables produces shifts in parameters 
estimates and we even find sign changes. These results typically indicate 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is foremost a technical problem. It means that, due to 
the high correlation between variables, it is difficult for the model to identify the effects 
independently and determine which variable is actually producing the effect on FDI. As a 
result, the estimated effects vary across samples. Yet, estimates are still best linear 
unbiased (BLUE) and dropping variables to reduce the degree of multicollinearity would 
cause the estimators of the remaining variables to be inconsistent (omitted variables 
bias). The proper specification therefore includes all three variables, i.e., skilled labour, 
GDP per capita and institutional quality. Looking across the various specifications, we 
find positive effects on FDI from all three variables at one time or another. We conclude 
from this that skilled labour, the level of development and institutional quality are all 
likely determinants of FDI, but that their effects coincide.  
 
 
 
                                                          
104 The coefficient on per capita GDP of the host becomes statistically significant in the specification with 
skilled-labour abundance. This is not the case in the regression with human capital. Table 5D.1 in Appendix 5D 
illustrates that the negative and statistically significant effect of GDP per capita of the host in the specification 
with skilled-labour abundance is probably a sample selection effect. 
105 Variance-inflation-factor (vif) values for institutional quality (parent and host), parent-country skilled-labour 
abundance and host-country per capita GDP are high (7.7 and beyond). Skilled-labour abundance, GDP per 
capita and institutional quality are highly correlated in the data (see the correlation matrix in Appendix 5A).  
5  The Knowledge-Capital Model – Robustness Analysis   101 
 
 
5.4. Additional robustness analysis – multilevel analysis 
The results above are from a panel data set. The use of a panel data set will generally 
yield more efficient estimators than cross-sectional or time series data because data vary 
over two dimensions, countries and time (see, e.g., Verbeek, 2004). Nevertheless, the 
weaker the time-series variation in bilateral trade and FDI, the closer we are to merely 
running a series of cross-sections.106 Significance levels (standard errors) of the 
regression coefficients may then be overstated (understated) due to dependence of 
observations. In this section, we therefore estimate results of a cross-classified multilevel 
version of the gravity model including skilled labour, GDP per capita and institutional 
quality.107 As explained in Chapter 4, the general idea of the multilevel analysis in this 
study is first that higher-level (here, parent, host or parent-host-combination) 
heterogeneity has an impact on the dependent variable. Next, that because of these 
higher-level effects, ‘years’ (annual FDI values) for the same parent country i, host 
country j, or the same parent-host combination tend to be more alike. The multilevel 
model therefore accounts for the effects of parent, host or parent-host-combination 
heterogeneity on FDI and subsequently explains the variance between years for parent 
country i and host j. In this respect, the multilevel approach is equivalent to a procedure 
with parent, host and pair wise fixed effects. Yet, multilevel analysis has a number of 
advantages. First, in a cross-classified multilevel model, we can control for the effects of 
parent and host countries and parent-by-host interaction all at once without running into 
problems of multicollinearity. Second, and related to the previous, since a multilevel 
model estimates only the variances of country and interaction effects, we can still 
estimate the effects of the explanatory variables in a multilevel model. Third, a multilevel 
model is more parsimonious in terms of degrees of freedom than a specification with 
many dummy variables.  
 Table 5.5 presents the results. Cluster means are included (but not shown) to ensure 
unbiased coefficients on the explanatory variables.108 Column (1) gives the results with 
skilled-labour abundance, column (2) with human capital.  
 We once again observe some effects from multicollinearity, in this case the negative 
coefficients of parent institutional quality in the specification with skilled-labour 
abundance and institutional quality of the host in the specification with human capital.109  
  
 
                                                          
106 See Appendix 5A for the calculation of the degree of clustering in the regression of the gravity model 
(N=2591).  
107 See Appendix 5D for the results of different specifications of the gravity model.  
108 We used the same procedure as in Chapter 4. That is, we first dropped cluster means that are highly 
correlated (> 0.9) with the explanatory variables. Next, we dropped cluster means that are highly (> 0.8) 
correlated with (an)other cluster mean(s). Which cluster means have been included is listed under Table 5.5.   
109 In Appendix 5D we show the effects from adding or dropping variables in (various specifications of) the 
gravity model. 
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Table 5.5. Results gravity specifications of bilateral FDI, multilevel model  
Skill indicator: Skill abundance Human capital 
 (1) (2) 
Log GDP parent 1.62*** 1.41*** 
 (6.98) (5.66) 
Log GDP host 0.50** 0.38*** 
 (2.58) (3.17) 
Log Distance –0.93*** –0.91*** 
 (7.63) (10.36) 
Language dummy 0.52 0.73*** 
 (1.52) (2.85) 
Colonial dummy 0.66 0.48 
 (1.48) (1.56) 
Log Skills parent 3.52*** 1.34 
 (6.25) (0.77) 
Log Skills host 0.17 0.11 
 (0.53) (0.18) 
Log GDP capita parent 2.13*** 2.34*** 
 (4.06) (6.27) 
Log GDP capita host 0.54 1.28*** 
 (1.38) (5.86) 
Institutional quality parent –0.52 2.32*** 
 (0.54) (2.80) 
Institutional quality host 0.24 –0.44 
 (0.54) (1.33) 
Constant 103.54 2.78 
 (1.26) (0.05) 
Observations 1423 2591 
log likelihood –1718 –3166 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
coefficients relate to within-country (pair) changes. Cluster means are included to ensure consistent estimators 
(not shown). 
Means included in (1): GDP of parent by host country, GDP of host by parent country, GDP per capita and 
institutional quality of parent by host country, GDP per capita of host by parent country, and distance, language 
and colony by parent and host country.  
Means included in (2): GDP of parent by host country, GDP of host by parent country, GDP per capita, 
institutional quality and human capital of parent by host country, GDP per capita of host by parent country, and 
distance, language and colony by parent and host country. 
 
 
As for the other variables, they all have the expected sign in both specifications. In this 
sense, the sign patterns and coefficient sizes are qualitatively robust. Still, we do find 
that, when clustering of the data is taken into account, significance levels of the standard 
gravity variables GDP, distance, and the language and colonial dummy variables are 
lower. The effect of a common colonial past (and of a common language in the 
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regression with skilled-labour abundance) is no longer statistically significant at the 
conventional significance levels. Hence, in this case, OLS leads to spuriously significant 
results. 
 As explained in Chapter 2 one can get a sense of the relative importance of 
explanatory variables by calculating standardised, or beta, coefficients. We calculated 
beta coefficients for specifications of the gravity model that include skilled labour, GDP 
per capita and institutional quality. This entails specifications (5) and (6) in Table 5.4 and 
the multilevel specifications in Table 5.5. The estimates give a range of minimum and 
maximum effect sizes. The beta coefficients based on this range are given in Table 5.6. 
 The beta coefficients indicate that an increase by one standard deviation in the 
skilled-labour abundance of the parent country can raise bilateral FDI by maximum 58 
per cent of a standard deviation of bilateral FDI. A one standard deviation increase in the 
skilled-labour abundance of the host country can raise FDI by up to 7 per cent of a 
standard deviation of bilateral FDI. An increase of one standard deviation in human 
capital in the parent and the host can raise FDI by maximum 14 and 1 percent of a 
standard deviation of FDI, respectively. A one-standard-deviation-increase in 
institutional quality of a parent and a host country can increase FDI by maximum 30 and 
32 percent of a standard deviation, respectively. A one standard deviation increase in the 
level of development of the parent country can increase FDI by up to 20 per cent of a 
standard deviation of FDI. For level of development of the host country, the 
corresponding increase is 32 per cent of a standard deviation of FDI. 
 
 
Table 5.6. Beta coefficients of gravity specifications 
Skill indicator: Skill abundance Human capital 
Log GDP parent 0.68 0.78 0.68 0.71 
Log GDP host 0.25 0.53 0.20 0.41 
Log Distance –0.42 –0.30 –0.41 –0.28 
Language dummy 0.07 0.19 0.11 0.14 
Colonial dummy 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 
Log Skills parent –0.01 0.58 0.06 0.14 
Log Skills host 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 
Log GDP capita parent 0.00 0.18 0.06 0.20 
Log GDP capita host –0.25 0.10 0.15 0.37 
Institutional quality parent –0.07 0.25 0.19 0.30 
Institutional quality host 0.06 0.32 –0.13 0.10 
Beta coefficients based on specifications (5) and (6) of Table 5.4 and the multilevel estimates of Table 5.5. 
The table gives the relative importance based on the range of the estimates in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.   
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5.5. Conclusion  
This chapter empirically examines the specification of the knowledge-capital model for 
FDI of the OECD. The distinctive feature of the knowledge-capital model is that, within 
aggregate FDI, it distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI. To capture the 
predictions of the vertical model, the empirical specification in CMM (i) imposes the 
subtractive linear constraint that the coefficients on parent and host country skilled-
labour abundance are of equal size but opposite in sign; and (ii) includes the interaction 
between income differences and skill differences. To allow for such interaction terms, 
CMM do not log the data, but use a linear specification instead. The empirical 
specification of the knowledge-capital is derived from theory. We test the linear 
restrictions and the functional form of the knowledge-capital model. This chapter finds 
that the subtractive linear restriction that parent and host-country skill abundances have 
equal but opposite effects on FDI, which serves to capture that differences in relative 
skill abundance give rise to vertical FDI, is rejected by the data. A specification in which 
parent and host-country skilled labour are estimated separately thus seems more 
appropriate. Also, a log linear model is more appropriate. However, transforming the 
data alters the empirical specification, which subsequently no longer represents the 
predictions of the knowledge-capital model. Given the empirical evidence in this chapter, 
we reject the knowledge-capital model as a model to explain bilateral FDI stocks of 
OECD countries on statistical grounds. 
 We subsequently estimate a gravity model of bilateral FDI. This entails that we no 
longer distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI, but rather seek to explain the 
overall pattern of bilateral FDI of the OECD. With regard to skilled labour, we look at 
skilled-labour abundance as well as human capital. Next, we extend the gravity 
specification with GDP per capita (a proxy for the level of development) and institutional 
quality. Despite econometric difficulties to identify the effects of each variable 
independently, we find positive effects on FDI from all three variables at one time or 
another. We conclude that skilled labour, the level of development and institutional 
quality are all likely determinants of FDI.  
 How can we interpret the results concerning skilled labour, institutions and level of 
development from the gravity specifications? We find that both parent- and host-country 
skilled labour, institutions and level of development affect FDI positively. First, 
concerning skilled labour this suggest that MNEs arise in countries that are skilled-labour 
abundant and/or have high levels of human capital (high-quality schooling) and that this 
is also what makes them choose one location to host their foreign activities over another. 
Firms’ choice of a suitable location is also affected by costs. The costs – adjustment costs 
and additional lack of trust and confidence in security of transactions – will be lower 
when differences in the institutional environment between the parent and the host country 
are small (Linders, 2006). These results suggest that ‘proximity’ between parent and host 
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countries is the key in explaining bilateral FDI: MNEs choose locations that are ‘close’ to 
the parent country in terms of skilled labour endowments and/or quality and in terms of 
institutional quality. The importance of the level of development for FDI may be 
explained by the importance of skilled labour and institutional quality. High-income, 
developed countries are generally also the ones with high levels of human capital and/or 
large endowments of skilled labour, as well as high-quality institutions. With reference to 
the empirical literature on economic growth and development (cf. Chapter 2), we assume 
that the causality runs from skilled labour and institutions to the level of development 
rather than the other way around. On the other hand, the level of development can also 
reflect the ‘quality’ of demand (income-related pattern of demand). In this case, the level 
of development has its own impact on FDI. In this case, proximity again matters, this 
time in terms of proximity of production and demand patterns. 
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Appendix 5A. Data  
Table 5A.1 gives the descriptive statistics for regressions of the gravity model with 
human capital (QL indicator).  
 
Table 5A.1 – Summary statistics gravity model sample (N=2591) 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Log FDIij 6.27 2.48  –2.30  12.1 
Log GDP parent 13.4 1.25  8.10  15.3 
Log GDP host 12.2 1.33  7.91  15.3 
Log Distance 8.33 1.13  5.16  9.88 
Language dummy 0.16 0.37  0 1 
Colonial dummy 0.07 0.25  0 1 
Log skills parent (QL) 4.01 0.12  3.85  4.18 
Log skills host (QL) 3.92  0.26  3.03  4.28 
Log GDP cap parent 9.51  0.21  8.53  9.80 
Log GDP cap host 8.99 0.72  6.84  9.80 
Institutional quality parent 1.50    0.32  0.59  1.90 
Institutional quality host 1.13     0.74  –0.46  1.93 
 
Table 5A.2 gives the descriptive statistics for regressions of the gravity model with 
relative skill endowments.  
 
Table 5A.2 – Summary statistics gravity model (N=1423) 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Log FDIij 6.54  2.55 –2.30  12.08 
Log GDP parent 13.2  1.23 11.0  15.3 
Log GDP host 12.25  1.29 9.99 15.3 
Log Distance 8.19  1.16 5.16 9.84 
Language dummy 0.16  0.36 0 1 
Colonial dummy 0.06  0.23 0 1 
Log Skill abundance parent  –1.54 0.42 –2.53    –1.08 
Log Skill abundance host –1.73 0.51 –3.00 –1.08 
Log GDP cap parent 9.52 0.22 8.53 9.80 
Log GDP cap host 9.24 0.47 7.83 9.80 
Institutional quality parent 1.51 0.35 0.59 1.90 
Institutional quality host 1.33 0.62 –0.17 1.93 
 
Tables 5A.3 – 5A.5 present correlation matrices.  
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 Observations on FDI are clustered within parent and host countries and within parent 
and host combinations. Table 5A.6 gives the estimates of the within-variance 2e  as well 
as the between-variances for parent and host countries and parent-host combinations, for 
two different baseline models, one including and the other excluding the combination 
effect c0ij. Note that the model including c0ij has a much better fit in terms of the log 
likelihood –2LL. All three variances are statistically significant. To test the significance 
of the variances we compare the –2LL of the model including all three effects with the 
corresponding –2LL value of the model without p0i, h0j and c0ij, respectively (see Snijders 
and Bosker, 1999). An effect is significant if its inclusion decreases the –2LL. The 
difference in –2LL is Chi-squared distributed with 1 degree of freedom. (In general, the 
number of degrees of freedom equals the number of parameters in an unrestricted model, 
including random effects, that have to be set to zero to obtain the restricted model.) In the 
case at hand, not including p0i, h0j or c0ij causes the value of –2LL to increase by 230, 130 
and 2063, respectively. These increases are highly significant. Based on the estimates of 
this model, the correlation of two FDI values drawn from the same parent country or host 
country is 0.49 and 0.21, respectively. The correlation of two FDI values drawn from the 
same parent-host combination is 0.92. We conclude that intra-class correlation needs to 
be taken into account in order to make correct inferences. 
 
Table 5A.6 – Estimates of covariance parameters and intra-class correlations  
 Estimates of model  
( ) 00 0 0 (t ij i j t ij
FDI b p h e  
 
Estimates of model 
( ) 00 0 0 0t ij i j ij
FDI b p h c   
 
Level 1   
   Individual variance, 2e  1.98 0.66 
Level 2   
   Parent country variance, 
2
0 p  4.65 4.30 
   Host country variance, 20h  2.43 1.88 
   Parent-host combination variance,
 
2
0 ph  - 1.86 
Intra-class correlation   
   Same parent country 0.49 
   Same host country   0.21 
   Same parent / host combination  0.92 
–2LL 9937 7875 
Dependent variable: log FDIt(ij). 
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Appendix 5B.1 – Testing multiplicative heteroskedasticity  
If we do not wish to specify the type of heteroskedasticity we can simply use 
heteroskedasticity-consistent (White) standard errors. This procedure uses an alternative 
formula for computing the OLS covariance matrix (Verbeek, 2004).110 If, on the other 
hand, we are willing to make assumptions about the form of heteroskedasticity, we can 
use the more efficient generalised least squares (GLS) estimator. In the main text we 
have assumed multiplicative heteroskedasticity of the form 
2 2 exp{ }
ii z   . In this 
appendix we test the assumption of multiplicative heteroskedasticity and investigate what 
form is most appropriate. We consider two specifications for{ }iz  : a specification where 
zi is the full set of explanatory variables in the knowledge-capital model (z = X), and, in 
order to check whether the former specification for the form of heteroskedasticity is not 
too restrictive, a specification where the squared terms are also included.  
 A test of the assumption of multiplicative heteroskedasticity is based on the F-value 
of the auxiliary regression of log ei2 on zi and a constant. The results where z = X are 
given in Table 5B.1. The F-value of the auxiliary regressions is 129.7 and 50.6, 
respectively. Hence, the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are equal 
to zero, i.e. the assumption of homoskedasticity, is decidedly rejected for both indicator 
sets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
110 Under Gauss-Markov conditions the variance of  the OLS estimator b is routinely calculated as 2 1( ' ) .X X   
When the condition of homoskedasticity no longer applies the covariance matrix of b becomes 
1 2 1( ' ) ' { } ( ' ) .iX X X Diag X X X   Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White) standard errors use a consistent 
estimator 
1
2 '1 N
i i ii
e x x
N 
  for 21 { }' .iX Diag X
N
   
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Table 5B.1 – Auxiliary regressions multiplicative heteroskedasticity, z = X  
  
BDH indicators 
 
CMM indicators 
SUMGDPt(ij) 0.0012*** 0.001*** 
 (14.03) (12.74) 
(GDPDIFFt(ij))2 2.43e-08 –7.73e-08*** 
 (1.12) (3.38) 
SKDIFFt(ij) –0.05* 0.80 
 (1.86) (1.41) 
GDPDIFFt(ij) SKDIFFt(ij) –0.0002*** –0.004*** 
 (9.85) (11.09) 
INVCt(j) –0.03*** –0.02** 
 (6.27) (2.49) 
TCHt(j) 0.002** 0.001 
 (2.28) (0.13) 
TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2 0.00019*** 0.09 
 (2.88) (1.02) 
TCPt(i) 0.003 0.02*** 
 (1.04) (3.35) 
DISTij 0.00005*** 0.00003** 
 (4.69) (2.11) 
Constant 14.76*** 14.67*** 
 (67.88) (50.25) 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.23 
F-value 129.7 50.6 
Observations 2460 1474 
Dependent variable log ei2, where the ei are the residuals from estimating the knowledge- 
capital model given in (5.1).  
 
 
 Table 5B.2 presents the results of the auxiliary regressions where zi is the full set of 
explanatory variables and the squared terms. F-values, 71.5 and 28.0, respectively, 
indicate that the assumption of homoskedasticity is also rejected for this specification of
{ }iz  .  
 Which specification for the form of { }iz   is most appropriate? We perform an F-test 
on the nine restrictions implied by the specification z = X in Table 5B.1. This produces an 
F-statistic of 9.36 and 4.40, so the null hypothesis is rejected for both indicator sets. In 
other words, the specification that also includes the squared terms performs significantly 
better than the specification that only includes the knowledge-capital variables. 
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Table 5B.2 – Auxiliary regressions multiplicative heteroskedasticity, z = X + X2  
 BDH indicators CMM indicators 
SUMGDPt(ij) 0.002*** 0.0006*** 
 (8.31) (3.38) 
(GDPDIFFt(ij))2 –1.32e-08 –1.99e-08 
 (0.19) (0.21) 
SKDIFFt(ij) –0.06** 1.10* 
 (2.19) (1.88) 
GDPDIFFt(ij) SKDIFFt(ij) –0.0002*** –0.01*** 
 (7.46) (7.97) 
INVCt(j) –0.0007 0.07* 
 (0.03) (1.74) 
TCHt(j) 0.003* 0.04* 
 (1.74) (1.84) 
TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2 –0.00002 0.14 
 (0.20) (0.30) 
TCPt(i) –0.01 0.04 
 (1.07) (1.03) 
DISTij –0.00008** –0.00002 
 (2.33) (0.60) 
{SUMGDPt(ij)} 2 –6.41e-08** 9.35e-08*** 
 (2.39) (3.00) 
{(GDPDIFFt(ij))2} 2 3.29e-15 –3.61e-15 
 (1.18) (0.89) 
{SKDIFFt(ij)} 2 0.01 –5.81 
 (1.61) (0.44) 
{GDPDIFFt(ij) SKDIFFt(ij)}2 1.17e-09 1.27e-06 
 (1.24) (1.45) 
{INVCt(j)} 2 –0.0004 –0.001** 
 (1.23) (2.12) 
{TCHt(j)} 2 –9.41e-06 –0.0007** 
 (1.13) (2.28) 
{TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2} 2 7.93e-08*** 0.04 
 (4.41) (0.58) 
{TCPt(i)} 2 0.0001 –0.0002 
 (1.35) (0.50) 
{DISTij} 2 8.03e-09*** 4.13e-09* 
 (4.14) (1.77) 
Constant 14.43*** 12.43*** 
 (27.19) (13.94) 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.25 
F-value 71.5 28.0 
Dependent variable log ei2, where the ei are the residuals from estimating the knowledge-capital model given in 
(5.1). 
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Testing the linear restrictions  
The main text gives the results of testing the linear restrictions in the knowledge-capital 
model for the WLS regression assuming that the error variance depends on the 
knowledge-capital variables only (z = X). In Tables 5B.3 and 5B.4 we present the results 
for the assumption that the error variance depends on the knowledge-capital variables 
and their square values, z = X + X2. The restriction on the skill variables is once again 
rejected.  
 
Table 5B.3 – Testing restrictions BDH indicators. z = X + X2  
 Keeping the other linear 
restriction (on GDP or skills) 
Unrestricted model 
H0 F-statistic 5% F-statistic 5% 
1. β1 = β2 F(1, 2449) = 4.50 Rejected F(1, 2448) = 8.11 Rejected 
2. β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
F(1, 2449) = 4.78 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
Rejected F(1, 2448) = 12.2 Rejected 
3. β1 = β2 
    and 
   β4 = –β5 
 
F(2, 2448) = 10.2 Rejected 
 
 
Table 5B.4 – Testing restrictions CMM indicators. z = X + X2  
 Keeping the other linear 
restriction (on GDP or skills) 
Specification without linear 
restrictions 
H0 F-statistic 5% F-statistic 5% 
1. β1 = β2 F(1, 1463) = 8.93 Rejected F(1, 1462) = 3.08 Not rejected 
2. β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
F(1, 1369) = 69.4 
 
 
β4>0 
β5>0  
Rejected F(1, 1462) = 41.4 Rejected 
3. β1 = β2 
    and 
   β4 = –β5 
 
 F(2, 1462) = 24.6 Rejected 
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Appendix 5B.2 – Heteroskedasticity and functional form  
Figure 5B.1 shows the residuals from estimating the knowledge-capital model for 
bilateral FDI of the OECD plotted against the fitted values (using the BDH indicators and 
the CMM indicators of skilled labour and trade and investment costs, respectively). The 
figures indicate the clear presence of heteroskedasticity.  
 
Figure 5B.1 – Residuals versus fitted values, the knowledge-capital model  
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Changing the functional form 
Figure 5B.2 shows the residuals from estimating a log linear model for FDI of the OECD 
plotted against the fitted values. The figure indicates that changing the functional form 
goes a long way in solving the heteroskedasticity problem. The graphs are far less 
pronounced than for the linear model. Hence, the graphs suggest that a log linear model 
is a more appropriate specification given the data.  
 
Figure 5B.2 – Residuals versus fitted values log linear model 
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Appendix 5C. Linear restrictions in the knowledge-capital model using QL 
This appendix presents the results from testing the linear restrictions of the knowledge-
capital model using the QL indicator of skilled labour.   
 Like before, we use weighted least squares (WLS) estimators. We assume 
multiplicative heteroskedasticity of the form 
2 2 exp{ }
ii z    (see below for tests of 
this assumption).  
 Tables 5C.1 and 5C.2 give the results of testing the linear restrictions in the 
knowledge-capital model for the WLS regression assuming that the error variance 
depends on the knowledge-capital variables only (z = X). Once again, the subtractive 
linear constraint that coefficients on parent and host country skilled-labour abundance are 
equal, but opposite in sign, is rejected for the QL indicator.  
 
Table 5C.1 – Linear restrictions using QL, BDH indicators trade & investment costs. z = X  
 Keeping the other linear 
restriction (on GDP or skills) 
Specification without linear 
restrictions 
H0 F-statistic 5% F-statistic 5% 
1. β1 = β2 F(1, 2439) = 2.65 Not 
rejected 
F(1, 2438) = 3.67 Not rejected 
2. β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
F(1, 2439) = 5.86 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
Rejected 
 
 
F(1, 2438) = 6.21 Rejected 
3. β1 = β2 
    and 
   β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
 
 
F(2, 2438) = 4.27 
 
 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
Rejected 
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Table 5C.2 – Linear restrictions using QL, CMM indicators trade & investment costs. z = X  
 Keeping the other linear 
restriction (on GDP or skills) 
Specification without linear 
restrictions 
H0 F-statistic 5% F-statistic 5% 
1. β1 = β2 F(1, 1776) = 0.03 Not 
rejected 
F(1, 1775) = 0.01 Not rejected 
2. β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
F(1, 1776) = 32.7 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
Rejected 
 
 
F(1, 1775) = 33.7 Rejected 
3. β1 = β2 
    and 
   β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
 
 
F(2, 1775) = 
16.95 
 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
Rejected 
 
 
 Tables 5C.3 and 5C.4 present the results for the assumption that the error variance 
depends on the knowledge-capital variables and their squares. The subtractive linear 
constraint that coefficients on parent and host country skilled-labour abundance are 
equal, but opposite in sign, is rejected in the specification with CMM indicators of trade 
and investment costs, but not in the specification with the BDH indicators.  
 
 
Table 5C.3 – Linear restrictions using QL, BDH indicators trade & investment costs. z = X + X2  
 Keeping the other linear 
restriction (on GDP or skills) 
Specification without linear 
restrictions 
H0 F-statistic 5% F-statistic 5% 
1. β1 = β2 F(1, 2439) = 5.96 Rejected F(1, 2438) = 1.98 Not rejected 
2. β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
F(1, 2439) = 3.82 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
Not 
rejected 
 
 
F(1, 2438) = 1.91 Not rejected 
3. β1 = β2 
    and 
   β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
 
 
F(2, 2438) = 2.24 
 
 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
Not rejected 
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Table 5C.4 – Linear restrictions using QL, CMM indicators trade & investment costs. z = X + X2  
 Keeping the other linear 
restriction (on GDP or skills) 
Specification without linear 
restrictions 
H0 F-statistic 5% F-statistic 5% 
1. β1 = β2 F(1, 1776) =  
0.15 
Not 
rejected 
F(1, 1775) = 0.12 Not rejected 
2. β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
F(1, 1776) = 25.6 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
Rejected 
 
 
F(1, 1775) = 24.5 Rejected 
3. β1 = β2 
    and 
   β4 = –β5 
 
    Signs skill variables 
 
 
F(2, 1775) = 12.7 
 
 
 
β4>0 
β5<0 
Rejected 
 
 
Testing the assumption of multiplicative heteroskedasticity 
Table 5C.5 gives the results of the auxiliary regression of log ei2 on zi and a constant, 
where z = X. The F-value of the auxiliary regressions is 126.5 and 57.7, respectively. 
Hence, the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are equal to zero, i.e. 
the assumption of homoskedasticity, is decidedly rejected for both specifications. 
Coefficients are often statistically significant as well.  
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Table 5C.5 – Auxiliary regressions multiplicative heteroskedasticity, z = X  
 QL & BDH indicators trade 
and investment costs 
QL & CMM indicators trade 
and investment costs 
SUMGDPt(ij) 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 
 (13.75) (12.65) 
(GDPDIFFt(ij))2 –1.05e-07 *** –1.80e-07*** 
 (5.70) (7.77) 
SKDIFFt(ij) 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (3.93) (4.47) 
GDPDIFFt(ij) SKDIFFt(ij) –0.00002 *** –0.00002*** 
 (6.51) (7.20) 
INVCt(j) –0.06*** –0.05*** 
 (12.76) (6.80) 
TCHt(j) –0.001 –0.02** 
 (0.69) (2.47) 
TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2 6.34e-06 ** –5.88e-06 
 (2.41) (1.26) 
TCPt(i) –0.01*** 0.01** 
 (3.46) (2.51) 
DISTij 0.00008*** 8.50e-06 
 (7.90) (0.76) 
Constant 16.34*** 16.61*** 
 (78.66) (50.88) 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.22 
F-value 126.5 57.7 
Observations 2450 1787 
Dependent variable log ei2, where the ei are the residuals from estimating the knowledge-capital model given in 
(5.1). 
 
 
 Table 5C.6 presents the results of the auxiliary regressions where zi is the full set of 
explanatory variables and the squared terms. F-values, 73.2 and 32.0, respectively, 
indicate that the assumption of homoskedasticity is also rejected for this specification of
{ }iz  .  
 Which specification for the form of { }iz   is most appropriate? We perform an F-test 
on the nine restrictions implied by the specification z = X in Table 5C.5. This produces an 
f-statistic of 13.9 and 5.23, respectively, so the null hypothesis is rejected in both cases. 
In other words, the specification that also includes the squared terms performs 
significantly better than the specification that only includes the knowledge-capital 
variables.   
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Table 5C.6 – Auxiliary regressions multiplicative heteroskedasticity, z = X + X2  
 QL & BDH indicators trade 
and investment costs 
QL & CMM indicators trade 
and investment costs 
SUMGDPt(ij) 0.0015*** 0.0012*** 
 (8.10) (6.91) 
(GDPDIFFt(ij))2 –2.47e-07 *** –2.55e-07***  
 (4.04) (2.81) 
SKDIFFt(ij) 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (4.44) (4.01) 
GDPDIFFt(ij) SKDIFFt(ij) –0.00001*** –0.00002***  
 (5.45) (5.29) 
INVCt(j) 0.02 –0.12*** 
 (0.94) (3.01) 
TCHt(j) 0.001 0.02 
 (0.30) (0.83) 
TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2 0.00001*** 0.00004* 
 (3.27) (1.68) 
TCPt(i) –0.01 –0.02 
 (1.26) (0.47) 
DISTij –0.00015*** –0.0001*** 
 (4.60) (2.66) 
{SUMGDPt(ij)} 2 –4.89e-08* –7.25e-09 
 (1.83) (0.24) 
{(GDPDIFFt(ij))2} 2 6.12e-15** 2.25e-15 
 (2.30) (0.56) 
{SKDIFFt(ij)} 2 –0.0007** –0.0015 
 (1.99) (1.46) 
{GDPDIFFt(ij) SKDIFFt(ij)}2 1.78e-10*** 2.61e-10*** 
 (3.77) (4.22) 
{INVCt(j)} 2 –0.001*** 0.001* 
 (3.20) (1.86) 
{TCHt(j)} 2 0.00001 –0.0005* 
 (1.45) (1.65) 
{TCHt(j) SKDIFFt(ij)2} 2 6.15e-11*** –2.76e-10*** 
 (2.82) (2.63) 
{TCPt(i)} 2 –2.73e-06 0.0005 
 (0.04) (1.01) 
{DISTij} 2 1.41e-08*** 6.16e-09*** 
 (7.46) (2.83) 
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.24 
F-value 73.2 32.0 
Dependent variable log ei2, where the ei are the residuals from estimating the knowledge-capital model given in 
(5.1). Intercept was estimated but not shown.  
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Appendix 5D. Background gravity specifications 
In this Appendix we present results of various specifications of the gravity model. We 
use different estimation samples. These specifications provide the background for 
references to sample selection effects and the effects from adding/dropping variables 
made in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 in the main text.  
 
OLS 
Table 5D.1 below presents OLS estimations of gravity specifications excluding skilled 
labour. We use different estimation samples: N=2629 (the set of maximum observations 
in the data); N=2591 (the number of observations in the regressions with human capital); 
and N=1423 (the number of observations in the regressions with skilled-labour 
abundance). In column (6) we find that, when institutional quality is included, the 
coefficient on per capita GDP of the host becomes negative and statistically significant 
with N=1423. We do not find this result for the larger samples. These results suggest that 
the negative and statistically significant effect of GDP per capita of the host column (5) 
in Table 5.4 is due to a sample selection effect.  
 
Multilevel estimation  
Tables 5D.2 and 5D.3 give the results for different specifications of the gravity model 
with multilevel estimation. The tables give results for N=1423 observations (the sample 
with skilled-labour abundance) and N=2591 (the sample with human capital). Table 5D.2 
gives the results of the basic gravity equation (specifications (1) and (3)) and 
specifications including GDP per capita. Table 5D.3 illustrates the effect on FDI of 
institutional quality from including GDP per capita and skilled labour. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122     Part II –Empirical Analysis of Bilateral FDI       
 
Table 5D.1 – Results standard gravity equations for different sample sizes, OLS 
 GDP per capita  Adding institutional quality 
 Full 
sample 
Sample 
human 
cap 
Sample 
skill 
abun’ce 
Full 
sample 
Sample 
human 
cap 
Sample 
skill 
abun’ce 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log GDP parent 1.11*** 1.11*** 1.15*** 1.26*** 1.27*** 1.40*** 
 (37.12) (36.88) (26.54) (40.09) (40.13) (30.37) 
Log GDP host 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.79*** 0.75*** 0.77*** 1.05*** 
 (27.67) (27.36) (21.09) (27.94) (26.97) (22.98) 
Log Distance –0.63*** –0.63*** –0.72*** –0.56*** –0.56*** –0.66*** 
 (23.28) (23.32) (19.33) (20.53) (20.63) (17.62) 
Language dummy 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.40*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 1.35*** 
 (11.68) (11.65) (10.65) (10.77) (10.72) (10.57) 
Colonial dummy 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.96*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.49*** 
 (4.83) (4.84) (5.11) (4.10) (4.07) (2.86) 
Log GDP/cap parent 1.94*** 1.95*** 2.22*** 0.26 0.22 0.07 
 (9.88) (9.87) (8.85) (1.01) (0.85) (0.21) 
Log GDP/cap host 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.46*** 0.54*** 0.46*** –1.23*** 
 (14.69) (14.40) (4.54) (6.17) (4.61) (5.30) 
Inst. quality parent    1.45*** 1.51*** 1.74*** 
    (9.44) (9.80) (9.56) 
Inst. quality host    0.29*** 0.37*** 1.45*** 
    (3.84) (4.30) (9.21) 
Constant –37.40*** –37.37*** –38.12*** –25.25*** –24.47*** –13.92*** 
 (20.38) (20.25) (15.80) (11.94) (11.49) (4.54) 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.60 
Observations   2629   2591   1423   2629   2591   1423 
log likelihood –5031 –4966 –2751 –4981 –4911 –2684 
Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Year dummies included (not shown). 
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Table 5D.2 – Effects GDP and GDP per capita for different specifications of gravity equation and 
sample sizes, multilevel 
 
Sample N=1423 (skilled-labour 
abundance) 
Sample N=2591 (human 
capital) 
 
Basic gravity 
model 
Gravity model 
incl. GDP per 
capita 
Basic gravity 
model 
Gravity model 
incl. GDP per 
capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log GDP parent 5.01*** 1.08*** 3.75*** 0.94*** 
 (17.49) (5.15) (21.95) (4.34) 
Log GDP host 0.81*** 0.47*** 0.74*** 0.45*** 
 (5.92) (2.70) (7.50) (4.22) 
Log GDP per capita parent  4.19***  3.00*** 
  (9.48)  (9.00) 
Log GDP per capita host  1.09***  1.09*** 
  (3.33)  (6.32) 
Log Distance –0.90*** –0.91*** –0.89*** –0.90*** 
 (7.41) (7.52) (10.15) (10.31) 
Language dummy 0.61 0.54 0.73*** 0.74*** 
 (1.36) (1.60) (2.88) (2.88) 
Colonial dummy 0.60 0.64 0.48 0.48 
 (1.36) (1.45) (1.57) (1.57) 
Constant –61.90 127.88** –78.61** 78.64** 
 (0.93) (2.21) (2.39) (2.17) 
Observations 1423 1423 2591 2591 
log likelihood –1753 –1743 –3206 –3171 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The coefficients relate to within-country (pair) changes. 
Cluster means of explanatory variables are included to ensure consistent estimators (not shown). See Table 5.5 
which cluster means have been used in the multilevel analysis. 
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FDI and Trade: the Role of Multiple 
Dimensions of Distance111  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
To serve foreign markets, firms can either export or set up a local subsidiary through 
horizontal FDI. Brainard (1997) models this decision of firms as a trade-off between 
achieving proximity to local markets, and concentrating production in space so as to 
exploit economies of scale. FDI substitutes for trade if distance between countries is 
large, while exports become more important if scale economies in production are large. 
This chapter aims to contribute to the discussion on the trade-off between exports and 
FDI by empirically investigating how distance affects the volume of bilateral sales and its 
composition in terms of trade and FDI. In the models in Brainard (1997) and Helpman et 
al. (2004) distance is measured first and foremost in terms of transport costs and trade 
barriers. This chapter considers different dimensions of distance suggested by the 
literature. Our approach explicitly takes into account intangible barriers related to 
cultural and institutional differences. Unlike the mechanisms described by the proximity-
                                                          
111 This chapter is based on Lankhuizen et al. (2009). 
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concentration hypothesis, these ‘intangible’ barriers can affect the costs related to FDI as 
well as trade, as pointed out in more detail in the literature review in Section 3.5.3. 
 The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes the model setup. Section 
6.3 describes the data. In Section 6.4 we present and discuss the regression results. In 
Section 6.5 we check the robustness of our results using multilevel estimation. Section 
6.6 concludes.  
 
6.2. A gravity model of international transactions 
We use the following basic gravity equation to study patterns of bilateral foreign sales 
(sum of exports and sales related to FDI) from exporter e to importer i: 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ln( ) β β ln( ) β ln( ) β ln( )
β ln( ) β ln ε .
t t t t
t t t
ei e i e
i ei ei
F GDP GDP GDPcap
GDPcap dist
    
                      (6.1) 
  
eiF  denotes bilateral sales. The size of the origin and destination markets is reflected by 
the gross domestic products of the countries of origin and destination (GDP), and by per 
capita incomes (GDPcap). Including GDP per capita is based on the stylized fact in 
international trade that “high-income countries trade disproportionately more with all 
trading partners and not just among themselves, while low-income countries trade less” 
(Deardorff, 1998, p.16).  
 The focus in this chapter is on four dimensions of distance (distei). We specify 
distance in terms of geography, culture and institutions, and distance caused by import 
tariffs. To measure cultural and institutional distance, we apply an index of distance that 
was developed for these purposes and first applied by Kogut and Singh (1988).112 In 
addition to cultural distance, we control for a shared cultural background by including a 
dummy variable that indicates whether countries share a common language. Apart from a 
direct measure of institutional distance, we also include the quality levels of the 
institutional environment in the country of origin and the country of destination. 
Transaction costs depend on both the level of institutional quality (e.g., contract 
enforceability and expropriation risk) in both countries and the bilateral distance 
(affecting mutual understanding of and familiarity with informal solutions to governance 
                                                          
112 The index is defined as: 
 2, ,
,
1
1 K i k j k
i j
k k
I I
D
K V

  . Here Di,j is the measure of distance between country i 
and country j, K is the number of indicators of culture/institutional quality distinguished  (indexed by k), Ii,k is 
country i’s score with respect to indicator k, and Vk the variance of indicator k over all countries in the sample.  
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problems). The set of control variables also includes a dummy variable that indicates 
whether or not countries are adjacent in space. We also include year dummies to control 
for global trends. 
 We are interested in the effect of the different dimensions of transactional distance on 
the volume of bilateral sales and on the trade-off between its components. Therefore, we 
distinguish two bilateral measures: the volume of bilateral sales (sum of exports and FDI-
sales) and FDI intensity (share of FDI-sales in bilateral sales). To describe the volume of 
bilateral sales, we estimate equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS). For FDI 
intensity as dependent variable, we need to transform the gravity equation, because (by 
definition) FDI intensity ranges between zero and one. We assume that FDI intensity 
follows a continuous logistic function between zero and one, given by: 
  
β ε
1
1 j j ei
ei XS e 
                      (6.2)
 
 
where Sei stands for the share of FDI-sales in bilateral sales, and the Xj’s refer to the same 
set of explanatory variables as in equation (1). Due to its functional form, the 
(deterministic) expected FDI intensity of bilateral sales and the random outcome are 
bounded between zero and one as well. For this functional form, the effect of a 
continuous explanatory variable on FDI intensity is illustrated graphically in Figure 6.1. 
Panel (a) shows the effect of changes in variables whose coefficient β is negative. An 
increase in X reduces the FDI intensity. On the other hand, when β is positive, an increase 
in X raises FDI intensity as illustrated in panel (b). We estimate equation (6.2) using non-
linear least squares (NLS). 
 
6.3. Data 
The OECD data on FDI represent FDI stocks. To analyse the relative importance of FDI 
versus exports in bilateral foreign sales, we use a proxy for sales associated with FDI.113 
The proxy is derived by transforming FDI stocks into sales using capital-output ratios. 
Data on capital intensity are from the Penn World Tables. Export data are from the UN 
COMTRADE database for bilateral trade. The data sample includes exports and FDI 
between OECD countries as well as exports and FDI from OECD countries to major non-  
 
                                                          
113 Comparison of data on affiliate sales from the BEA and our measures of FDI-related sales for the U.S. shows 
high levels of correlation: 0.99 or 0.90 in the case inward FDI sales, and 0.85 or 0.92 for outward sales (the 
differences depend on whether the capital-output ratio of the parent country or the host country is used). The 
calculation is based on data for 1990. 
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Figure 6.1. Illustration of the FDI-intensity function  
 
 
Panel (a): β<0 
 
 
 
 
Panel (b): β>0  
 
 
OECD countries for the period 1984–1990.114  
 The source of data for GDP and GDP per capita is the Penn World Tables Mark 5.6, 
as before. We use distance in miles between capital cities for geographical distance 
between countries. The data for the indicators of cultural distance are from Hofstede 
(2001).115 Hofstede (1980, 2001) has developed a set of variables that reflect national 
cultures in terms of norms and values. These variables are: masculinity/femininity; 
uncertainty avoidance; individualism/collectivism; and power distance. Each is 
constructed on the basis of principal components analysis, and intends to reflect the 
stance of a distinct set of work-related norms and values in national cultures. Institutional 
                                                          
114 We have omitted the years 1982-1983 and 1991-1992 from our sample due to a lack of observations. 
Although FDI has increased rapidly in the last two decades in particular, we may assume that the (marginal) 
effects of distance on trade and FDI are more or less constant over time. For instance, the effect of (geographic) 
distance on trade is shown to be persistent over time despite falling costs of transport and communication (see, 
e.g., Disdier and Head, 2008, Linders, 2006).   
115 Supplemented with additional countries (Linders et al., 2005). 
1
0 Xj
0
1
Xj
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data are from Kaufmann et al. (2005). Kaufmann et al. (2005) have constructed six 
indicators of perceived institutional quality on the basis of principal components analysis. 
These indicators are: voice and accountability; political stability; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption. The institutional 
quality score of a country is calculated by taking the simple average of the scores across 
all six governance indicators. Data on common borders and a common language are from 
CEPII. As an indicator of tangible trade barriers, we use trade-weighted applied tariffs 
from the WITS data set. Further information on the variables used in this chapter is 
presented in the Data Appendix in the back of this study. Descriptive statistics and 
correlations for our data sample are presented in Appendix 6A. 
 
6.4. Empirical results 
This section presents the results from estimating gravity equations for bilateral foreign 
sales and for the share of FDI-sales. First we discuss the results for a standard gravity 
model. Then we turn to the multiple dimensions of distance.  
 
6.4.1. The gravity model of total bilateral sales and FDI intensity  
The first specification in Table 6.1 presents the results for the basic model of bilateral 
sales, given in equation (1). The results indicate that the patterns of bilateral sales are 
explained fairly well by the gravity equation. The effect size for the traditional gravity 
model variables, GDP and geographical distance, is comparable to the standard findings 
in empirical studies of bilateral trade patterns (see Frankel, 1997, Disdier and Head, 
2008, Linders et al., 2008). Total sales increase with both the GDP of the origin and the 
destination country, and fall with geographical distance. Following the stylized fact that 
high-income countries trade more (Deardorff, 1998), we included GDP per capita of the 
origin and destination countries in the gravity equation for total bilateral sales. The 
statement by Deardorff receives some empirical support from our estimates of the basic 
model. Except for per capita income of the country of origin, all variables in the base 
model are highly statistically significant. 
 The results for FDI intensity, given in column (2), show the rich possibilities for 
interpretation that follow from investigating the composition of bilateral sales. First, we 
find clear evidence of a conventional proximity-concentration trade-off in geographical 
terms. FDI intensity increases with geographical distance and this effect is highly 
statistically significant. Regarding the other traditional gravity equation variables, we can 
see that the country of origin is relatively more involved in FDI-related sales if its GDP 
level is higher. In contrast, the GDP in the destination country does not appear to affect  
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Table 6.1. Estimation results total bilateral sales and FDI intensity 
 
Basic model 
Culture, institutions and 
bilateral tariffs 
Fixed effects 
 Log Total 
sales 
FDI intensity Log Total 
sales 
FDI intensity Log Total 
sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log GDP exp 0.90*** 0.14*** 1.02*** 0.36***  
 (37.99) (4.72) (40.36) (10.35)  
Log GDP imp 0.76*** 0.02 0.86*** 0.02  
 (35.12) (0.74) (36.02) (0.47)  
Log GDP/cap exp 0.10 1.62*** –1.23*** –0.44  
 (0.90) (8.56) (7.92) (1.64)  
Log GDP/cap imp 0.72*** 0.17*** –0.03 0.08  
 (18.06) (3.28) (0.37) (0.65)  
Log Distance –0.70*** 0.14*** –0.59*** 0.10*** –0.68*** 
 (29.83) (4.65) (23.35) (2.84) (21.55) 
Language dummy   0.51*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 
   (6.79) (5.46) (6.75) 
Adjacency   0.42*** –0.51*** 0.41*** 
   (5.24) (4.48) (5.92) 
Cultural distance   –0.03* –0.14*** –0.09*** 
   (1.79) (4.93) (5.19) 
Inst. quality exp   0.83*** 1.53***  
   (8.90) (8.31)  
Inst. quality imp   0.63*** 0.29**  
   (7.13) (2.13)  
Inst. distance   0.02 0.04 0.10** 
   (0.53) (0.75) (2.39) 
Log(1+Tariff)   –3.79*** 2.54** –4.80*** 
   (5.25) (2.13) (3.59) 
Constant –15.29*** –20.59*** –1.62 –5.60** 12.31*** 
 (14.29) (11.62) (1.27) (2.70) (26.01) 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.89 
Observations 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
Note: Specifications for FDI intensity are estimated using nonlinear least squares. Specifications for total sales 
are estimated with standard OLS. 
Columns 1–4: year dummies included (not shown). Column 5 includes importer-year and exporter-year specific 
dummies. Data cover the period 1984–1990. 
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the composition of bilateral sales.116 A possible explanation is that the probability of 
highly productive firms is higher in larger economies, because of scale advantages at the 
firm level that can be exploited on the domestic market. Because highly productive 
companies are more likely to engage in FDI (see Helpman et al., 2004), FDI would 
respond elastically to GDP in the parent country. A similar reasoning may explain why 
GDP per capita in the parent country is important in explaining the trade-off between 
FDI and exports. If only the most productive of firms that engage in international 
transactions become established as multinational firms, a high average income and 
productivity is likely to yield relatively more FDI-related sales. 
 
6.4.2. The multiple dimensions of distance  
We now turn to the main question in this chapter, i.e. how transaction costs that arise 
from different dimensions of distance affect the volume and composition of bilateral 
sales. Column (3) in Table 6.1 presents the estimation results for total bilateral sales 
volumes.117 Column (4) reports the outcomes for FDI intensity. Specification (5) includes 
year-specific fixed effects for country of origin and country of destination and is included 
to assess the robustness for a number of our dimensions of distance. The fixed-effects 
specification is in line with theoretical concerns about omitted variables in the gravity 
equation for exports (see Feenstra, 2004). The disadvantage, though, is that country-
specific regressors cannot be included because of the fixed effects. This implies, for 
example, that we cannot assess the effect of the level of institutional quality in both 
origin and destination. 
 As shown in column (3), the gravity equation again performs quite well in explaining 
total bilateral foreign sales. The sum of exports and FDI sales depends negatively on 
geographical distance, as before, although the magnitude of distance decay falls when we 
add other dimensions of proximity or distance affecting transactions. The sign of the 
effect of most dimensions of distance (language, adjacency, cultural distance, 
institutional quality and import tariffs) is as one would expect, given the impact we a-
priori believe they have on transaction costs.  
 Bilateral sales decrease with cultural distance.118 Although the effect of distance in 
cultural norms and values is statistically significant only at the 10% level in specification 
                                                          
116  These findings are consistent with the existing literature on FDI. See, for example, Bergstrand and Egger 
(2007, p. 296) who note that ‘typical FDI gravity equation estimates find home country GDP elasticities 
significantly larger than host country GDP elasticities’. 
117 We have also disentangled bilateral sales, and estimated gravity equations for exports and FDI-sales. The 
results are presented separately in Appendix 6B. Because we have used data on FDI stocks to compute FDI-
sales, we also present gravity equation estimates for FDI stocks there. 
118 Cultural distance is estimated to have a positive effect on exports and a negative effect on FDI (see Table 
6B.1 in Appendix 6B). These results suggest that cultural distance is of particular importance to FDI and that 
firms substitute exports for FDI when cultural distance increases. Nevertheless, in a specification with full 
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(3), the estimate is statistically more significant in the fixed-effects regression. Next, we 
turn to institutional quality and institutional distance. Institutional quality positively and 
significantly affects bilateral interaction. This reflects that better institutions reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding transactions, thereby acting to lower transaction costs. The 
estimated effect of institutional distance does not support our ex-ante expectations, 
neither in the extended model (3), nor in the fixed effects specification (5). We would 
expect that bilateral sales to increase if institutional environments between countries are 
more similar. In the fixed-effects estimation, the effect of institutional distance on 
bilateral sales is significantly positive. This finding is contrary to estimates for bilateral 
trade previously found in the literature, and may be related to the nature of the sample in 
our analysis. The set of origin countries only consists of 12 OECD countries, while 
destination countries include both OECD and non-OECD countries. Low institutional 
distance applies to trade between OECD countries, and high institutional distance to trade 
between OECD and non-OECD countries. This explains why institutional distance and 
destination country institutional quality are highly correlated in our sample (see Table 
6A.2). Since flows originating from countries with relatively low institutional quality are 
lacking from this sample, it may be difficult to capture the effect of institutional distance 
(as separate from institutional quality). 
 The results in column (3) of Table 6.1 seem at odds with the stylized fact on the role 
of GDP per capita in bilateral sales. Per capita income of the origin country has a 
negative and significant effect on bilateral sales. This suggests that more developed 
countries engage less in outward bilateral sales, all else equal. The level of development 
of the destination country has no significant impact on bilateral sales. Despite the stylized 
facts quoted by Deardorff, the theoretical literature that underpins the gravity equation 
does not predict any relation between the level of development and total bilateral export. 
In fact, GDP per capita may proxy for omitted variables such as institutional quality that 
are highly correlated to it. It is quite common to find an insignificant or negative effect of 
per capita income on bilateral trade once institutional effectiveness is controlled for 
(Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002, De Groot et al., 2004). A negative effect may also 
reflect that, when countries become wealthier, the share of total expenditure devoted to 
traded goods falls, because the structure of production and consumption shifts from 
commodities towards services.119 
 With respect to FDI intensity, we see that the extension into multiple dimensions of 
distance supplements the conventional proximity-concentration trade off. The relative 
importance of FDI increases with geographical distance, as before. The results also 
                                                                                                                                                
country-specific fixed effects, the effect of cultural distance is negative for both exports and FDI alike. Thus, 
the results no longer provide evidence for the substitution (in absolute terms) of FDI by exports. Rather, they 
are consistent with a trade-off in relative terms. 
119 As FDI stocks include the service sector, this argument cannot explain why FDI is negatively related to 
income per capita of the parent country, all else equal. This result remains puzzling in a setting of horizontal 
FDI. 
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strongly indicate a shift from exports to FDI if tariff barriers increase. This supports the 
conventional proximity-concentration trade off.120  
 The results furthermore indicate that the relative importance of FDI sales increases as 
the quality of institutions in both the parent and host country increases. The effect of 
institutional quality of the parent country is particularly large. This may reflect that only 
the most productive firms engage in FDI which are likely to be found only in high-
quality institutional environments (Helpman et al., 2004).  
 As a robustness check, we also estimated specifications including absolute per capita 
GDP differentials to control for factor-proportions and preference differences (cf. 
Brainard, 1997). Our results suggest that countries with similar levels of income trade 
and invest more amongst each other. This provides support for the Linder (1961) 
hypothesis that similarity in income promotes bilateral sales. However, the support for 
this result is statistically weak. Per capita GDP similarities turn out to be relatively more 
important for FDI, a result that mirrors previous findings in Brainard (1997). However, 
the statistical significance of this finding is low. The results do not affect other findings 
qualitatively, and are available on request. 
 
Discussion 
We find that different dimensions of distance affect exports and FDI differently. As a 
result, some destinations are served relatively intensively through exports and others 
more through sales from FDI. The share of FDI sales increases with geographical 
distance. As geographical distance increases so do transport costs. Total foreign sales 
(exports and sales related to FDI) fall with geographical distance, but it constitutes a 
larger cost for exports than FDI. On the other hand, ‘soft’ barriers, i.e. language, culture 
and institutions, are particularly important for FDI. This can be explained from the fact 
that local presence entails a relatively deep involvement with and exposure to local 
cultures and institutions. Also, the demands in terms of language are higher for operating 
a plant in a foreign market compared to exporting.  
 To interpret the economic significance for the FDI intensity of the coefficients in 
column (4) in Table 6.1, we use typical values of the explanatory variables in the sample. 
Table 6.2 gives the expected value of the FDI intensity for the minimum and maximum 
values, the sample mean and the mean plus (minus) one standard deviation for each  
 
                                                          
120 The results in Appendix 6B, where export and FDI sales are disentangled, show a relative trade-off; both 
FDI sales and exports negatively depend on distance and tariffs, but the elasticity is higher for trade. In fact, 
FDI sales only show a statistically weak decline if tariffs rise, indicating a possibly substantial substitution of 
exports by FDI sales in the face of high tariff barriers (see, e.g. Carr et al., 2001, Markusen, 2002). For 
comparison, Brainard (1997) finds a positive coefficient of trade barriers on the level of affiliate sales, even 
though she notes that, strictly speaking, the proximity-concentration hypothesis applies to shares rather than to 
levels of affiliate sales and trade. Carr et al. (2001) also predict and find a positive effect of trade costs in the 
host country on the level of affiliate sales. 
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Table 6.2. Economic significance of parameter estimates FDI intensity  
 
Min. 
–1 
Std. Dev. 
Mean 
+1 
Std. Dev. 
Max. 
Log GDP exporter 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.44 0.51 
Log GDP importer 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 
Log GDP per capita exporter 0.44 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 
Log GDP per capita importer 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 
Log Distance 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.37 
Language dummy 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.43 
Adjacency 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.24 
Cultural distance 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.29 0.20 
Institutional quality exporter 0.12 0.23 0.34 0.46 0.49 
Institutional quality importer 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.38 
Institutional distance 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.38 
Log(1+Tariff) 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.51 
Note: the numbers indicate the value of FDI intensity for typical values of the explanatory variables in our 
sample, fixing all other variables to their sample mean. ‘Min.’ and ‘Max.’ denote the minimum and maximum 
values in the sample; ‘–1 (+1) Std. Dev.’ denote –1 (+1) standard deviation from the sample mean.  
 
 
of the explanatory variables, fixing all other explanatory variables to their sample mean. 
Our results illustrate that FDI does not merely substitute for trade when transport costs 
and trade barriers are high: FDI sales incur costs of their own. Table 3 indicates that, for 
example, increasing cultural distance by one standard deviation from its sample mean 
ceteris paribus reduces the share of FDI sales in total foreign sales (FDI plus exports) by 
5 percentage points. Similarly, an increase in institutional quality of the parent and the 
host country by one standard deviation from their sample mean increases the share of 
FDI sales by 12 and 4 percentage points, respectively. For comparison, the effects of our 
‘soft’ dimensions of transactional distance on the trade-off between exports and FDI are 
comparable to, and sometimes more substantial, than the effects of the traditional 
proximity-concentration control variables. An increase in geographical distance by one 
standard deviation from its sample mean increases the share of FDI sales by 2 percentage 
points. A one standard deviation increase in bilateral import tariffs increases the share of 
FDI sales by 3 percentage points. For comparison of their quantitative effects on FDI 
intensity, we can express changes in intangible barriers as tariff equivalents (similar to 
Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). A decrease in cultural distance of one standard 
deviation is equivalent to an 8 percentage point increase of the average bilateral tariff. 
The tariff equivalents of an increase in institutional quality of the parent and the host 
country of one standard deviation are 22 and 7 percentage points, respectively. 
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6.5. Additional robustness analysis  
In this section, we check the robustness of our results. We start by using multilevel 
estimation. Regarding total foreign sales, we perform a cross-classified multilevel 
analysis, as we have done throughout Part II.121 We use a different method for the 
estimation of the FDI intensity. The logistic function cannot be estimated with standard 
multilevel programmes.122 A solution is to resort to Bayesian analysis. However, 
Bayesian analysis is based on a rather different philosophy as regards the nature of the 
estimated parameters than classical ‘frequentist’ analysis. The latter views parameters as 
unknown constants, whereas the former views them as random, i.e., uncertain, 
outcomes.123 The frequentist approach is the one that is commonly used in the empirical 
trade literature. Bayesian analysis is beyond the context of this study. In order to account 
for clustering in the estimation of the FDI intensity after all, we estimate the equation 
with nonlinear least squares and cluster-robust standard errors. Table 6.3 gives the 
results. 
 Column (1) gives the results of the multilevel analysis for total sales with parent, host 
and parent-host random effects.124 Cluster means are included (but not shown) to ensure 
unbiased coefficients of the explanatory variables.125 We find that our results for total 
sales are largely robust to the multilevel estimation. Coefficients by and large have the 
expected sign.126 We note that the effect of GDP per capita is now positive. Furthermore, 
although significance levels are generally reduced compared to OLS, most variables 
remain statistically significant. The only exception in this respect is bilateral tariffs.  
 Columns (2) – (4) give the results for the estimation of FDI intensity with cluster-
robust standard errors. As explained in Chapter 4, we can only use one cluster variable at 
a time. Column (2) gives the results with clustering by parent, column (3) with clustering 
by host country, and column (4) with clustering by parent-host combinations. Once 
again, significance levels across the board are lower when clustering of the data is taken 
into account. In fact, institutional quality of the host and geographic distance are no 
longer significant statistically, regardless of the cluster variable. The latter indicates that, 
with cluster-robust standard errors, the statistical evidence in favour of a trade-off 
between FDI and exports in the face of geographic distance is weak. 
 
                                                          
121 The multilevel results for exports, FDI stocks and FDI sales are presented in Table 6B.2 in Appendix 6B. 
122 Multilevel models are computationally complex as it is. Multilevel analysis is mostly applied to linear 
models (see, e.g., Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).  
123 Bayesian analysis has been used by, e.g., Fernandez et al. (2001) to investigate the issue of model 
uncertainty in cross-country growth regressions.  
124 Table 6A.3 in the Appendix 6A gives the estimates of the within parent-host combination variance as well as 
the between variances (parent, host and parent-host combinations) for two different baseline models. All three 
between-variances are significant.  
125 We applied the same procedure for including cluster means (see Chapters 4 and 5).    
126 Institutional quality of the host has a negative effect on total sales, but this is most likely the result of 
collinearity between institutional quality and GDP per capita.   
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Table 6.3. Sensitivity analysis: multilevel analysis and cluster-robust standard errors  
 Total sales FDI intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log GDP exporter 1.46*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 
 (9.99) (4.07) (6.17) (4.64) 
Log GDP importer 0.78*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (10.37) (0.23) (0.11) (0.20) 
Log GDP cap exporter 0.57** –0.44 –0.44 –0.44 
 (2.62) (0.75) (0.89) (0.74) 
Log GDP cap importer 1.58*** 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 (11.05) (0.47) (0.17) (0.28) 
Log Distance –0.80*** 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 (14.17) (1.29) (1.20) (1.23) 
Language dummy 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.48** 0.48*** 
 (3.40) (3.53) (2.07) (2.31) 
Adjacency 0.36** –0.51*** –0.51** –0.51*** 
 (2.09) (2.71) (2.11) (2.01) 
Cultural distance –0.09** –0.14** –0.14** –0.14** 
 (2.62) (2.08) (2.16) (2.02) 
Institutional quality exporter 1.29*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 
 (3.06) (3.48) (5.18) (3.49) 
Institutional quality importer –0.08 0.29 0.29 0.29 
 (0.39) (1.11) (0.53) (0.90) 
Inst. distance 0.12* 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (1.68) (0.51) (0.28) (0.35) 
Log(1+Tariff) –1.34 2.54*** 2.54 2.54 
 (0.73) (2.78) (0.54) (0.96) 
Constant –57.48*** –5.60 –5.60** –5.60 
 (3.16) (1.24) (1.27) (1.24) 
Observations 1145 1145 1145 1145 
log likelihood –192    
Column 1: multilevel analysis with parent, host and parent-host random effects. The coefficients in column (1) 
relate to within-country (pair) changes. Cluster means of explanatory variables are included to ensure consistent 
estimators (not shown). The following cluster means are included: GDP and GDP per capita of parent by host 
country, GDP and GDP per capita of host by parent country, distance by host country, language and adjacency 
by parent and host country, and cultural distance by parent and host country. 
Columns 2–4: non-linear regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Column (2) gives the results from 
clustering by parent, column (3) from clustering by host country, column (4) from clustering by parent-host 
combinations. Year dummies included in columns 2–4 (not shown). 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
The evidence for tariffs depends on which cluster variable is used. At the same time, our 
results still support the relative importance for FDI of a common language, institutional 
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quality of the parent and cultural proximity. The same is true for the relative importance 
of adjacency for exports. 
 Next, we examine the specifications of total sales and FDI intensity using purely 
cross-sectional data. This is done by averaging the variables over time. The results are 
given in Table 6.4. The table indicates that t-statistics (standard errors) of all variables 
are generally lower (higher) in the cross-section estimation. In a few cases, coefficients 
are no longer statistically significant.127 Nevertheless, the sign patterns and coefficient 
sizes are qualitatively robust. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
To serve foreign markets, firms can either export or set up a local subsidiary through 
horizontal FDI. According to the proximity-concentration trade-off (Brainard, 1997, 
Helpman et al., 2004) local sales associated with FDI increase relative to exports the 
higher are transport costs and trade barriers and the lower are investment barriers and 
scale economies at the plant level relative to the corporate level.  
 In this chapter, we extend the framework for analysing the trade-off between exports 
and FDI empirically. We investigate the effect of various dimensions of distance on the 
composition of total bilateral interaction, viz. geographical distance and distance in 
economic terms due to tangible trade barriers such as tariffs and intangible barriers such 
as cultural and institutional differences between countries. Furthermore, unlike the 
conventional proximity-concentration trade-off our approach explicitly takes into account 
that intangible barriers affect the fixed and variable costs related to FDI as well and may 
affect the trade-off between exports and FDI differently. 
 We show that different dimensions of distance affect exports and FDI differently. 
First, there is clear evidence in support of a conventional proximity-concentration trade-
off. The share of FDI sales increases with both geographical distance and import tariffs. 
On the other hand, this chapter illustrates that FDI does not merely substitute for trade 
when transport costs and trade barriers are high. It incurs costs of its own. These costs are 
primarily of an intangible nature. The share of FDI in total bilateral sales decreases with 
language differences and cultural distance, and increases with institutional quality in both 
the parent and host country. Hence, ‘soft’ barriers are particularly important for FDI. Our 
results, though, do not offer robust support for a negative effect of institutional distance 
on either trade or FDI.  
 
                                                          
127 In particular, this pertains to the effect of cultural distance on total sales and the effects of geographical 
distance, institutional quality of the importer and bilateral tariffs on FDI intensity.  
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Table 6.4. Results from cross-section  
 Culture, institutions and bilateral tariffs 
 Log Total sales                FDI intensity 
 (1) (2) 
Log GDP exporter 0.95*** 0.41*** 
 (18.03) (5.72) 
Log GDP importer 0.87*** 0.03    
 (16.33) (0.38) 
Log GDP per capita exporter –0.97*** –0.33    
 (2.99) (0.54) 
Log GDP per capita importer –0.12 0.07  
 (0.66) (0.24) 
Log Distance –0.60*** 0.06  
 (10.69) (0.75) 
Language dummy 0.39** 0.48**  
 (2.27) (2.47) 
Adjacency 0.50*** –0.51**  
 (2.78) (2.03) 
Cultural distance –0.05 –0.15**  
 (1.40) (2.31) 
Institutional quality exporter 0.79*** 1.61***  
 (3.71) (3.59) 
Institutional quality importer 0.77*** 0.35  
 (4.26) (1.12) 
Institutional distance 0.05 0.05 
 (0.84) (0.38) 
Log(1+Tariff) –3.56** 3.69  
 (2.33) (1.30) 
Constant –2.23 –7.25 
 (0.83) (1.48) 
Observations 223 223 
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.75 
Notes: Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. Starts indicate statistical significance: * significant at 10%,  
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
 Finally, our results indicate that larger economies engage relatively more in outward 
FDI, while the size of the foreign market affects exports and FDI by and large equally. 
This may be interpreted to provide support for the argument that only relatively high-
productivity firms are active on the export market and the most productive firms become 
multinational firms by investing abroad. On the other hand, per capita income, as a 
measure of productivity, does not have a statistically positive effect on the FDI intensity 
of bilateral sales. This reflects that high-income countries tend to have less bilateral 
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interaction both inward and outward, once we control for the effect of institutional 
quality. 
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Appendix 6A. Data 
Table 6A.1 gives the summary statistics for the estimation sample. 
 
Table 6A.1 – Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Log Exports 14.12 1.61 5.74 18.39 1145 
Log FDI stock 6.25 2.40 –1.18 11.92 1145 
Log FDI sales 6.17 2.41 –1.26 11.98 1145 
Log total foreign sales 7.75 1.63 2.59 12.44 1145 
FDI intensity 0.34 0.25 0.00 1.00 1145 
Log GDP exporter 13.31 1.19 11.03 15.32 1145 
Log GDP importer 12.25 1.25 10.13 15.32 1145 
Log GDP per capita exporter 9.50 0.22 8.53 9.80 1145 
Log GDP per capita importer 9.12 0.63 6.92 9.80 1145 
Log absolute diff. GDP per capita 0.51 0.57 0.00 2.78 1145 
Log Distance 8.25 1.14 5.16 9.88 1145 
Language dummy 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 1145 
Adjacency 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 1145 
Cultural distance 2.20 1.47 0.02 7.44 1145 
Institutional quality exporter 1.47 0.35 0.59 1.90 1145 
Institutional quality importer 1.25 0.65 –0.46 1.93 1145 
Institutional distance 0.74 1.04 0.02 5.43 1145 
Log(1+Tariff) 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.31 1145 
 
 
Table 6A.2 gives the correlation matrix for the data used in the estimation samples.
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Table 6A.3 gives the estimates of the within parent-host combination variance 2e  as 
well as the variances between parent countries, host countries and parent-host 
combinations, 20 p , 20h  and 20 ph , respectively, for two different baseline models, one 
including and the other excluding the combination effect c0ij. The estimates of between-
country variances can be used to calculate correlation of observations within parent and 
host countries and parent-host combinations. These intra-class correlations are given in 
Table 6A.3 as well.  
 Table 6A.4 shows the increase in –2LL of the model for exports, FDI stocks and total 
sales, respectively, when omitting p0i, h0j or c0ij. These increases are highly significant for 
a Chi-squared distributed with 1 degree of freedom.  
 
 
Table 6A.4 – Significance of variances 
 Exports FDI stocks Total sales 
Effect on –2LL from omitting:    
   Parent random effect 80 170 118 
   Host random effect 117 114 126 
   Parent-host random effect 1292 950 1303 
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Appendix 6B. Background regressions 
This appendix presents the background regressions for exports, FDI stocks and FDI sales 
referred to in the main text. Table 6B.1 gives the results from OLS. Table 6B.2 gives the 
results of the multilevel analysis with parent, host and parent-host random effects.  
 For the majority of the variables, the results from the multilevel analysis are 
qualitatively similar to those from OLS (in the case of institutional distance and bilateral 
tariffs, similar to the OLS results with fixed effects).128 This is particularly true for the 
multiple dimensions of distance.129 Coefficients that are statistically significant with OLS 
by and large remain statistically significant in the multilevel model, indicating that the 
bias from ignoring intra-class correlation in OLS is less consequential. 
                                                          
128 Somewhat puzzling in Table 6B.2 is the negative effect of importer GDP on exports. This result indicates 
that, as importer countries become larger over time, they attract fewer exports. There is no strong evidence of a 
substitution effect of exports by FDI: the effect of importer GDP on FDI sales is positive but the effect is highly 
insignificant statistically. We also find a negative effect of importer GDP on exports in a specification with 
country and pair wise fixed effects. These results are available on request. 
129 With respect to the effects of institutional quality of the importer, we once again suspect the effects of 
collinearity. The effect of importer per capita GDP is positive and statistically significant. We suspect that it is 
difficult for the model to identify the effect of institutional quality of the importer independently and that the 
coefficient of GDP per capita of the importer pretty much absorbs the effect of institutional quality (particularly 
in the regressions of FDI stocks and sales). 
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Table 6B.1 – Background regressions exports, FDI stocks and sales associated with FDI  
 
Culture, institutions and bilateral tariffs 
Adding per capita GDP 
differences 
 Exports FDI stocks FDI sales Exports FDI stocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log GDP exp 0.88*** 1.48*** 1.48*** 0.88*** 1.49*** 
 (35.06) (31.12) (29.68) (34.78) (31.25) 
Log GDP imp 0.87*** 0.80*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.82*** 
 (37.06) (18.91) (19.83) (38.75) (18.66) 
Log GDP cap exp –0.94*** –1.44*** –1.43*** –0.93*** –1.39*** 
 (5.48) (4.49) (4.27) (5.53) (4.23) 
Log GDP cap imp –0.13 0.30* –0.12 –0.24** –0.09 
 (1.53) (1.77) (0.68) (2.46) (0.32) 
Log Distance –0.65*** –0.58*** –0.58*** –0.65*** –0.56*** 
 (27.82) (11.15) (10.71) (26.68) (10.48) 
Language dummy 0.30*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 0.31*** 0.81*** 
 (4.56) (6.34) (5.94) (4.65) (6.50) 
Adjacency 0.63*** 0.12 0.08 0.63*** 0.12 
 (8.01) (0.72) (0.50) (7.99) (0.75) 
Cultural distance 0.03 –0.24*** –0.25*** 0.03* –0.24*** 
 (1.58) (5.47) (5.47) (1.68) (5.34) 
Inst. quality exp. 0.21* 2.55*** 2.55*** 0.21* 2.54*** 
 (1.96) (11.68) (11.34) (1.95) (11.63) 
Inst. quality imp. 0.56*** 0.84*** 1.00*** 0.58*** 0.94*** 
 (7.87) (5.12) (5.79) (8.31) (5.41) 
Inst. distance 0.00 0.13* 0.12* 0.02 0.18** 
 (0.03) (1.88) (1.65) (0.42) (2.42) 
Log(1+Tariff) –5.75*** –2.25 –2.06 –5.79*** –2.37 
 (6.49) (1.43) (1.24) (6.57) (1.50) 
Abs diff. Log GDP 
cap    –0.12 –0.42* 
    (1.10) (1.85) 
Constant 6.22*** –11.92*** –9.51*** 6.90*** –9.49*** 
 (5.00) (4.35) (3.33) (4.47) (3.45) 
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.65 0.62 0.79 0.65 
Observations 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Columns 1–6: year dummies included (not shown). Column 7–9 includes importer-year and exporter-year 
specific dummies. Data cover the period 1984–1990. 
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Table 6B.1 – Continued  
 Adding per 
capita GDP 
differences 
Fixed effects 
 FDI sales Exports FDI stocks FDI sales 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log GDP exp 1.49***    
 (29.91)    
Log GDP imp 0.92***    
 (19.70)    
Log GDP cap exp –1.37***    
 (3.97)    
Log GDP cap imp –0.60**    
 (2.18)    
Log Distance –0.56*** –0.73*** –0.72*** –0.72*** 
 (9.99) (20.67) (11.84) (11.84) 
Language dummy 0.79*** 0.23*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 
 (6.16) (4.06) (4.82) (4.82) 
Adjacency 0.09 0.57*** 0.22 0.22 
 (0.54) (8.77) (1.52) (1.52) 
Cultural distance –0.25*** –0.09*** –0.20*** –0.20*** 
 (5.32) (4.54) (4.78) (4.78) 
Inst. quality exp. 2.54***    
 (11.31)    
Inst. quality imp. 1.13***    
 (6.19)    
Inst. distance 0.19** 0.16*** 0.05 0.05 
 (2.37) (2.84) (0.61) (0.61) 
Log(1+Tariff) –2.22 –7.27*** 2.75 2.75 
 (1.33) (4.94) (1.10) (1.10) 
Abs diff. Log GDP cap –0.53**    
 (2.20)    
Constant –6.46** 19.40*** 10.67*** 10.64*** 
 (2.26) (38.34) (13.33) (13.30) 
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.87 0.83 0.83 
Observations 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Columns 1–6: year dummies included (not shown). Column 7–9 includes importer-year and exporter-year 
specific dummies. Data cover the period 1984–1990. 
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Table 6B.2 – Background regressions: multilevel analysis 
Multilevel analysis with parent, host and parent-host random effects. The coefficients relate to within-country 
(pair) changes. Cluster means of explanatory variables are included to ensure consistent estimators (not shown). 
The following cluster means are included: GDP and GDP per capita of parent by host country, GDP and GDP 
per capita of host by parent country, distance by host country, language and adjacency by parent and host 
country, and cultural distance by parent and host country. 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 Exports FDI stocks FDI sales 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP exporter 1.20*** 1.95*** 1.92*** 
 (12.22) (5.41) (5.46) 
Log GDP importer 0.85*** 0.60*** 0.69*** 
 (16.45) (3.86) (3.82) 
Log GDP cap exporter 0.83*** 1.84*** 1.63*** 
 (3.87) (3.48) (3.13) 
Log GDP cap importer 0.83*** 1.50*** 1.72*** 
 (5.28) (4.65) (5.13) 
Log Distance –0.83*** –0.86*** –0.88*** 
 (14.75) (8.18) (8.26) 
Language dummy 0.22 0.72*** 0.71*** 
 (1.44) (2.75) (2.71) 
Adjacency 0.52*** 0.15 0.15 
 (2.89) (0.47) (0.49) 
Cultural distance –0.08** –0.23*** –0.24*** 
 (2.07) (3.63) (3.56) 
Institutional quality exporter 0.64** 3.35*** 3.41*** 
 (2.13) (3.26) (3.40) 
Institutional quality importer 0.15 0.02 –0.13 
 (0.85) (0.06) (0.29) 
Inst. distance 0.12* 0.09 0.08 
 (1.80) (0.68) (0.60) 
Log(1+Tariff) –5.11*** 0.50 2.23 
 (3.44) (0.14) (0.57) 
Constant –71.94*** –53.54 –43.30 
 (5.35) (1.34) (1.02) 
Observations 1145 1145 1145 
log likelihood –529 –1123 –1121 
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7.1. Introduction 
Available data show marked regularities in the world-wide pattern of FDI: developed 
economies are the main source of FDI and also the main recipients. It thus seems that 
FDI is foremost between developed, high-income countries. The aim of this study has 
been to explain this stylised fact. Why do some countries attract large amounts of FDI, 
whilst others attract only small amounts? In Chapter 1 we formulated the following 
overall research question as a guideline for the analysis: what are the sources of attraction 
for FDI? Having arrived at the end of this study, we can now assess the results.  
 This concluding chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 summarizes the main 
findings from this study. Section 7.3 links the conclusions from this study back to the 
research question. In Section 7.4 we present policy implications. Lastly, Section 7.5 
suggests areas for further research. 
 
7 
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7.2. Summary of the research results 
Chapter 2 served as a first introductory analysis in the investigation into the sources of 
attraction for FDI. The chapter empirically investigates the stylised fact that developed 
countries attract the bulk of FDI whilst the least developed countries attract only a little. 
What factors can explain this marked pattern in world-wide FDI? The chapter 
investigates a number of factors that are regarded as important determinants of economic 
development. To what extent do these factors then explain the variation in FDI inflows 
across host countries? We look particularly at: human capital, inflation, institutional 
quality and geographic characteristics. Multinationals are generally regarded as 
knowledge-intensive companies. They account for about two thirds of private sector 
R&D and they produce, own and control most of the world’s advanced technology. We 
therefore examine the importance of human capital for attracting FDI. Institutions are 
recognised as variables that affect productivity. They influence the uncertainty 
surrounding transactions and hence the costs associated with this. Concerning FDI, the 
quality of institutions affects expropriation risks, securing of intellectual property rights, 
the degree of corruption, the enforceability of private contracts, and the security of 
investment in general. The costs of operating abroad will generally be lower if the quality 
of institutions overseas is higher. Inflation is a measure of macro-instability. We find that 
institutional quality is an important determinant of total FDI inflows across host 
countries. Institutional quality explains up to 27 per cent of the average variation in total 
FDI. The effect of institutional quality is robust across different specifications. Inflation 
is much less robust. Human capital and geography (e.g., climate) each explain about 10 
per cent of the total variation in total FDI inflows, but the effects are not robust when the 
effects of human capital, institutional quality or inflation, and geography are controlled 
for all together. Still, the single most important determinant of total FDI is GDP. GDP 
has a statistically significant effect in all regressions and explains over 60 per cent of the 
average variation in total FDI inflows across countries.  
 The main contribution of Chapter 2 is its additional investigation of the role of human 
capital in attracting FDI. In the new growth theory, human capital is considered to be 
important with respect to technological progress. It is a key input in the production of 
new knowledge and the assimilation of new technologies. We therefore investigate 
whether human capital is more conducive to attracting FDI in technology-intensive 
sectors than total FDI. We also investigate whether attracting FDI in technology-
intensive sectors requires a particular type of skills, technical as opposed to, e.g., 
managerial skills. We look at: enrolment in science; enrolment in engineering, 
manufacturing and construction; and enrolment in social sciences, business and law. 
High-tech FDI is proxied by FDI in machinery and equipment and electrical and 
electronic equipment. We find that the quality of human capital appears to be relatively 
more important for FDI in electrical and electronic equipment than for total FDI. Our 
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results indicate that FDI inflows in this sector are highly elastic with respect to human 
capital: a one per cent increase in the quality of human capital increases FDI inflows 
more than proportionally. Human capital is also more important than institutional quality 
in explaining FDI in electrical and electronic equipment. The latter is less important in 
FDI in electrical and electronic equipment than in total FDI. In fact, the effect of 
institutional quality on FDI in electrical and electronic equipment is highly insignificant 
when human capital is included. Human capital and institutional quality have no 
significant effect on FDI in machinery and equipment. This type of FDI is explained 
almost entirely by GDP. With regard to the type of skills, we find that is technical skills 
that matter particularly for attracting high-tech FDI. Technical skills (measured by 
enrolment in science and in engineering, manufacturing and construction) are more 
important for attracting FDI in machinery and equipment and electrical and electronic 
equipment than managerial skills. The latter (measured by enrolment in social sciences, 
business and law) have no significant effect on FDI in machinery and equipment nor 
electrical and electronic equipment, whilst having a statistically significant positive 
impact on total FDI inflows. The statistical significance of institutional quality on FDI in 
machinery and equipment and electrical and electronic equipment is very low in 
specifications that control for technical skills as well. So, our expectations regarding the 
role of human capital and skills in high-tech FDI are largely confirmed by the data. 
Nevertheless, our conclusions regarding the role of human capital and skills in high-tech 
FDI are tentative. The analysis of high-tech FDI is much inconvenienced by a limited 
availability of data at a sector level. More additional research is needed to corroborate the 
evidence on high-tech FDI in Chapter 2. This research would greatly benefit from the 
availability of more detailed information on FDI at a sector level (see also Section 7.5).  
 Chapter 2 demonstrates the factors that can potentially explain the variation in FDI 
inflows across host countries. Yet, the selection of explanatory variables is not tied back 
to a theoretical model of location selection by firms. General-equilibrium models of FDI 
exist for bilateral FDI. These models explain how FDI comes about and specify long-
term factors that determine the magnitude of FDI between countries based on a 
microeconomic theory of firm decision making. The empirical analysis in Part II of this 
study is based on bilateral FDI.  
 Chapter 3 motivates and describes the research approach for our analysis in Part II. 
The chapter first of all presents two important theoretical models of FDI, i.e., the 
knowledge-capital model and the proximity-concentration trade-off hypothesis. This is 
followed by a critical review of the two models and the empirical work related to them. 
Chapter 3 argues there are three main issues in this literature that warrant further 
investigation. The first issue has to do with the FDI data. Important empirical 
contributions discussed in Chapter 3 all use FDI data that are bilateral with the U.S. only. 
This leaves out many observations of FDI between other countries. One of the main 
contributions in Part II pertains to the FDI data: we use data on bilateral FDI of the 
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OECD. This significantly increases the amount of observations compared to key 
contributions in the empirical literature on bilateral FDI that use bilateral data for the 
U.S. only. An issue in the data on bilateral FDI of the OECD is dependence. The data is a 
panel data set for multiple parent and host countries. We thus have several repeated 
observations: for parents over all host countries, for host countries over all parents, for 
parent and host countries over time, and for specific parent-host combinations. Failure to 
take intra-class correlations into account leads to underestimation of the standard errors 
of the regression coefficients and can result in spuriously significant results. Even low 
levels of intra-class correlation can cause the standard errors from OLS to be seriously 
biased downwards. The second issue that follows from our review of the literature in 
Chapter 3 pertains to the assumptions and empirical specification of the knowledge-
capital model. The empirical specification in CMM (i) imposes linear constraints on 
coefficients; and (ii) includes interactions between variables. To allow for such 
interaction terms, CMM do not log the data, but use a linear specification instead. In this 
context, Chapter 3 also looks at the gravity model. The gravity equation presents an 
alternative model to explain bilateral FDI. The gravity model is the most commonly used 
model in the empirical literature to explain variation in trade or investments between 
countries. It is only loosely connected to theory. Compared to a standard gravity 
equation, the empirical specification of the knowledge-capital model is rather complex. 
The empirical specification of the knowledge-capital is derived from theory. Yet, to what 
extent do the data support the linear restrictions and the functional form of the 
knowledge-capital model, in particular data other than for the U.S.? The third issue in the 
existing literature brought forward in Chapter 3 has to do with the specification of 
distance in the proximity-concentration model. The chapter discusses lessons from the 
empirical literature on the importance of culture and institutions as intangible barriers to 
trade and investment.  In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we address each of the issues described 
above. 
 Chapter 4 is largely methodological in nature. This study uses multilevel techniques 
to account for the correlation in the data on bilateral FDI of the OECD. Chapter 4 
explains the multilevel approach. We use a cross-classified multilevel technique to 
account for clustering of FDI within parent and host countries and parent-host 
combinations. The general idea of the multilevel analysis in this study is first that higher-
level (here, parent, host or parent-host-combination) heterogeneity has an impact on the 
dependent variable. Next, that because of these higher-level effects, ‘years’ (annual FDI 
values) for the same parent country i, host country j, or the same parent-host combination 
tend to be more alike. The multilevel model therefore accounts for the effects of parent, 
host or parent-host-combination heterogeneity on FDI and subsequently explains the 
variance between years for parent country i and host j. Chapter 4 holds relevant lessons 
for empirical investigations of bilateral phenomena such as international trade, FDI, 
migration, etc., with panel data. The use of panel data has become increasingly prominent 
7  Conclusions      155 
 
 
in the empirical literature. The use of a panel data set will generally yield more efficient 
estimators than cross-sectional or time series data because data vary over two 
dimensions, countries and time. In addition, with panel data, one can control for time 
invariant country-specific effects. An issue that often remains unaddressed in the 
literature is the clustering of observations in a panel data set: because the same units are 
repeatedly observed, it is no longer independent observations. In the empirical analysis of 
bilateral trade, FDI, migration, etc., with panel data, the issue of clustering is particularly 
complex since there are several repeated observations: for countries of origin (over all 
destination countries), for destination countries (over all origin countries), for origin and 
destination countries over time, and for specific origin-destination combinations. This 
chapter illustrates that multilevel analysis offers a useful framework to address intra-class 
correlation when there are several cluster variables at the same time. The advantage of 
the cross-classified multilevel model over cluster-robust linear regression in this study is 
that the former accounts for three cluster variables simultaneously. With cluster-robust 
linear regression one can only use one cluster variable at a time. Furthermore, this 
chapter shows that random effects can be a viable alternative to fixed effects in the case 
of many country-specific and country pair-specific effects. Contrary to common practice 
in the gravity literature, the cross-classified multilevel model uses random rather than 
fixed effects for controlling for the effects of parent, host and parent-host-combination 
heterogeneity. A possible drawback of random effects is the correlation between the 
random effects and the explanatory variables. In general, economists are of the view that, 
if there is a significant difference between the random effects estimator and the fixed 
effects estimator, the fixed effects specification and OLS estimation should be used. This 
chapter shows that unbiased estimates can equally be obtained with random effects, 
provided that the cluster means of the explanatory variables are added to the model.  
 Chapter 4 subsequently fits a cross-classified multilevel version of the knowledge-
capital model to the FDI data of the OECD. The multilevel approach entails estimating 
the effect of the explanatory variables over time for parent i and host j. We find that, for 
the most part, the predictions of the knowledge-capital model as derived from theory and 
simulations equally apply over time. That is, coefficient sizes from the multilevel 
estimation are different from OLS, yet the effects of the explanatory variables on FDI 
over time are qualitatively similar to the country/temporal effects from OLS. What do the 
results from Chapter 4 tell us about possible sources of attraction for FDI? The main 
explanatory variables in the knowledge-capital model are GDP, relative skill 
endowments, trade and investment costs. Summing up, the results indicate that FDI 
between two countries increases in the sum of their GDPs. Convergence in income in 
both directions between two countries increases FDI from parent i to host j. In other 
words, both size and similarity between countries in terms of size are important for FDI. 
Third, an increase in the skilled-labour abundance of the parent will increase FDI if the 
parent is relatively small and/or skilled-labour scarce. On the other hand, when the parent 
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is large and/or relatively skill abundant, an increase in host-country skill abundance (i.e., 
a decrease in the difference) will increase FDI from the parent to the host. The latter 
indicates that FDI from large and skill abundant OECD countries is attracted to more 
skill-abundant hosts. The evidence regarding the effects of GDP and relative skill 
endowments above is consistent with the stylised fact that FDI is foremost between 
developed, high-income countries. In terms of the knowledge-capital model this pattern 
indicates that FDI is largely of a horizontal nature. The knowledge-capital model predicts 
that horizontal firms dominate when markets in both countries are large and countries are 
similar in relative skill endowments. Economies of scale explain the need for size in both 
markets. The reason for skill similarity in this type of FDI is that when countries are 
dissimilar it becomes more profitable for firms separate production and headquarter 
activities and concentrate production in the skilled-labour scarce country and 
headquarters in the skill abundant country (vertical FDI). Concerning investment costs 
we find that, on the one hand, a higher level of investment costs in one host country 
versus another increases the level of investment in the latter (OLS-results and consistent 
with theoretical prediction). However, an increase in investment costs within one host 
country over time does not have this effect (multilevel). The results concerning the 
impact over time of trade costs of the host country are inconclusive. The theoretical 
prediction is that high trade costs in a host country induce horizontal FDI as a substitute 
for exports. Yet, different regressions in this chapter yield mixed results. 
 In Chapter 5 we test the robustness of the empirical specification of the knowledge-
capital model for the OECD data. As explained in Chapter 3, the empirical specification 
of the model is derived from theory. Yet, are the linear constraints imposed in the 
empirical specification supported by the data? And how appropriate is the linear form of 
the model? We find that the data reject the subtractive linear restriction that parent and 
host-country skill abundances have equal but opposite effects on FDI, which serves to 
capture that differences in relative skill abundance give rise to vertical FDI. A 
specification in which parent and host-country skilled labour are estimated separately 
thus seems more appropriate. Also, a log linear model is more appropriate. However, 
transforming the data alters the empirical specification, which subsequently no longer 
represents the predictions of the knowledge-capital model. Given the empirical evidence 
in this chapter, we reject the knowledge-capital model as a model to explain FDI of the 
OECD. Subsequently, Chapter 5 estimates a gravity model of bilateral FDI. This entails 
that we no longer distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI, but rather seek to 
explain the overall pattern of bilateral FDI of the OECD. With regard to skilled labour, 
we look at skilled-labour abundance as well as human capital. Next, we extend the 
gravity specification with GDP per capita (a proxy for the level of development) and 
institutional quality. The reason is as follows. High-income, developed countries are 
generally also the ones with high levels of human capital and/or large endowments of 
skilled labour. This implies that, if we do not control for the level of development, results 
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on skilled labour may suffer from an omitted variable bias. In a similar vein, we include 
institutional quality based on lessons from the empirical literature on international trade 
that omission of institutional quality in the gravity specification biases the estimates of 
GDP per capita. We find positive effects on FDI from skilled labour, the level of 
development and institutional quality alike, despite econometric difficulties to identify 
the effects of each variable independently. We conclude that skilled labour, the level of 
development and institutional quality are all likely determinants of FDI, but that their 
effects coincide. We find that both parent- and host-country skilled labour, institutions 
and level of development affect FDI positively. These results suggest that ‘proximity’ 
between parent and host countries in terms of skilled labour endowments and/or quality, 
institutional quality and level of development is the key in explaining bilateral FDI: 
multinational firms choose locations that are ‘close’ to the parent country. First, our 
results concerning skilled labour suggest that MNEs arise in countries that are skilled-
labour abundant and/or have high levels of human capital (high-quality schooling) and 
that this is also what makes them choose one location to host their foreign activities over 
another. This fits the image of multinationals as knowledge-intensive companies with 
often advanced production technologies. To the extent that multinationals set up new 
plants in a host country, the latter needs sufficient human capital to adopt the advanced 
technology of the multinational.130 In addition, multinational firms choose locations that 
are close to the parent country in terms of the quality of governance systems. Firms’ 
choice of a suitable location is affected by costs. The costs – adjustment costs and 
additional lack of trust and confidence in security of transactions – will be lower when 
differences in the institutional environment between the parent and the host country are 
small (Linders, 2006). The importance of the level of development for FDI may be 
explained by the importance of skilled labour and institutional quality. High-income, 
developed countries are generally also the ones with high levels of human capital and/or 
large endowments of skilled labour, as well as high-quality institutions. With reference to 
the empirical literature on economic growth and development (cf. Chapter 2), we assume 
that the causality runs from skilled labour and institutions to the level of development 
rather than the other way around. On the other hand, the level of development can also 
reflect the ‘quality’ of demand (income-related pattern of demand). In this case, the level 
of development has its own impact on FDI. In this case, proximity again matters, this 
time in terms of proximity of production and demand patterns. 
 Chapter 6 investigates the effect of different dimensions of distance on the choice 
between export and FDI as alternative modes of serving foreign markets. Conventional 
proximity-concentration theory suggests that FDI substitutes for trade if distance between 
countries is large, while exports become more important if scale economies in production 
                                                          
130 Multinationals may also acquire this technology from existing firms in other countries (e.g. through mergers 
and acquisition). In this case too, they are likely to invest predominantly in host countries with an abundance of 
human capital as these are the countries that generate this type of firms. 
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are large. The chapter extends the empirical framework for analysing the trade-off 
between exports and FDI. Our approach explicitly takes into account intangible barriers 
related to cultural and institutional differences. Unlike the mechanisms described by the 
proximity-concentration hypothesis, these ‘intangible’ barriers can affect the costs related 
to FDI as well as trade. We estimate gravity equations for total foreign sales (sum of 
exports and sales related to FDI) and the share of FDI-sales in total bilateral sales. Since 
the OECD data on FDI used in this study represent FDI stocks, we derive measures of 
FDI sales. We transform FDI stocks into a measure of FDI-related sales in the foreign 
market by using capital-output ratios. We show that different dimensions of distance 
affect exports and FDI differently. First, there is clear evidence in support of a 
conventional proximity-concentration trade-off. The share of FDI sales increases with 
both geographical distance and import tariffs. On the other hand, this chapter illustrates 
that FDI does not merely substitute for trade when transport costs and trade barriers are 
high. It incurs costs of its own. These costs are primarily of an intangible nature. The 
share of FDI in total bilateral sales decreases with language differences and cultural 
distance, and increases with institutional quality in both the parent and host country. 
Hence, ‘soft’ barriers are particularly important for FDI. ‘Soft’ barriers are particularly 
important for FDI because local presence entails a relatively deep involvement with and 
exposure to local cultures and institutions. Also, the demands in terms of language are 
higher for operating a plant in a foreign market compared to exporting. 
 
7.3. Conclusions concerning the sources of attraction for FDI 
What do the results of this study entail for the question as to why some countries attract 
so much FDI, whilst others attract so little? In other words, what are the main sources of 
attraction for FDI identified in this study? The relevant contributions in this respect are 
mainly in Chapters 2, 5 and 6. We have looked at the effects of skilled labour, level of 
development, institutional quality and culture. We find that both parent- and host-country 
skilled labour, institutions and level of development affect FDI positively. Cultural 
distance has a negative effect on FDI. We control for the impact of GDP in all 
regressions. Market size is important for FDI throughout. We conclude that proximity in 
terms of skilled labour, level of development, institutional quality and culture is an 
important source of attraction for FDI. The analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that the impact 
of skilled labour on FDI may differ across sectors. In particular, we find that human 
capital and technical skills are particularly important for attracting high-tech FDI viz. 
total FDI. 
 Having reached the end of this study, let’s return to the questions raised at the 
beginning of this study. In Section 1.1, we formulated the following questions, that 
served as the background for this study: What is the impact of FDI on the distribution of 
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economic activity across space? Does FDI lead to more clustering of economic activity in 
important centres, thus increasing gaps between countries? Or, does it promote a more 
even spread of economic activities globally? In view of our results, we speculate that, 
overall, the effect of FDI will be more towards the first. That is, FDI will lead to more 
clustering of economic activity in important centres. This study has shown that mass, that 
is, market size as well as absorption capacity, and proximity are the key drivers of FDI. 
Absorption capacity can be defined in terms of skilled labour, institutional quality and/or 
level of development in general. Proximity may be in terms of institutions, culture, or 
income-related patterns of production and demand. These factors provide explanations 
for the stylised fact that FDI is foremost between developed, high-income countries. 
Based on this study, we tend to say that FDI follows patterns of economic geography that 
are already there, rather than changing patterns or shaping a new geography of its own. 
This also implies that the potential of FDI as medium to foster catching up by developing 
countries is limited (see below). 
 
7.4. Policy implications 
In the economic literature, FDI is generally considered to have a positive impact on the 
welfare of host countries.131 FDI can have a direct impact on the welfare in the host 
country by raising the rate of investment.132 FDI can also indirectly affect the welfare of 
the host country by raising productivity levels of domestic firms. Assuming that 
knowledge is, at least partly, a public good, it may spill-over to and increase the 
productivity of domestic firms in the host countries.133 For most countries, foreign 
sources of technology are of dominant importance for productivity growth (Keller, 2004). 
                                                          
131 In sociology on the other hand, the dominant view is that a high degree of foreign capital penetration in 
developing countries has a detrimental effect on their growth in the long run, arising from the repatriation of 
profits and negative externalities such e.g., over-urbanisation, adoption of inappropriate technology and 
disregard for the local environment (see, e.g., Bornschier and Chase Dunn, 1985, and Dixon and Boswell, 
1996).  
132 Roy and Van den Berg (2006) estimate for the U.S. that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of FDI in 
GDP raises economic growth by 0.17 per cent over a period of 30 years (1970–2001). However, evidence by 
Borensztein et al. (1998) suggests that the effect of FDI on economic growth may depend on the level of 
education in the host country. Borensztein et al. examine the relationship between FDI from industrialised 
countries and economic growth in 69 developing countries. They find that FDI contributes relatively more to 
economic growth than domestic investments. They attribute this to better management techniques and more 
advanced technology. However, the higher productivity of FDI only holds when the host has a minimum 
threshold of human capital. Borensztein et al. conclude that FDI only contributes to economic growth when 
there is sufficient capacity in the host country to absorb advanced technologies. 
133 The notion of FDI as a channel for technology diffusion and economic development has roots in the 
convergence literature. In the convergence literature, growth rates in less advanced countries are, in part, 
explained by a catch-up process in the level of technology. In a typical model of technology diffusion, 
backward countries achieve substantial technological progress and reduce the technology gap with more 
advanced countries by assimilating superior productive techniques developed in the leader countries and by 
modernising obsolete plants and equipment accordingly. As a result, they will gradually catch up with 
technological leaders. Research on technology diffusion includes Nelson and Phelps (1966), Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, Ch. 11 and 12) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 8) and Smeets (2009). 
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Direct or indirect interaction with companies from technologically advanced countries is 
then critical for countries to get access to more advanced knowledge.134 
 This study underlines the importance of investing in skilled labour and high-quality 
institutions to attract FDI and thus to increase the potential to benefit from FDI. 
Education and institutional systems are man-made and hence can be made subject of 
policy. Yet, the results from our study also imply that the benefits of FDI are likely to be 
limited to developed countries. It is these countries that have the ‘proper’ education and 
institutional systems in place that attract FDI. Furthermore, their level of development 
entails a pattern of demand that suits the activities of MNEs. Countries that could 
potentially benefit most from FDI and the knowledge embedded in it, i.e. the least 
developed countries (e.g. UNCTAD, 1996 and 2004), may not be able to do so because 
they fail to attract FDI in the first place. Investments in education and institutions are 
costly and improvements materialise only over long periods of time. Besides, 
institutional change in these countries may be further constrained by cultural factors and 
geographic circumstances. If cultural and geographic factors shape the incentives for 
institutional change, policy intervention is even harder and more costly, because cultural 
and geographic constraints are hard to overcome (Linders, 2006). Hence, this study 
illustrates that the effectiveness of FDI as a channel for economic development in the 
least developed countries has its limitations. In the convergence literature, growth rates in 
less advanced countries are, in part, explained by a catch-up process in the level of 
technology. In a typical model of technology diffusion, backward countries achieve 
substantial technological progress and reduce the technology gap with leading countries 
by assimilating superior productive techniques developed in the leader countries and by 
modernising obsolete plants and equipment accordingly. As a result, they will gradually 
catch up with technological leaders. However, Abramovitz (1986 and 1994) points out 
that limitations to laggards’ so-called social capabilities and technological congruence 
may restrict catching up: “Countries’ potential for rapid growth by catch-up (...) is not 
determined solely by the gaps in the levels of technology, capital intensity and efficient 
allocation that separate them from leading countries. They are restricted also by natural 
resource endowments and more generally because of the size of their markets, relative 
factor supplies and income-constrained patterns of demand that make their technical 
capabilities and their product structures incongruent with those that characterise countries 
that operate at or near the technological frontiers. And they are limited, finally, by those 
                                                          
134 The results concerning spill-over effects from firm-level studies are mixed (see Görg and Strobl, 2001, and 
Keller, 2004, for surveys), although a number of recent microeconometric studies by Haskel et al. (2002), 
Griffith et al. (2003), Keller and Yeaple (2003) and Javorcik (2004) suggest that there can indeed be positive, 
and in some cases large spill-over effects from FDI. The studies involve the U.K., the U.S. and Lithuania. Xu 
(2000) finds that technology transfer by American MNEs contributes to productivity growth in developed 
countries, but not in developing countries. Similar to Borensztein et al. (1998), Xu finds that a country needs to 
reach a minimum human capital threshold level to benefit from the technology transfer. Most least developed 
countries do not meet this threshold requirement. 
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institutional characteristics that restrict their abilities to finance, organise and operate the 
kinds of enterprises that the technologies of the frontiers require” (Abramovitz, 1994, p. 
25-26). This study explains (part of the reason) why these factors limit the catch up 
potential of least developed countries: because the lack of skilled labour, an income-
constrained pattern of demand and low institutional quality inhibit a potential carrier of 
the superior productive techniques developed in the leader countries that are needed in 
the process of catch up, i.e. FDI.  
 This study illustrates the importance of skilled labour for FDI. This evidence is 
usually taken to indicate that FDI is of a predominantly horizontal character. However, 
skilled labour may be important for vertical FDI as well (cf. Yeaple, 2003). In a recent 
report on globalization, the IMF (2007b) reports that “the composition of inward FDI in 
both advanced and developing countries has been more concentrated in high-skill sectors, 
including high/medium-high-technology manufacturing and the knowledge-intensive 
service sector.” This pattern is consistent with evidence presented in different parts of 
this study, i.e. that MNEs account for half of global R&D and two thirds of private sector 
R&D (Chapter 1) and that MNEs produce, own and control most of the world’s advanced 
technology (Chapter 2). This implies that occurring vertical FDI will also take place in 
high-skill sectors. MNEs look for cheap labour, but this does mean they look for low-
skilled labour. It follows that preserving the skill base (by training and education) is 
important not only for the development of MNEs in a home country, but also for keeping 
skill-intensive production in the home country. This may become increasingly imminent 
in the future. True, according to the IMF (2007a), the intensity of offshoring of the 
production of intermediates is still small in the overall economy and offshoring is likely 
to involve the least skill-intensive stages of production in these skilled sectors.135 
However, with a growing pool of skilled workers in developing countries, especially 
Asia (IMF, 2007a), and MNEs being able to move parts of their production (quickly) in 
and out of countries, one cannot be complacent.136  
 Finally, in the context of the knowledge-capital model the explanation why the 
overwhelming share of world investment is between high-income, developed economies 
is that FDI is of a predominantly horizontal nature. In this scenario the labour-market 
effects in the parent country tend to be relatively limited, since by definition horizontal 
FDI involves setting up plants in various markets in addition to the parent country. 
However, using the knowledge-capital model as a guideline one may underestimate the 
labour-market effects of FDI in the parent country. As argued in this study the 
knowledge-capital model’s distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI on the basis 
of skill similarities/differences may well be somewhat theoretical and part of FDI 
between similar countries may actually be vertical. This study has used a gravity model 
                                                          
135 However, the available data do not allow confirmation of this (IMF, 2007a). 
136 In this sense, Friedman’s call for concern is not all together beside the point.  
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to examine the impact of skilled labour. The gravity model does not distinguish between 
horizontal and vertical motivations for FDI. In order to evaluate employment effects we 
need to go beyond the general model and look ‘inside the data’, i.e. at the level of firm 
strategy. Case study research may provide more exact results. 
 
7.5. Suggestions for further research 
A first area for further research is FDI at the sector level. This study has largely 
examined the overall pattern of FDI. There are some strong regularities in the overall 
pattern of FDI as suggested by the stylized facts presented in this study. Yet, looking at 
the overall pattern pays little attention to the diversity that lies beneath. We looked at FDI 
at a sector level in Chapter 2, but the analysis was much inconvenienced by a limited 
availability of data. The study of the diversity in FDI would be greatly facilitated by the 
availability of more detailed information on FDI at a sector level.   
 A second area for further research relates to theoretical models of FDI. In Chapter 5 
we examined the knowledge-capital model of bilateral FDI. The knowledge-capital 
model provides the most articulate general equilibrium model of MNE with proper 
microeconomic foundations. Still, we relinquished the knowledge-capital model on 
empirical grounds and continued our empirical analysis with a gravity model of bilateral 
FDI. However, contrary to international trade the theoretical foundations for the gravity 
equation have not yet been established fully satisfactorily for FDI. Hence, the search for 
a theoretical model of FDI that withstands a confrontation with the data is an area that 
deserves further attention.    
 A third area for further research relates to the effects of vertical FDI on the demand 
for skills in the parent country. Few studies on FDI estimate the effect of overseas 
production on the demand for skilled labour in the parent country for the U.S., Sweden 
and Japan (Slaughter, 2000, Hansson, 2001, Head and Ries, 2002, respectively). The 
results critically depend on whether the analysis is carried out using industry- or firm-
level data (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2006, Ch. 9): the results support the idea that 
vertical FDI has a positive effect on the skill intensity of MNEs’ activities in the home 
country (firm-level); they fail to explain average skill upgrading in manufacturing sectors 
(industry-level).137 Furthermore, this research is generally based on the idea that MNEs 
transfer low-skilled jobs. However, the present study has argued that the activities of 
multinational firms involve skilled labour and human capital. This can even extend to 
vertical FDI. The research needed in this direction includes a detailed investigation into 
the type and skill content of activities that are being relocated. For instance, the IMF 
(2007a) surmises that offshoring in skilled sectors is likely to involve only the least skill-
                                                          
137 A recent study by the IMF (2007b) suggests that technological progress is by far the most important 
determinant of the increased demand for skilled labour.   
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intensive stages of production, but also notes that the available data do not allow 
confirmation of this. More work in terms of data, number of countries and concepts is 
needed in this area if we want to make useful assessment of the effects of vertical FDI on 
the skill content of parent countries.  
 Finally, this study has empirically examined the effect of multiple dimensions of 
distance on (the choice between) exports and FDI. We (implicitly) assumed that the 
effects of distance are constant over time. We have focused on the cross-sectional effects 
and also regarding estimations over time (fixed effects estimation and multilevel 
analysis) we assumed that the effects are constant over time. In other words, the sample 
period does not matter. A subject for further investigation is the (in)variability of the 
effects of distance over time. Do the effects of distance on trade and FDI vary across 
different periods of time? Despite falling costs of transport and communication, the effect 
of geographic distance on trade is found to be very persistent over time (e.g., Frankel, 
1997, Disdier and Head, 2008, Linders, 2006). Yet, from the perspective of this study, 
there may be changes within the overall effect. And what about the effect over time of 
distance – as a whole and the multiple dimensions – on FDI? To our knowledge, little has 
been done in this area.  
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Data Appendix 
This appendix provides details of data definitions and sources used in this study. 
Descriptive statistics are given in the respective chapters.  
 
FDI and trade    
FDI inflows 
Total FDIi The simple average of annual FDI inflows in current 
US$ over the period 1995–2004. Data were taken 
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Online of the International Monetary Fund. 
High-tech FDI FDI inflows in ISIC Rev.3 sector 29 (machinery and 
equipment) and sector 30,31,32 (electrical and 
electronic equipment). The indicators are the simple 
average of annual FDI inflows in the period 1995–
2004. Data are from the UNCTAD FDI/TNC 
database. 
Bilateral FDI 
FDIt(ij) Outward FDI stock in millions of real U.S. dollars. 
Panel 1982–1992. Source: OECD International Direct 
Investment Statistics. 
FDI sales (Value of FDI stock) * GDP/K, where GDP and K 
denote real GDP and capital stock, respectively 
constructed from the Penn World Tables 5.6.  
In Chapter 6 we used the capital-output ratio of 
destination countries to transform FDI stocks into 
sales related to FDI, the idea being that output from 
FDI is determined foremost by the characteristics of 
the local market. Still, one may also argue that it is 
the technology and/or management techniques of the 
parent firm (origin country) that determine output. In 
this case one would apply the capital-output ratio of 
the country of origin. Both methods yield similar 
estimations results. 
 
Bilateral trade Exports from country i to j.  
Source: UN COMTRADE database for bilateral trade. 
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Economic indicators   
Chapter 2 GDP in current US$. The simple average over the 
period 1995–2004. Source: World Development 
Indicators.  
 
Chapters 4-6 Real GDP constructed from GDP per capita and 
population data. Data on GDP per capita and 
population are from the Penn World Tables 5.6. 
Inflation The average annual growth (in percentage) of the 
GDP deflator in the period 1995–2004. Source: 
World Development Indicators Online 2006. 
 
Human capital and skills  
Amount of schooling  Average education attainment level in number of 
years. Source: Barro and Lee (1993) data. 
   
Quality of schooling Students’ performance in mathematics and science 
from Hanushek and Kim (1995). The measure 
combines all the information on international 
mathematics and science tests available for countries 
from 1965 through 1991. Performance series are 
observed for 39 countries, but Hanushek and Kim 
extend these quality measures to other countries by 
imputing missing values from international test score 
regressions. 
 
Skilled-labour abundance The sum of ISCO-68 categories 0/1 (professional, 
technical and kindred workers) and 2 (administrative 
workers) in employment divided by total 
employment. Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 
published by the International Labour Organisation. 
 
Type of skills Enrolment in science; enrolment in engineering, 
manufacturing and construction; and enrolment in 
social sciences, business and law. The variables are 
the average percentage of (totally enrolled) students 
in tertiary education (ISCED levels 5–6) in science, 
engineering, manufacturing and construction, and 
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social sciences, business and law, respectively, in the 
period 1998–2004. Source: UNESCO Global 
Education Digest 2005 CD-Rom. 
 
Geographic variables    
Island Dummy variable indicating whether countries are 
islands. Source: CIA factbook 
(www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook). 
 
Climate  The percentage of population living in temperate 
ecozones. Source: Mellinger et al. (2000). 
 
Traditional distance measures 
Distance   Distance between capital cities (in miles). Source: 
CEPII. 
 
Language Dummy indicating whether two countries share a 
common official language. Source: CEPII. 
 
Colony Dummy indicating whether two countries share a 
colonial past. Source: CEPII. 
 
Adjacency Dummy indicating whether or not countries share a 
common border. Source: CEPII. 
 
Tariffs  Trade-weighted applied tariffs. Tariffs are for 1999. 
Source: WITS. 
 
Trade and investment costs  
Trade costs CMM Index ranging from 0–100 of impediments to trade. 
Simple average of a number of indexes reported in the 
World Competitiveness Report. 1986, 1989–1994 
 
Trade costs BDH Trade openness measure from Penn World Tables, 
defined as (imports+exports)/GDP. Trade costs are 
defined as 100 minus the trade openness measure. 
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Investment costs CMM Index ranging from 0–100 of investment impediments 
in the host country. Simple average of a number of 
indexes reported in the World Competitiveness 
Report. 1986, 1989–1994. Indexes include:  
- Restrictions on ability to acquire control in domestic 
company 
- Limitations on ability to employ foreign skilled 
labour 
  - Restraints on negotiating joint ventures 
  - Strict controls on hiring and firing practices 
  - Market dominance by a small number of enterprises 
  - Absence of fair administration of justice 
  - Difficulties in acquiring local bank credit 
 - Restrictions on access to local and foreign capital 
markets 
  - Inadequate protection of intellectual property 
 
Investment costs BDH  FDI openness measure for host country recently 
 obtained from Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence, S.A. (BERI). Includes measures of 
political risk, financial risk, and other economic 
indicators. Investment barriers are defined as 100 
minus the BERI’s composite score. 
 
Cultural and institutional variables    
Cultural distance  Kogut-Singh index138 of four dimensions of national 
culture identified by Hofstede (1980; 2001). These 
variables are: masculinity/femininity; uncertainty 
avoidance; individualism/ collectivism; and power 
distance. Each is constructed on the basis of a 
principal components analysis, and intends to reflect 
                                                          
138 In formula form the Kogut-Singh index is defined as:
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  , where Di,j is the 
measure of distance between country i and country j, K the number of observed indicators. Ii,k (Ij,k)indicates the 
score on indicator k for country i (country j), and Vk indicates the variance of this dimension k across all 
countries in the sample.  
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the stance of a distinct set of work-related norms and 
values in national cultures. 
 
Institutional quality A simple average of six governance indicators of 
perceived institutional quality from Kaufmann 
(2005). The six indicators have been determined on 
the basis of principal components analysis. The 
indicators are: voice and accountability; political 
stability; government effectiveness; regulatory 
quality; rule of law; control of corruption. Data are 
for 1996. 
 
Institutional distance Kogut-Singh index of the six governance indicators 
from Kaufmann (2005).  
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Inleiding  
Multinationals spelen een belangrijke rol in een globaliserende wereld. Zij belichamen 
bij uitstek de toenemende mobiliteit van bedrijven en productiefactoren. De activiteiten 
van multinationals, die we kunnen meten in de vorm van hun directe buitenlandse 
investeringen (hierna aangeduid als FDI) zijn sterk toegenomen in de laatste twee 
decennia. De toename van FDI-voorraden en -stromen was groter dan de groei van het 
wereldwijde bruto nationale product, van kapitaalvoorraden en van de internationale 
handel. Dit roept een aantal vragen op, die de achtergrond vormen voor deze studie. 
Welk effect heeft FDI op de wereldwijde verdeling van economische activiteit? 
Empirisch bewijs laat een sterke clustering van economische activiteit in een beperkt 
aantal belangrijke economische centra zien. Welke rol speelt FDI hierin? Leidt FDI tot 
een verdere samenklontering van economische activiteit in de bestaande centra en 
daarmee tot toenemende verschillen tussen landen? Of bevordert het een meer 
gelijkmatigere spreiding van economische activiteiten over de wereld? Deze vragen zijn 
interessant (voor de economische onderzoeker) en belangrijk (vanuit maatschappelijk 
perspectief). 
 Om deze vragen te kunnen beantwoorden moeten we begrijpen welke onderliggende 
factoren FDI bepalen. Dat is het doel van deze studie. De overkoepelende 
onderzoeksvraag luidt: welke factoren vormen een bron van aantrekkingskracht voor 
FDI? Het uitgangspunt voor deze studie vormen enkele zogenaamde stylised facts: 
statistieken laten zien dat het patroon van FDI regelmatig is. FDI speelt zich vooral af 
tussen rijke, ontwikkelde landen. De minst ontwikkelde landen trekken zelfs minder FDI 
aan dan men op grond van hun aandeel in het wereldwijde inkomen zou verwachten. Het 
doel van deze studie is om dit opmerkelijke patroon van wereldwijde FDI te verklaren. 
Waarom trekken sommige landen veel FDI aan, terwijl andere slechts kleine 
hoeveelheden aantrekken? 
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Samenvatting van de onderzoeksresultaten  
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt het stylised fact dat ontwikkelde landen het overgrote deel van 
FDI aantrekken terwijl maar een fractie naar de minst ontwikkelde landen vloeit. Hoe 
valt dit opmerkelijke patroon in wereldwijde FDI te verklaren? Het hoofdstuk onderzoekt 
enkele factoren die in de economische groeiliteratuur bekend staan als belangrijke 
motoren van economische ontwikkeling. De vraag in Hoofdstuk 2 is vervolgens: kunnen 
deze factoren ook de variatie in de instroom van totale FDI over bestemmingslanden 
verklaren? We kijken in het bijzonder naar: human capital, inflatie, institutionele 
kwaliteit en geografische kenmerken. Multinationals worden doorgaans beschouwd als 
kennisintensieve bedrijven. Ze nemen tweederde van de totale uitgaven aan private R&D 
voor hun rekening en ze produceren, bezitten of controleren het grootste gedeelte van alle 
high tech. We onderzoeken daarom de rol van human capital in het aantrekken van FDI. 
Instituties worden gezien als een factor die de productiviteit in een land beïnvloedt. Ze 
beïnvloeden de risico’s rondom transacties en daarmee de transactiekosten. Wat betreft 
FDI is de kwaliteit van instituties onder andere van invloed op het risico van onteigening, 
de bescherming van intellectueel eigendom, de mate van corruptie, de uitvoerbaarheid 
van private contracten en de zekerheid van investeren in het algemeen. De kosten van het 
opereren in een buitenlandse markt zullen over het algemeen lager zijn naarmate de 
kwaliteit van instituties daar hoger is. Inflatie is een maatstaf voor de macro-economische 
instabiliteit van een bestemmingsland. We vinden dat institutionele kwaliteit een 
belangrijke determinant is van de instroom van FDI in bestemmingslanden. Institutionele 
kwaliteit verklaart tot 27 procent van de gemiddelde variatie in inwaartse FDI. Het effect 
van institutionele kwaliteit is bovendien robuust. Inflatie is veel minder robuust. 
Menselijk kapitaal en geografische kenmerken (onder andere klimaat) verklaren ieder 
ongeveer 10 procent van de variatie in inwaartse FDI over bestemmingslanden, maar de 
effecten zijn niet robuust wanneer we gelijktijdig controleren voor de effecten van 
menselijk kapitaal, inflatie of institutionele kwaliteit en geografische kenmerken. Veruit 
de belangrijkste determinant van de instroom van FDI in bestemmingslanden is evenwel 
het bruto nationaal product (BNP). BNP heeft een statistisch significant effect in alle 
regressies en verklaart meer dan 60 procent van de gemiddelde variatie in de instroom 
van FDI over bestemmingslanden. Dit suggereert dat marktomvang een belangrijke bron 
van aantrekkingskracht is voor FDI. 
 De voornaamste bijdrage van Hoofdstuk 2 aan de bestaande literatuur is de 
aanvullende analyse van de rol van human capital in het aantrekken van FDI. In de 
zogenaamde ‘nieuwe groeitheorie’ is human capital belangrijk met het oog op 
technologische vooruitgang. Human capital speelt een sleutelrol in de ontwikkeling van 
nieuwe kennis en de assimilatie van nieuwe technologieën. We onderzoeken daarom of 
human capital meer bevorderlijk is voor het aantrekken van FDI in technologie-
intensieve sectoren dan voor de instroom van FDI in zijn geheel. Daarnaast bekijken we 
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of het aantrekken van FDI in technologie-intensieve sectoren een bepaald soort expertise 
vergt, namelijk technische in plaats van bijvoorbeeld managementvaardigheden. We 
kijken naar: het percentage studenten in de exacte wetenschappen; het percentage 
studenten in de technische wetenschappen; en het percentage studenten in de sociale 
wetenschappen, bedrijfswetenschappen en rechten. High-tech FDI is gedefinieerd als FDI 
in de sectoren ‘machines en apparaten’ en ‘elektrische en elektronische apparatuur’. De 
kwaliteit van human capital blijkt relatief belangrijker voor FDI in elektrische en 
elektronische apparatuur dan voor totale FDI. Onze resultaten duiden er op dat de 
instroom van FDI in deze sector zeer elastisch is met betrekking tot human capital: een 
toename in de kwaliteit van human capital van 1 procent verhoogt de instroom van FDI 
meer dan evenredig. Human capital is tevens belangrijker dan institutionele kwaliteit 
voor het verklaren van FDI in elektrische en elektronische apparatuur. Laatstgenoemde 
factor is minder belangrijk voor de instroom van FDI in elektrische en elektronische 
apparatuur dan voor totale inwaartse FDI. Sterker nog, wanneer we human capital 
opnemen in de regressievergelijking is het effect van institutionele kwaliteit op FDI in 
elektrische en elektronische apparatuur zeer insignificant. Human capital en 
institutionele kwaliteit hebben geen statistisch significant effect op FDI in machines en 
apparaten. Dit type FDI wordt vrijwel geheel verklaard door BNP. Wat betreft het type 
vaardigheden dat van belang is voor het aantrekken van high-tech FDI vinden we dat 
vooral technische vaardigheden ertoe doen. Technische vaardigheden (gemeten als het 
percentage studenten in de exacte wetenschappen en in de technische wetenschappen) 
zijn belangrijker voor het aantrekken van FDI in de sectoren machines en apparaten en 
elektrische en elektronische apparatuur dan management vaardigheden. De laatste 
(gemeten als het percentage studenten in de sociale wetenschappen, 
bedrijfswetenschappen en rechten) hebben geen significant effect op FDI in machines en 
apparaten en elektrische en elektronische apparatuur, terwijl ze een positief en statistisch 
significant effect hebben op de totale instroom van FDI. Institutionele kwaliteit is zeer 
insignificant wanneer we gelijktijdig controleren voor technische vaardigheden. We 
concluderen dat onze verwachtingen aangaande de rol van human capital en 
vaardigheden in high-tech FDI grotendeels bevestigd worden. Maar de resultaten zijn 
voorlopig. De analyse van high-tech FDI wordt bemoeilijkt door een beperkte 
beschikbaarheid van gegevens op sectorniveau. Meer vervolgonderzoek is nodig om het 
bewijs inzake high-tech FDI in Hoofdstuk 2 te bevestigen (zie ook hieronder). Dit 
onderzoek zou veel profijt hebben van een grotere beschikbaarheid van uitgebreide 
informatie over FDI op het niveau van industriële sectoren.  
 Hoofdstuk 2 vormt een eerste inleidende empirische analyse naar de mogelijke 
bronnen van aantrekkingskracht voor FDI. De keuze van de verklarende variabelen is 
echter niet theoretisch onderbouwd. Algemeen evenwichtsmodellen bestaan wel voor 
bilaterale FDI. Deze modellen verklaren hoe FDI tot stand komt, en tonen aan welke 
lange-termijnfactoren de omvang van FDI van land i naar land j, op basis van een micro-
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economische theorie van de besluitvorming door bedrijven. De empirische analyse in 
Deel II van deze studie is gebaseerd op bilaterale FDI.  
 Hoofdstuk 3 motiveert en beschrijft de onderzoeksopzet in Deel II. Het hoofdstuk 
introduceert allereerst de twee belangrijkste theoretische modellen van FDI, het 
zogenaamde knowledge-capital model en de proximity-concentration trade-off 
hypothese. Het knowledge-capital model is het meest elegante algemeen 
evenwichtsmodel van FDI met micro-economische onderbouwing. Het model integreert 
twee motieven voor FDI: het omzeilen van (hoge) handelsbarrières bij het bedienen van 
een buitenlandse markt (horizontale FDI) en het uitbaten van verschillen in de kosten van 
productiefactoren als gevolg van verschillende relatieve factorhoeveelheden tussen 
landen door productie naar het buitenland te verplaatsen (verticale FDI). De proximity-
concentration trade-off hypothese is een model van horizontale FDI. Om een 
buitenlandse markt te bedienen hebben bedrijven de keuze tussen export en lokale 
productie in de buitenlandse markt via horizontale FDI. De proximity-concentration 
trade-off hypothese modelleert deze keuze als een afruil tussen de nabijheid van lokale 
markten (en daarmee het reduceren van transportkosten) en het concentreren van 
productie op één plaats teneinde schaalvoordelen te kunnen benutten. Het model 
voorspelt dat FDI toeneemt naarmate de afstand tussen twee landen groter wordt, terwijl 
andersom export belangrijker wordt wanneer schaalvoordelen in productie toenemen. De 
beschrijving van de twee theoretische modellen wordt gevolgd door een kritische 
beschouwing daarvan en het daaraan gerelateerde empirische werk. Hoofdstuk 3 stelt dat 
er drie belangrijke issues zijn in deze literatuur die aanleiding geven tot nader onderzoek. 
Het eerste heeft te maken met de FDI-data. Belangrijke empirische bijdragen tot nog toe 
maken uitsluitend gebruik van gegevens over bilaterale FDI van en naar de VS. Dit laat 
veel observaties van FDI tussen andere landen buiten beschouwing. Één van de bijdragen 
van deze studie heeft betrekking op de data: in Deel II van deze studie gebruiken we 
gegevens over bilaterale FDI van de Organisatie voor Economische Samenwerking en 
Ontwikkeling (OESO). De data hebben betrekking op FDI tussen OESO-landen 
onderling en van OESO-landen naar niet-OESO-landen. Dit levert een substantiële 
verhoging op van het aantal waarnemingen in vergelijking met belangrijke bijdragen in 
de literatuur over bilaterale FDI, die gegevens over bilaterale FDI voor alleen de VS 
gebruiken. Een issue in de data is afhankelijkheid. De FDI-data vormen een panel-dataset 
met meerdere oorsprong- en bestemmingslanden. Daarbij is sprake van diverse herhaalde 
observaties: voor oorspronglanden over alle bestemmingslanden, voor 
bestemmingslanden over alle oorspronglanden, voor oorsprong- en bestemmingslanden 
over de tijd en voor bepaalde combinaties van oorsprong/bestemming. Het niet rekening 
houden met intraclass correlation leidt tot een onderschatting van de standaardfouten 
van de regressiecoëfficiënten en kan leiden tot schijnbaar significante resultaten. Zelfs 
lage niveaus van intraclass correlation kunnen ertoe leiden dat standaardfouten met OLS 
lager worden ingeschat dan ze werkelijk zijn. Een tweede kwestie heeft betrekking op de 
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empirische specificatie van het knowledge-capital model. De empirische specificatie van 
het knowledge-capital model legt een bepaalde structuur op aan de data: er worden (i) 
lineaire restricties opgelegd aan coëfficiënten; en er worden (ii) interacties van variabelen 
opgenomen. Om deze interactietermen mogelijk te maken worden er geen logaritmes van 
de data genomen maar wordt in plaats daarvan een lineaire specificatie gebruikt. 
Hoofdstuk 3 kijkt in dit verband ook naar het graviteitsmodel. De graviteitsvergelijking 
behelst een alternatief model voor het verklaren van bilaterale FDI. Het graviteitsmodel 
is het meest gebruikte model in de empirische literatuur om variatie in handel of 
investeringen tussen landen te verklaren. Het is slechts losjes verbonden met de theorie. 
Vergeleken bij een standaard graviteitsvergelijking is de empirische specificatie van het 
knowledge-capital model nogal complex. De empirische specificatie van het knowledge-
capital model wordt afgeleid van de theorie, maar de vraag is in hoeverre de data het 
opleggen van de lineaire restricties en de functionele vorm van het knowledge-capital 
model toelaten – met name andere data dan die voor alleen de VS. De derde kwestie in de 
bestaande literatuur die in Hoofdstuk 3 naar voren wordt gebracht heeft te maken met de 
specificatie van afstand in de proximity-concentration trade-off hypothese. Het hoofdstuk 
bespreekt de lessen uit de empirische literatuur over het belang van cultuur en instituties 
als zogenaamde immateriële barrières voor internationale handel en investeringen. In 
Hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 pakken we elk van de hierboven beschreven punten op.  
 De bijdrage van Hoofdstuk 4 is grotendeels methodologisch. Deze studie gebruikt 
multilevel technieken om rekening te houden met de correlatie in de FDI-data van de 
OESO. Hoofdstuk 4 legt de multilevel benadering uit. We gebruiken een zogenaamd 
cross-classified multilevel model om rekening te houden met clustering van FDI-
observaties binnen oorsprong- en bestemmingslanden en combinaties van 
oorsprong/bestemming. Het algemene idee van de multilevel analyse in deze studie is ten 
eerste dat heterogeniteit van een hogere orde (hier oorsprong, bestemming en 
combinaties oorsprong/bestemming) een effect heeft op de afhankelijke variabele FDI. 
En vervolgens dat, vanwege deze hogere-orde effecten, ‘jaren’ (jaarlijkse waarden van 
FDI) voor dezelfde oorsprong i, bestemming j of dezelfde combinatie van 
oorsprong/bestemming meer op elkaar lijken. Het multilevel model controleert daarom 
voor de effecten van heterogeniteit tussen landen en -combinaties op FDI en verklaart 
vervolgens de variantie tussen jaren voor oorsprong i en bestemming j. Hoofdstuk 4 
bevat relevante lessen voor empirisch onderzoek naar bilaterale verschijnselen zoals 
internationale handel, FDI, migratie, et cetera, met panel-data. Panel-data zijn steeds 
prominenter geworden in de empirische literatuur. Het gebruik van een panel-dataset 
leidt over het algemeen tot efficiëntere schatters dan cross-sectie data of tijdreeksdata 
omdat de gegevens over twee dimensies variëren, namelijk landen en tijd. Met panel-data 
kan men tevens controleren voor landspecifieke effecten. Een onderwerp dat vaak 
onbesproken blijft in de literatuur is de mogelijke clustering van observaties in een panel-
dataset: omdat telkens dezelfde eenheden worden geobserveerd zijn observaties niet 
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langer onafhankelijk. In de empirische analyse van bilaterale handel, FDI, migratie, et 
cetera, met panel-data is de kwestie van clustering bijzonder complex aangezien er 
diverse herhaalde observaties over de tijd zijn: voor oorspronglanden (over alle 
bestemmingslanden), voor bestemmingslanden (over alle oorspronglanden), voor 
oorsprong- en bestemmingslanden over de tijd en voor bepaalde combinaties van 
oorsprong/bestemming. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat multilevel analyse een geschikt 
raamwerk biedt om met intraclass correlation om te gaan wanneer er meerdere 
clustervariabelen tegelijkertijd zijn. Het voordeel van het cross-classified multilevel 
model ten opzichte van lineaire regressie met clusterrobuuste standaardfouten in deze 
studie is dat de eerste methode met drie clustervariabelen tegelijk rekening houdt. Bij 
lineaire regressie met clusterrobuuste standaardfouten kan men slechts één 
clustervariabele tegelijkertijd gebruiken. Bovendien toont het hoofdstuk aan dat random 
effects een goed alternatief kunnen vormen voor fixed effects in het geval van talrijke 
land- en paarspecifieke effecten. Anders dan te doen gebruikelijk in bijvoorbeeld de 
graviteitsliteratuur gebruikt het multilevel model random in plaats van fixed effects om te 
controleren voor effecten van heterogeniteit tussen oorsprong- en bestemmingslanden en 
combinaties van oorsprong/bestemming. Een potentieel nadeel van random effects is de 
correlatie tussen de random effects en de verklarende variabelen. Economen verkiezen 
daarom vaak fixed effects. Dit hoofdstuk laat echter zien dat consistente schatters ook 
kunnen worden verkregen met random effects, mits de clustergemiddelden van de 
verklarende variabelen aan het model worden toegevoegd. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 schat vervolgens een cross-classified multilevel versie van het 
knowledge-capital model met de gegevens over bilaterale FDI van de OESO. De 
multilevel benadering houdt in dat het effect van de verklarende variabelen voor 
oorsprong i en bestemming j over de tijd wordt geschat. We vinden grotendeels dat de 
voorspellingen van het knowledge-capital model zoals afgeleid van de theorie ook in de 
tijd van toepassing zijn. Dat wil zeggen, de omvang van de coëfficiënten in de multilevel 
schatting verschilt weliswaar van de OLS-resultaten, maar de effecten van de verklarende 
variabelen op FDI in de tijd zijn kwalitatief gelijk aan de effecten over landen en tijd van 
OLS. Wat kunnen we uit Hoofdstuk 4 afleiden over mogelijke bronnen van 
aantrekkingskracht voor FDI? De belangrijkste factoren in het model zijn BNP, 
hoeveelheid hooggeschoolde arbeid, handel- en investeringskosten. FDI tussen twee 
landen neemt allereerst toe met de som van hun beider BNP. Bovendien neemt FDI van i 
naar j toe met inkomensconvergentie tussen twee landen in beide richtingen. Met andere 
woorden, zowel omvang als gelijkheid in grootte tussen twee landen is belangrijk voor 
FDI. Ten derde, een toename in de relatieve hoeveelheid hooggeschoolde arbeid in i zal 
FDI naar j doen toenemen wanneer i relatief klein is en over relatief minder 
hooggeschoolde arbeid beschikt dan bestemming j. Indien i daarentegen groot is en 
relatief meer hooggeschoolde arbeid heeft dan j, zal het juist een toename in de relatieve 
hoeveelheid hooggeschoolde arbeid van j (dus een afname van het verschil) zijn die FDI 
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van i naar j doet toenemen. Dit laatste impliceert dat FDI vanuit grote landen die tevens 
een hoog aandeel hooggeschoolde arbeid hebben, wordt aangetrokken naar landen met 
relatief meer hooggeschoolde arbeid. De resultaten voor BNP en hoeveelheid geschoolde 
arbeid zijn consistent met het stylised fact dat het overgrote deel van wereldwijde FDI 
zich afspeelt tussen rijke, ontwikkelde economieën. Volgens het knowledge-capital 
model betekent dit patroon dat wereldwijde FDI grotendeels horizontaal is. Het model 
voorspelt namelijk dat horizontale FDI overheerst wanneer landen vergelijkbaar zijn in 
termen van (economische) grootte en relatieve hoeveelheden hooggeschoolde arbeid. 
Horizontale multinationals hebben productiefaciliteiten in zowel de thuismarkt i als de 
buitenlandse markt j. Schaalvoordelen in productie verklaren waarom grootte van beide 
markten belangrijk is. Gelijkheid van de hoeveelheid hooggeschoolde arbeid is 
kenmerkend voor horizontale FDI omdat het bij ongelijke relatieve hoeveelheden 
volgens het model gunstiger wordt voor de onderneming om productie volledig te 
concentreren in het land dat over relatief minder hooggeschoolde arbeid beschikt en het 
hoofdkantoor in het land met relatief veel hooggeschoolde arbeid (verticale FDI). Hogere 
investeringskosten in het ene bestemmingsland ten opzichte van een ander leidt tot meer 
FDI in het tweede land (OLS-resultaten en in overeenstemming met de theoretische 
voorspelling). Echter, een toename van de investeringskosten binnen één 
bestemmingsland over de tijd heeft niet dit effect (multilevel). Handelskosten in het land 
van bestemming tenslotte hebben geen eenduidig effect op FDI. Volgens de theoretische 
voorspellingen leiden hogere handelskosten in een land van bestemming tot meer FDI als 
substituut voor export. Maar verschillende specificaties leveren verschillende resultaten 
op.  
 In Hoofdstuk 5 testen we de robuustheid van de empirische specificatie van het 
knowledge-capital model met de OESO-data. In hoeverre laten de data het opleggen van 
de lineaire restricties toe? En hoe geschikt is de lineaire vorm van het model? We vinden 
dat de lineaire restrictie dat de coëfficiënten van de relatieve hoeveelheid 
hooggeschoolde arbeid in het land van oorsprong en het land van bestemming gelijk 
maar tegengesteld zijn, die dient om de voorspelling van het model dat verschillen in 
relatieve hoeveelheden hooggeschoolde arbeid aanleiding geven tot verticale FDI vast te 
leggen, wordt verworpen door de data. Een specificatie waarin de relatieve hoeveelheid 
hooggeschoolde arbeid in het land van oorsprong en het land van bestemming 
afzonderlijk worden geschat lijkt dus gepaster. Ook is een loglineaire model een meer 
geëigende functionele vorm. Het transformeren van de data verandert echter de 
specificatie, die vervolgens de voorspellingen van het knowledge-capital model niet 
langer exact weergeeft. Op basis van het empirisch bewijs in dit hoofdstuk verwerpen we 
het knowledge-capital model als model om bilaterale FDI van de OESO te verklaren. 
Hoofdstuk 5 schat vervolgens een graviteitsmodel van bilaterale FDI. Dit houdt in dat we 
niet langer onderscheid maken tussen horizontale en verticale FDI, maar dat we in plaats 
daarvan beogen het algemene patroon van bilaterale FDI van de OESO te verklaren. Wat 
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betreft de factor geschoolde arbeid kijken we naar het aandeel hooggeschoolde arbeid in 
de beroepsbevolking en naar human capital. Vervolgens breiden we de 
graviteitsvergelijking uit met BNP per hoofd van de bevolking (een indicator voor het 
niveau van ontwikkeling) en institutionele kwaliteit. De reden is als volgt. Rijke, 
ontwikkelde landen hebben doorgaans ook een hoog niveau van human capital en/of 
grote hoeveelheden hoogopgeleide arbeid. Dit betekent dat, wanneer we niet controleren 
voor het niveau van ontwikkeling, de resultaten voor geschoolde arbeid vertekend 
kunnen zijn. Vanuit eenzelfde gedachte nemen we institutionele kwaliteit op gebaseerd 
op lessen uit de empirische literatuur over internationale handel dat het weglaten van 
institutionele kwaliteit de schatters van BNP per hoofd van de bevolking in de 
graviteitsvergelijking vertekent. We vinden positieve effecten op FDI van geschoolde 
arbeid, niveau van ontwikkeling en institutionele kwaliteit tezamen, ondanks 
econometrische problemen om ieder effect afzonderlijk te identificeren. We leiden 
daaruit af dat geschoolde arbeid, niveau van ontwikkeling en institutionele kwaliteit elk 
aannemelijke determinanten van FDI zijn. We vinden dat geschoolde arbeid, niveau van 
ontwikkeling en institutionele kwaliteit in zowel het land van oorsprong als het land van 
bestemming een positieve invloed op FDI hebben. Deze resultaten suggereren dat 
‘nabijheid’ van oorspong- en bestemmingslanden in termen van hoeveelheden en/of 
kwaliteit van geschoolde arbeid, institutionele kwaliteit en niveau van ontwikkeling in 
het algemeen essentieel is in het verklaren van bilaterale FDI: multinationals kiezen 
bestemmingen die lijken op het land van oorsprong. Onze bevindingen ten aanzien van 
geschoolde arbeid wijzen er ten eerste op dat multinationals ontstaan in landen met 
relatief grote hoeveelheden hooggeschoolde arbeid en/of een hoog niveau van human 
capital en dat dit ook bepaalt waarom ze het ene land verkiezen boven een ander als 
locatie van hun buitenlandse activiteiten. Dit past in het beeld van multinationals als 
kennisintensieve bedrijven met veelal hoogwaardige productietechnologieën. Dit laatste 
vergt dat een ontvangend land over voldoende geschoolde arbeid en/of human capital 
beschikt om de kennisintensieve productie te kunnen opnemen. Multinationals kiezen 
ook locaties die figuurlijk dichtbij zijn namelijk in termen van de kwaliteit van het 
bestuurlijke systeem. De keuze van een onderneming van een geschikte locatie wordt 
bepaald door kosten. De kosten – aanpassingskosten en kosten door bijkomend gebrek 
aan onderling vertrouwen en vertrouwen in de zekerheid van transacties – zullen lager 
zijn naarmate de verschillen in het institutionele kader tussen het land van oorsprong en 
het bestemmingsland geringer zijn. Het belang van het niveau van ontwikkeling voor FDI 
kan enerzijds verklaard worden door geschoolde arbeid en institutionele kwaliteit. Rijke, 
ontwikkelde landen doorgaans ook degene met een hoog niveau van human capital en/of 
grote hoeveelheden hoogopgeleide arbeid alsmede instituties van hoge kwaliteit. Onder 
verwijzing naar de empirische literatuur over economische groei (Hoofdstuk 2) nemen 
we hier aan dat de causaliteit van geschoolde arbeid en instituties naar ontwikkeling loopt 
en niet andersom. Anderzijds kan het niveau van ontwikkeling ook de ‘kwaliteit’ van de 
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vraag weergeven (inkomensgerelateerde patroon van de vraag). In dit geval heeft 
ontwikkeling een eigen effect op FDI. In dit geval doet nabijheid er opnieuw toe, dit keer 
in termen van de structuur van productie en de vraag.  
 Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt het effect van verschillende dimensies van afstand op de 
keuze tussen export en FDI als alternatieve manieren voor een bedrijf om een 
buitenlandse markt te bedienen. Zoals gezegd, de conventionele proximity-concentration 
trade-off hypothese stelt dat FDI toeneemt naarmate de afstand tussen twee landen groter 
wordt, terwijl andersom export belangrijker wordt wanneer schaalvoordelen in productie 
toenemen. Hoofdstuk 6 breidt het empirische raamwerk voor het analyseren van de afruil 
tussen export en FDI uit. Onze benadering houdt expliciet rekening met immateriële 
barrières die te maken hebben met culturele en institutionele verschillen tussen landen. 
Anders dan de mechanismen die worden beschreven in de proximity-concentration 
hypothese beïnvloeden deze niet-tastbare barrières de kosten van zowel FDI als handel. 
We schatten graviteitsvergelijkingen voor totale buitenlandse afzet (export plus productie 
voortkomend uit FDI van land i naar land j) en het aandeel van productie samenhangend 
met FDI in de totale afzet van land i naar land j. De OESO-data die we in deze studie 
gebruiken betrekking hebben op FDI-voorraden. Voor de analyse is de FDI-voorraad 
omgezet naar een maatstaf voor productie door gebruik te maken van de 
kapitaalintensiteit van productie. We laten zien dat verschillende dimensies van afstand 
een verschillende invloed hebben op export en FDI. In de eerste plaats is er een duidelijk 
bewijs voor de conventionele afruil tussen nabijheid en concentratie: het aandeel van 
productie samenhangend met FDI in de totale afzet neemt toe voor zowel geografische 
afstand als importtarieven. Aan de andere kant laat dit hoofdstuk zien dat FDI niet slechts 
een substituut is voor handel voor het geval dat transportkosten en handelsbarrières hoog 
zijn. FDI brengt eigen kosten met zich mee. Deze kosten zijn veelal van een immateriële 
aard. Het aandeel van FDI in de totale afzet neemt af voor taalverschillen en culturele 
afstand, een stijgt voor institutionele kwaliteit in zowel het oorsprong- als 
bestemmingsland. We duiden institutionele en culturele factoren aan als de ‘zachte’ 
dimensies van afstand. ‘Zachte’ barrières zijn dus vooral belangrijk voor FDI. Ze zijn 
vooral van invloed op FDI omdat lokale aanwezigheid een diepere betrokkenheid met en 
blootstelling aan lokale culturen en instituties inhoudt. Ook zijn de eisen die aan taal 
worden gesteld bij productie in een buitenlandse markt hoger dan voor export.    
 We kunnen nu de balans opmaken met betrekking tot de vraag waarom sommige 
landen zo veel FDI aantrekken, terwijl andere slechts kleine hoeveelheden aantrekken. 
Met andere woorden, welke factoren zijn bronnen van aantrekkingskracht van FDI? De 
relevante bijdragen in dit opzicht staan in Hoofdstukken 2, 5 en 6. We hebben gekeken 
naar de rol van geschoolde arbeid, niveau van ontwikkeling, institutionele kwaliteit en 
cultuur. We vinden dat geschoolde arbeid, niveau van ontwikkeling en institutionele 
kwaliteit in zowel het land van oorsprong als het land van bestemming een positieve 
invloed op FDI hebben. Culturele afstand beïnvloedt FDI negatief. We controleren bij dit 
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alles voor de invloed van BNP. Marktomvang speelt in alle gevallen een belangrijke rol 
voor FDI. We concluderen dat nabijheid in termen van geschoolde arbeid, niveau van 
ontwikkeling, institutionele kwaliteit en cultuur tussen landen belangrijke bronnen van 
aantrekkingskracht voor FDI vormen. De analyse in Hoofdstuk 2 suggereert dat het effect 
van geschoolde arbeid en human capital op FDI kan verschillen per sector. Het 
hoofdstuk laat zien dat human capital en technische vaardigheden belangrijker zijn voor 
het aantrekken van FDI in high-tech sectoren dan voor totale FDI.  
 Op dit punt beland keren we terug naar de achtergrondvragen die aan het begin van 
deze samenvatting werden geformuleerd. Welk effect heeft FDI op de wereldwijde 
verdeling van economische activiteit? Leidt FDI tot een verdere samenklontering van 
economische activiteit in de bestaande centra en daarmee tot toenemende verschillen 
tussen landen? Of bevordert het een meer gelijkmatigere spreiding van economische 
activiteiten wereldwijd? In het licht van onze resultaten vermoeden wij dat het effect van 
FDI door de bank genomen meer in de richting van het eerste zal zijn. Dat wil zeggen: 
FDI zal eerder leiden tot een verdere clustering van economische activiteit in de 
bestaande centra. Deze studie toont aan dat massa, dat wil zeggen marktomvang zowel 
als absorptievermogen, waarbij het laatste gedefinieerd kan worden in termen van 
geschoolde arbeid, institutionele kwaliteit en of het ontwikkelingsniveau in algemene zin, 
en nabijheid, hetzij in termen van instituties, cultuur of inkomensgerelateerde productie- 
en vraagpatronen, belangrijke drijfveren van FDI zijn. Deze factoren verklaren waarom 
FDI zich vooral afspeelt tussen ontwikkelde, rijke landen. Op grond van deze studie 
kunnen we stellen dat FDI eerder de reeds bestaande patronen van economische 
geografie volgt dan dat het deze patronen verandert of zelf een nieuwe geografie 
vormgeeft. Dit impliceert tevens dat het potentieel van FDI als instrument om de 
inkomensachterstand van ontwikkelingslanden te verminderen beperkt is (zie hieronder).   
 
Beleidsimplicaties 
Vanuit beleidsperspectief onderstrepen de resultaten van deze studie het belang van 
investeringen in scholing en goede instituties voor het aantrekken van FDI. Opleiding en 
instituties zijn door mensen ingesteld en kunnen daarmee tot uitgangspunt van beleid 
worden gemaakt. Goede instituties en een hoogopgeleide beroepsbevolking verhogen de 
instroom van FDI en daarmee de mogelijkheid om te profiteren van de voordelen van 
FDI. FDI kan een direct effect op de welvaart in het bestemmingsland hebben door het 
niveau van investeringen te verhogen. Daarnaast wordt FDI vaak beschouwd als een 
middel van technologieoverdracht. Voor de meeste landen geldt dat buitenlandse 
technologie de belangrijkste bron van productiviteitsgroei is. Directe of indirecte 
interactie met bedrijven uit technologisch ontwikkelde landen is dan cruciaal om toegang 
te krijgen tot geavanceerdere kennis. Middels (al dan niet bewuste) kennisdiffusie naar 
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lokale bedrijven kan FDI het productiviteitsniveau in bestemmingslanden verhogen. 
Maar onze resultaten impliceren ook dat de voordelen van FDI zich waarschijnlijk 
beperken tot de ontwikkelde landen. Deze landen beschikken reeds over goede 
onderwijssystemen en de ‘juiste’ institutionele kaders. Landen die daarentegen het meest 
van FDI zouden kunnen profiteren, te weten de minst ontwikkelde landen, kunnen dit 
wellicht niet omdat ze op voorhand niet in staat zijn FDI aan te trekken. Investeringen in 
onderwijs en instituties zijn kostbaar en het duurt lang voordat ze tot verbeteringen 
leiden. Daarnaast wordt institutionele verandering in deze landen vaak geremd door 
culturele en geografische barrières (afstand, topologie en klimaat) die moeilijk te 
doorbreken zijn. Deze studie laat daarmee zien dat het potentieel van FDI als middel voor 
economische ontwikkeling in de minst ontwikkelde landen beperkt is (zie beneden).   
 Investeren in human capital is ook belangrijk voor het land van origine. Vanuit de 
bestaande theorie wordt FDI tussen twee landen met veel geschoolde arbeid veelal gezien 
als horizontale FDI. Maar onderzoek over Amerikaanse multinationals laat zien dat deze 
bedrijven bij het verplaatsen van verschillende soorten productie naar het buitenland 
(verticale FDI) gebruik van het comparatieve voordeel van het partnerland. Ze kiezen 
partnerlanden met relatief veel geschoolde arbeid in kennisintensieve sectoren en landen 
met relatief veel ongeschoolde arbeid in arbeidsintensieve sectoren. Multinationals 
zoeken bij verticale FDI relatief goedkope arbeid, maar dat betekent niet dat ze per 
definitie laaggeschoolde arbeid zoeken. Het hangt van de industrie af. Uit onderzoek van 
het Internationaal Monetair Fonds (IMF) blijkt dat de instroom van FDI in zowel 
ontwikkelde landen als ontwikkelingslanden zich veelal concentreert in kennisintensieve 
sectoren. Dit houdt in dat eventuele verticale FDI ook plaatsvindt in kennisintensieve 
sectoren. Het bewaren van een hoog opleidingsniveau (door training en onderwijs) is dus 
niet alleen van belang is voor het ontstaan van multinationals in een land, maar is tevens 
belangrijk met het oog op het behouden van hoogwaardige productie in de thuismarkt. 
Dit is vooral van belang in de toekomst. Volgens het IMF is de intensiteit van het 
verplaatsen van delen van het productieproces naar het buitenland vooralsnog gering en 
zijn het binnen de kennisintensieve sectoren vooral de minst kennisintensieve activiteiten 
die worden verplaatst. Maar met een toenemend reservoir aan geschoolde arbeiders in 
met name Azië, is er voor het Westen geen reden tot onbekommerd achteroverleunen.    
 Een derde beleidsimplicatie van deze studie, en gerelateerd aan het vorige punt, is dat 
de gevolgen van FDI voor de arbeidsmarkt in het land van origine op basis van de 
bestaande theorie wellicht onderschat worden. In het knowledge-capital model wordt FDI 
tussen twee landen met veel geschoolde arbeid veelal gezien als horizontale FDI. Bij 
horizontale FDI hebben multinationals per definitie productiefaciliteiten in het buitenland 
naast productie in de eigen thuismarkt. Maar, zoals hierboven is geschetst, het 
onderscheid tussen horizontale en verticale FDI op basis van de hoeveelheid 
hooggeschoolde arbeid die er voor nodig is, is in de praktijk wellicht niet zo scherp. Deze 
studie verwerpt het knowledge-capital model op empirische gronden. We schatten een 
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graviteitsmodel. Het graviteitsmodel maakt geen onderscheid tussen horizontale en 
verticale motieven voor FDI. Om de werkgelegenheidseffecten van FDI in het land van 
oorsprong te kunnen vaststellen moeten we voorbij het algemene model kijken. Dit 
vereist inzicht op het niveau van ondernemingen.   
 De studie besluit met een aantal suggesties voor mogelijk vervolgonderzoek. Deze 
hebben betrekking op een analyse van FDI op sectorniveau, de theoretische 
onderbouwing voor de graviteitsvergelijking voor FDI, de werkgelegenheidseffecten van 
FDI en het effect van de verschillende dimensies van afstand over tijd. 
